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Nederlandstalige samenvatting 
- Dutch Summary 
Dit proefschrift onderzoekt de verschillende aspecten van een uitgebreide 
techno-economische analyse. Sinds de introductie van telecomgerelateerde 
diensten, heeft de sector een constant snelle evolutie gekend, die vooral gedreven 
wordt door technologische vooruitgang en regulering.  
Voor netwerkplanners, ontwikkelaars van applicaties, aanbieders van diensten, 
regulatoren en producenten van apparatuur vormt deze evolutie een uitdaging 
wanneer ze strategische beslissingen moeten nemen. Techno-economische 
analyse biedt een kwantitatieve methode om deze beslissingen op te baseren. 
Techno-economie is gebaseerd op de combinatie van een uitgebreide technische 
en economische analyse. Wanneer de haalbaarheid van de uitrol van een netwerk 
onderzocht wordt, moeten de onderliggende technische factoren meegenomen 
worden om de correcte netwerkdimensionering te bekomen. Gebaseerd op dit 
gedetailleerd model kunnen dan de stuklijst voor de apparatuur, de kost van 
operationele processen en de geschatte inkomsten van alle klantensegmenten 
berekend worden. Maar als de technologie evolueert, de klantpreferenties 
wijzigen, nieuwe spelers actief worden en kostprijzen evolueren, hoe wordt dit 
gereflecteerd in de techno-economische analyse? Algemener, hoe incorporeert 
men onzekerheid, flexibiliteit, competitieve en coöperatieve interacties in deze 
analyse? 
Het is op deze vraag dat dit proefschrift een antwoord formuleert. Vertrekkende 
vanuit de bestaande techno-economische methodologie en door aanvullingen en 
oplossingen aan te reiken voor typische problemen in telecom, bieden we hier 
een brede set van tools aan om een uitgebreide techno-economische analyse uit 
te voeren. 
De eerst stap in de techno-economische analyse omvat steeds het verzamelen van 
de benodigde input, gaande van kostprijsinformatie over marktgrootte tot de 
technische paramaters van de onderzochte case. Gebaseerd op deze input worden 
daarna de gedetailleerde modellen gebouwd voor netwerkdimensionering, het 
bepalen van de stuklijst voor apparatuur en de operationele processen. Maar de 
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analyse moet ook ruimer getrokken worden, en verschillende omgevingsfactoren 
incalculeren. Welke spelers zijn er actief binnen dezelfde sector of markt? 
Moeten we rekening houden met harde concurrentie of zijn er mogelijkheden om 
samen te werken met andere spelers? Om deze analyse te voeren, brengen we 
waardenetwerkanalyse aan. Door het probleem op te splitsen in kleine 
functionele rollen en de mogelijke interacties tussen deze rollen aan te duiden, 
krijgen we inzicht in twee aspecten. De rollen zijn bouwstenen voor de latere 
kwantitatieve techno-economische modellering, terwijl de interacties 
opportuniteiten voor samenwerking of mogelijke concurrentie aanduiden. Een 
waardenetwerk voor de vaste breedbandmarkt wordt voorgesteld in dit werk, 
waarbij we verschillende niveaus van samenwerking en competitie identificeren. 
Om de kwantitatieve analyse correct uit te voeren, is het kennen van de 
objectieven van de verschillende actoren vereist. Voor de meeste actoren zijn dit 
financiële objectieven, maar binnen de telecomsector zijn ook andere spelers 
aanwezig. Overheden en regulatoren gaan voor een maximalisatie van welzijn en 
niet voor monetaire doelen. Voor de breedbandmarkt zijn dit doelen als 
betaalbare diensten, toegang voor iedereen en netwerken met een hoge snelheid. 
Om deze doelen te kwantificeren, ontwikkelen we in dit werk een 
breedbandprestatie-index. 
Maar zoals vermeld, onzekerheid, flexibiliteit en competitie zullen een invloed 
hebben op al deze objectieven. Om een techno-economische analyse uit te 
voeren, is een predictie van de toekomstige evolutie van verschillende factoren 
vereist. Hoeveel extra capaciteit zal ik nodig hebben de komende jaren om aan 
alle vraag te voldoen? En als de initiële predictie fout is, ben ik flexibel genoeg 
om snel aanpassingen te doen aan het model? Het is deze flexibiliteit die reële 
opties kwantificeren. Doorheen ons onderzoek hebben we opties in verschillende 
telecom cases geïdentificeerd en geclassificeerd, zoals de uitrol van 
sensornetwerken in een gemeente, de migratie van vaste toegangsnetwerken naar 
glasvezelnetwerken en de upgrade van bestaande core netwerken. Gebaseerd op 
het inzicht uit al deze cases hebben we een tutorial gebouwd die toelaat om 
flexibiliteit te identificeren, te modelleren en te kwantificeren via reële opties als 
uitbreiding op de bestaande techno-economische analyse. 
Daarnaast is de telecomsector een geconcentreerde sector, en dus zullen 
interacties tussen verschillende spelers vaak voorkomen. In de meeste West-
Europese landen zijn er bijvoorbeeld al verschillende breedbandnetwerken 
aanwezig, die zo goed als de volledige huishoudelijke markt bedienen. Wanneer 
een extra netwerk uitgerold wordt naast de bestaande netwerken, zal dit dus 
klanten aantrekken van deze netwerken. Er moet dus rekening gehouden worden 
met de impact van competitie met andere spelers op je eigen marktaandeel. 
Daarnaast moet ook rekening gehouden worden met de competitie tussen 
aanbiedingen van dezelfde speler. Hiervoor is in dit werk een marktmodel 
ontwikkeld die deze impact capteert, waardoor er een realistische inschatting van 
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adoptie gemaakt kan worden. Deze adoptie is de belangrijkste input voor de 
stuklijst en dimensionering die in de volgende stap van de techno-economische 
analyse bepaald wordt.  
Hoewel competitie een vaak voorkomende interactievorm is, moet er ook 
rekening gehouden worden met samenwerkingsmogelijkheden. Terwijl 
competitieve interactie een invloed heeft op het mogelijke marktaandeel en de 
inkomsten, zorgt samenwerking voor mogelijkheden tot het delen en mogelijk 
verminderen van kosten. Samenwerken tijdens de infrastructuurwerken van de 
uitrol van een ondergronds vast telecommunicatie netwerk kan tot een besparing 
van 6 tot 21% leiden, afhankelijk van de locatie waar uitgerold wordt. En 
wanneer de infrastructuur gedeeld wordt tussen verschillende spelers, worden 
niet enkel kosten verminderd, maar ook de mogelijke klantenbasis van deze 
infrastructuur verhoogd. Publiek private partnerships zijn een voorbeeld van zo’n 
samenwerkingsverband. Door gebruik te maken van slechts één netwerk wordt 
de kost duidelijk verlaagd, omdat bepaalde apparatuur niet gedupliceerd hoeft te 
worden. Daarenboven kan de totale kost ook gespreid worden over de 
gecombineerde klantenbasis van de partnership. 
Wanneer concurrentie speelt in de sector waarbinnen de techno-economische 
beslissing genomen wordt, speelt ook de interactie tussen spelers een rol, en 
kunnen verschillende strategieën een verschillende uitkomst hebben. Hiervoor 
biedt speltheorie een gepaste methodologie. Om speltheorie toepasbaar te maken 
voor gedetailleerde kwantitatieve techno-economische cases, werd binnen dit 
onderzoek een toegepast speltheoretisch model gebouwd. Dit model werd 
toegepast op verschillende cases binnen dit proefschrift, zoals de uitrol van 
draadloze en vaste toegangsnetwerken. 
Als laatste duiden we in dit proefschrift de mogelijkheden en voordelen van de 
integratie van reële opties en speltheorie aan. Beide theorieën modelleren 
verschillende aspecten van hetzelfde vraagstuk. Reële opties modelleren 
stochastische onzekerheid, in abstractie van competitieve interactie, terwijl 
speltheorie net abstractie maakt van deze onzekerheid. De combinatie van beide 
theorieën kan de soms tegengestelde uitkomsten van beide wegnemen en 
waardevol inzicht meebrengen. 
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English Summary 
This dissertation takes a close look at the various aspects of extended techno-
economic analysis. Since the introduction of telecom services, the sector has 
known a constant and rapid evolution, driven by technological advances and 
regulation. During the most recent years, the speed of this evolution has even 
increased. 
In this environment, network planners, application developers, service providers, 
equipment vendors, regulators and many more have to constantly make strategic 
decisions. Making correct decisions are of vital importance, as a wrong decision 
may force them out of the market and result in serious financial distress for the 
company. To make the correct decisions, the decision makers rely on techno-
economic analysis. 
Techno-economics focus on the analysis of different problems from both a 
technical as economic point of view. For any network rollout, a clear view on the 
technical solution, its requirements and limitations and the cost-benefit related 
economic aspects is required. Based on the detailed modelling of the bill of 
material, operational processes and revenues, the project is assessed on its 
viability. However, due to the constant change in the environment, the standard 
techno-economic tools fail to correctly incorporate this underlying environment. 
How to measure competition, value uncertainty and flexibility and address 
possible changing competitive or cooperative interactions with other players?  
This dissertation provides an answer to these questions. By describing existing 
methodologies and developing new approaches to typical problems, we offer a 
broad toolset for an extended techno-economic evaluation.  
The first step in any techno-economic analysis is gathering sufficient input. This 
step is required for building a detailed bill of material, cost models on the 
equipment and processes, but also on the environment. Which other actors are 
present, what is the level of competition we can expect, are there opportunities 
for cooperation with other actors? Value network analysis is particularly suited 
for providing an answer to these questions. It splits up the environment in roles, 
which can serve as input for the cost modelling. Indicating the interactions 
between these roles and mapping the actors offers valuable insight in possible 
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competitive or cooperative relations. By performing such an analysis on the 
broadband access network, we were able to identify different levels of 
competition and cooperation between players, going from vertical integration to 
open access.  
The next requirement is knowing your objectives. One cannot assess a decision 
to be good or bad without knowing the intended objective. For private players, 
these objectives are mainly related to financial goals in terms of monetary value, 
market share, etc. For public players, the exercise is less straightforward. Public 
players, like governments and regulators, do not primarily aim at the increase of 
their own monetary value, but at so-called social welfare. On the broadband 
access market, they strive for affordable access, full coverage, sufficient 
competition, etc. In this work, we introduce a composite index which allows to 
quantify these broadband policy objectives. 
However, the aforementioned aspects, uncertainty, flexibility and competition, 
will most likely impact these objectives. The quality of the result of a techno-
economic analysis is only as good as the quality of the used input data. An 
assessment of a techno-economic problem requires a prediction of future 
evolutions of certain parameters. How will my market share evolve, what is the 
estimated cost evolution of certain components? Although uncertainty 
surrounding these parameters will impact the outcome of the case, decision 
makers will flexibly adapt to changing conditions. In case uptake is higher than 
expected, the service can be extended to new regions. It is the value of this 
flexibility that real options capture. Throughout our research, we have applied 
real option thinking to various telecom infrastructure cases. The different 
migration paths towards future core networks were studied, as well as the 
deployment of sensor networks. In case of fixed broadband access networks, we 
showed how incremental planning, starting of small and gradually growing 
following demand is the designated strategy. Based on our insights from 
different cases, we developed a tutorial presenting a four-step methodology on 
how to apply real option thinking in telecom infrastructure investments. 
In a concentrated environment like the telecom sector, interactions with other 
market players will occur, and these will impact the objectives aimed for. In 
typical Western European cities, (copper-based) fixed broadband infrastructures 
are already present. In addition, the market is already close to saturation. If a 
fibre-based access network is deployed in these areas, the presence of other 
infrastructures will impact the uptake of the new network. This market share 
impact of competitors should be taken into account in the techno-economic 
analysis. A market response model was developed, allowing to estimate market 
share evolution of different offers, based on prices, elasticity and churn concepts. 
Applying such a market response model allows to adequately estimate the 
evolution of the market share of competing broadband offers. 
xxv 
Although competition is mainly focussed on, cooperation between players offers 
important opportunities for actors. Through cooperation, synergies can be 
gained. We studied cooperation in the deployment phase of physical 
infrastructure, and found cost savings of up to 15% in the initial deployment 
cost. Next to cooperation to achieve cost savings, cooperation can also be a result 
of the search towards increasing customer base. Public private partnerships are 
an example of such a cooperation strategy. By cooperating in the rollout of 
network infrastructure, a partnership achieves two goals. First, as only one 
infrastructure is deployed, no duplication takes place. Secondly, with only one 
network present, the customer base of this network is doubled compared to two 
independent rollouts. 
In light of the impact of competition on market share and cost savings through 
cooperation, it needs to be assessed which strategy is to be preferred, taking into 
account that competitors have similar strategies. Here, game theory provides a 
suitable framework. In order to evaluate competitive interaction between 
different detailed techno-economic models, we developed a hands-on game 
theory framework. Again, we applied this framework to the case of access 
network rollout. 
Finally, we indicate the opportunities of having an integrated option – game 
approach. As these concepts can sometimes result in conflicting outcomes, 
analysing their combined effect can provide valuable insight. 
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Introduction and Publications 
 “Economy does not lie in sparing money, but in spending it wisely”, 
Thomas Huxley 
The telecommunication sector is characterised by a constant and rapid evolution. 
Mobile telephony evolution from Global System for Mobile Communication 
(GSM) towards Third Generation (3G) and Long Term Evolution (LTE), the 
increasing fixed broadband access network speed through technology updates 
with different types of Digital Subscriber Line (xDSL) and Fibre To The Home 
(FTTH) and the still ongoing development of new applications are only a few 
examples. These fast technology changes bring important problems for the actors 
on the telecommunication market when investment opportunities are considered. 
The rollout of new access networks typically covers large areas and longer time 
spans. The operator can flexibly change his rollout plan according to the 
evolution of the uptake of the new network. Under high demand, the network can 
be expanded faster towards adjacent regions. Or the operator can gradually 
upgrade the offered access speeds, based on technological evolution and demand. 
However, additional aspects need to be taken into account. Regulation can 
impact the required dimensioning. The requirement to offer open access to third 
parties has an impact on the bill of material and the operational processes. 
Secondly, the network or service is operated in an open environment. When a 
new access network is rolled out, there will be competition with existing 
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networks. As this impacts the expected uptake, it is also reflected in the initial 
dimensioning. 
For private companies, projects are approved or disapproved after a thorough 
techno-economic feasibility analysis. During this analysis, one should estimate 
future user adoption, conduct an equipment dimensioning, calculate the bill of 
material and model the operational processes, translate these into the cost 
structure, revenues and the risks attached to the project. Only when this analysis 
shows that the project is economically interesting, the project should be 
executed. The most known and used tool is the Net Present Value (NPV) 
analysis. This method gives a good indication about the economic feasibility of 
the project, but the underlying assumptions of the model are no longer consistent 
with the reality actors are confronted with today.  
The NPV method handles investment decisions as now or never decisions. In a 
closed environment, where the future evolution of most parameters is known in 
advance, such an approach is indeed appropriate. However, the reality has 
changed significantly over the last decades. Actors in the telecom sector no 
longer operate in a closed environment. Until the liberalisation of the 1990s in 
Europe, most operators were historic natural monopolies. But after this 
liberalisation of the market, new entrants appeared, increasing the level of 
competition. Making investment decisions should now be made in light of these  
possible competitive reactions. Adapting your own strategy can (and most likely 
will) impact the strategy of your direct competitors. An investment decision is 
made in order to increase value. However, competitive or cooperative 
interactions typically impact the possible value creation of your competitors. 
When your value increase churns on the value of your competitors, reciprocating 
actions by these competitors will occur, as they aim at maximising their own 
value as well. Attracting a higher market share results in a decrease of revenues 
for competitors, who will react and try to regain their lost customers and their 
revenues. A well-known example of such interaction is a price war, where all 
companies decrease their prices to defend their market share. As a result, the 
market division stays the same, but the overall price level dropped, decreasing 
the profit of all competitors. In this dissertation, we will hand tools to assess the 
impact of competition on market division, and introduce a hands-on game 
theoretic approach to model competitive interactions. Game theory is a very 
useful tool to assess competition, as its main goal is to model those situations in 
which decision makers make actions that have possibly conflicting 
consequences. 
While assessing these competitive interactions already increases the difficulty of 
making good investment decisions, a second factor complicating the process is 
the uncertainty surrounding the future evolutions. When launching a new product 
or service, several assumptions, e.g. customer uptake or technology evolution 
and performance, come with a certain degree of uncertainty. Regarding customer 
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uptake, market research can offer an indication of the market potential evolution. 
But although such prognoses offer an indication for the initial uptake, the further 
in the future, the higher the uncertainty on this estimation. Consumer taste can 
change, a technological breakthrough can make the product redundant, or cost 
evolutions can make the product unprofitable. These uncertainties should be 
taken into account when making the investment decision.  
In reality, when the environment changes, the decision makers will adapt the 
project to counter these changes. Under an unfavourable evolution, the company 
can decide to stop the sale of the product or service. In the telecom market, the 
withdrawal of the Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) service is an 
example of such a decision. Decision makers have considerable flexibility to 
counter unexpected changes in the environment. And this is where the NPV 
method falls short, as it tackles investment problems as now or never decisions, 
which cannot be turned back or adapted. As a solution to this drawback, real 
option theory has been developed. We will indicate why this theory is the 
designated approach for the analysis of large investment projects, as it manages 
to take both uncertainty and flexibility into account. 
The application of the NPV method, or its different extensions developed 
throughout this dissertation, focuses primarily on the analysis of future cash 
flows. As such, it lacks the possibility to assess the impact of investment or 
strategic decisions on the other goals of decision makers. For example, in the 
European telecom market, the European Commission and National Regulatory 
Authorities continue to monitor the evolution of this market. On the fixed 
broadband market, they aim at increasing the coverage and penetration of high 
speed broadband, the uptake of broadband based services, at reducing price 
levels and promoting competition on the retail market. When new regulation or 
policy is issued, it should be tested if it has the desired effect. This effect can no 
longer be measured through financial tools like the NPV analysis. The question 
thus arises how the impact of policy and regulation on different, sometimes 
inversely proportional parameters, can be captured in a quantitative approach. By 
introducing a composite broadband performance index in this work, we will 
indicate how other goals can be analysed in an extended techno-economic 
analysis. 
1.1 Overview of This Work 
In this dissertation, a general overview of the aspects of performing an extended 
techno-economic analysis is given, focussing on the application of the different 
frameworks on fixed and mobile broadband network deployment. The most 
important results obtained during the course of our research in this field are 
presented in this work. A complete list of all publications realised is given in 
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section 1.2. An overview of the different chapters is given below, linking these 
chapters with the related publications. 
In Chapter 2, we start by providing a clear motivation for extended techno-
economic analysis. We delve deeper into two factors complicating the analysis, 
uncertainty and competitive interaction. After a description of the standard 
techno-economic analysis, we indicate in more detail the shortcomings of this 
methodology and how the two complicating factors are related to these 
shortcomings. We also touch the requirement for measuring non-financial 
aspects in techno-economics. The chapter concludes with a description of a case 
study, which will be used and referred to throughout this dissertation, the 
deployment of a fixed broadband access network. Techno-economic analysis and 
the proposed extensions are best explained by showing how they impact a 
detailed numerical example. In more detail, the case studies the migration of 
existing broadband access networks towards FTTH networks. Based on network 
topology, equipment dimensioning and customer uptake, it estimates the viability 
of such a deployment. The selected example touches two flavours of fixed 
broadband network deployment, a Brownfield and Greenfield rollout. In the 
Greenfield rollout, the deployment is started from scratch, while in the case of a 
Brownfield deployment, there is already an existing network present, allowing 
for a migration strategy towards faster broadband of this network. The selected 
case has been elaborated on in several publications ([4], [7] and [17]).  
The case is well suited to indicate the impact of uncertainty, flexibility and 
competition on the techno-economic analysis. Upgrading a fixed access network 
towards higher capacities is bound to several factors of uncertainty. Expected 
uptake is one of the major uncertainties. How much additional capacity is 
required to meet customer demand? What are the different technology options 
available to meet this demand? The operator could provide additional capacity 
by duplicating equipment, but a migration towards a more performing network 
technology is also possible. But since demand only comes gradually, the decision 
does not need to be made today, but can be postponed until the initial installation 
reaches its capacity limits.  
The impact of competition is also covered in the case. Several access networks 
are already installed today offering broadband access. Deploying a new network 
or upgrading an existing one will impact the competitive equilibrium. As higher 
access speeds can be offered, how much more customers will be attracted to the 
network, and how does this impact the required equipment and operational 
processes? And what are the possible counterstrategies of our competitors. Do 
they have the possibility to perform a network upgrade as well to offer higher 
access speeds? 
Performing an extended techno-economic analysis requires a clear view on the 
environment in which the studied case is set. Chapter 3 provides methods to 
analyse this environment. Multi-actor analysis is introduced as a methodology to 
Introduction and Publications 5 
identify the different actors and their interactions. These actors perform different 
roles, the basic building blocks of a value network. A multi-actor analysis is 
performed for two different cases, the introduction of smart energy meters and 
the rollout of a fixed broadband access network ([7], [13], [16]).  
Once the different actors and roles are identified, a quantitative techno-economic 
analysis is only possible if the objectives of the actors are well known. The 
second part of Chapter 3 handles this aspect. A distinction is made between 
financial and non-financial objectives. In techno-economics, financial objectives 
are typically measured through NPV or other cash flow based methods. Non-
financial objectives pose more problems, as the quantification of such goals is 
not straightforward, especially if multiple conflicting goals are present. In case of 
broadband access networks, national regulatory authorities (NRA) have such 
non-financial goals. They aim at increasing coverage, speed and competition and 
attaining acceptable price levels. To measure these objectives, we developed a 
composite broadband performance index ([18], [21]). 
Chapter 4 discusses the impact of the first complicating factor in techno-
economic analysis, namely uncertainty and how decision makers can react to 
this. Real option analysis has been selected as designated approach to quantify 
these aspects. During our research, we have applied real options to a variety of 
cases, resulting in a tutorial for telecom professionals on how to apply real option 
analysis in their decision process [3]. These cases cover the migration to FTTH 
networks, but also deployment of sensor networks, core network migration and 
even pricing aspects of local loop unbundling. The different cases real options 
have been applied to are described in several publications ([2], [8], [10], [17], 
[19], [20]). 
Chapter 5 focuses on the impact of competition on techno-economic analysis, 
more specifically on market interactions. Two types of market interaction are 
discussed, competition and cooperation. The influence of competition on the 
outcome of a techno-economic analysis cannot be overestimated. Customers are 
the main driver for both revenues and variable costs. As the number of customers 
in any market is limited, competitive interaction will influence the attained 
market share of all players. A market response model was developed during this 
research to model market share evolution over time ([5]). 
However, cooperation models are as important as competition in techno-
economics. Actors cooperate to develop technology standards through various 
associations and alliances. In addition, cooperation also aims at cost sharing 
possibilities. In large infrastructure rollouts, synergies during the outside plant 
deployment can be gained, as described in [3] and [12]. 
In Chapter 6, game theory is introduced as a methodology to capture competitive 
and cooperative interaction in techno-economic analysis. Game theory is an 
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established field, offering various concepts for selecting equilibria
1
, the expected 
outcome of competition. Despite the broad toolset game theory offers, it has not 
penetrated into techno-economics, and especially not in business case analysis. 
In this chapter, we present a hands-on game theory approach, suited for extended 
techno-economic analysis. We have developed a framework implementing this 
approach, which was used in different publications ([1], [9]). 
Chapter 7 combines the option thinking from Chapter 4 with the game theory 
approach from Chapter 6. Two main approaches are described, option games and 
sensitivity games. We elaborate on a toy example to describe the option game 
methodology. Sensitivity games are the first step towards extending the hands-on 
game theory approach we developed in Chapter 6 with the concepts of real 
options. A typical game is extended with underlying uncertainty, to assess how 
this uncertainty impacts the outcome. To move towards a real option extension 
of the hands-on approach, a move towards continuous flexible games is required. 
These extensions are qualitatively introduced as a part of future work. 
This dissertation is concluded with a short overview of the work and its results, 
together with a general conclusion. We also link back to the topics for future 
work identified. 
  
                                                          
1 An equilibrium is a state in which competing influences are balanced. In scope of this 
dissertation, equilibrium refers to the equilibrium concepts of game theory. In game 
theory, different equilibrium concepts exist. Two definitions will be applied throughout 
the dissertation, namely a state in which no player can gain by unilaterally changing its 
strategy (Nash) and a state in which no player can gain without decreasing the gain for 
any other player (Pareto). 
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1.2 Publications 
The results of our work are disseminated in several papers published in 
international journals and presented on international conferences. Below an 
overview is given of all publications realised during the course of this research. 
1.2.1 A1 Publications 
Referenced in the Science Citation Index 
[1] Tahon, M., Lannoo, B., Van Ooteghem, J., Casier, K., Verbrugge, S., 
Colle, D., Pickavet, M., et al. “Municipal support of wireless access 
network rollout: A game theoretic approach.” Telecommunications 
Policy, 35(9-10), 883–894. doi:10.1016/j.telpol.2011.06.007, November 
2011 
[2] Tahon, M., Van Ooteghem, J., Casier, K., Verbrugge, S., Colle, D., 
Pickavet, M., & Demeester, P.  “Improving the FTTH business case - a 
joint telco-utility network rollout model.” accepted for publication in 
Telecommunications Policy 
[3] Tahon, M., Verbrugge, S., Colle, D., Pickavet, M., Demeester, P., 
Wright, P., & Lord, A., “Valuing Flexibility in the Migration to Flexgrid 
Networks”, Journal of Optical Communications and Networking 
(JOCN), 5(10), A184-A191 
[4] Tahon, M., Verbrugge, S., Willis, P.J., Botham, P., Colle, D., Pickavet, 
M., & Demeester, P. “Real Options in Telecom Infrastructure Projects – 
A Tutorial”, accepted for publication in IEEE Communications: Surveys 
and Tutorials 
[5] Tahon, M., Casier, K., Verbrugge, S., Colle, D., Pickavet, M., & 
Demeester, P. “Market Response Modelling under Competition: A 
Modular Approach”, submitted to The Engineering Economist 
[6] Vannieuwenborg, F., Tahon, M., Verbrugge, S., Pickavet, M., & Colle, 
D. "Deploying charging infrastructure for electric vehicles; viability 
analyses for municipal and private car parking facility operators", 
submitted to European Journal of Transport and Infrastructure Research 
[7] Van der Wee, M., Verbrugge, S., Tahon, M., Colle, D., & Pickavet, M., 
“Evaluation of the techno-economic viability of fiber access 
infrastructure deployment in Europe”, submitted to Journal of Optical 
Communications and Networking (JOCN) 
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1.2.2 P1 Publications  
Referenced in Conf. Proc. Citation Index 
[8] Casier, K., Tahon, M., Bilal, M., Verbrugge, S., Colle, D., Pickavet, M., 
& Demeester, P. (2010). Estimating the economic value of flexibility in 
access network unbundling. NETWORKING 2010 (pp. 362–372). 
Springer. 
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1.2.3 Other Publications 
[9] Lannoo, B., Tahon, M., Van Ooteghem, J., Pareit, D., Casier, K., 
Verbrugge, S., Moerman, I., et al. (2009). Game-theoretic evaluation of 
competing wireless access networks for offering Mobile Internet. 
Competition and Regulation in Network Industries, 2nd Annual 
conference, Proceedings. 
[10] Tahon, M., Verbrugge, S., Lannoo, B., Van Ooteghem, J., De Mil, P., 
Pickavet, M., & Demeester, P. (2010). Parking sensor network: 
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2 
The Need for Extended Modelling 
Techniques in Techno-Economics 
 
 “Years ago, I noticed one thing about economics, and that is that 
economists didn’t get anything right”, Nassim Nicholas Taleb 
The focus of this dissertation is on the requirement for advanced evaluation 
techniques for techno-economic analysis. Two main reasons can be identified in 
the current economic environment to motivate this need, namely uncertainty and 
competition. 
Following this introduction, this chapter will provide the necessary background 
on the standard techno-economic analysis methodology, indicating why it fails at 
capturing the impact of uncertainty and competition. As a result, the main 
research questions addressed in this dissertation will be introduced, with a link to 
the identified solutions, which will be tackled in later chapters of this work.  
In order to indicate the need for advanced techniques and the methodologies 
proposed in this work, a case study will be covered in this chapter. The 
considered case studies the migration towards Fibre to the Home (FTTH) access 
networks. Every following chapter will link back to this case to indicate the 
impact of the different methodologies and tools offered. 
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2.1 Uncertainty and competition in the environment 
The first reason motivating the need for advanced evaluation techniques is the 
constant and rapid evolution in the telecom sector, clustered with the doubt 
surrounding future economic growth. This increases the uncertainty of the 
environment in which companies make investment decisions. Several real-life 
examples reflect this uncertainty. The financial crisis has reduced the consumer 
confidence, resulting in a decrease in consumption by these consumers. As a 
result, turnover growth rates have decreased. Another example is linked to the 
ongoing technological evolution in the mobile phone sector. Cell phones have 
evolved from portable phones to handheld computer devices, allowing users to 
be connected everywhere, every time. This evolution is reflected in the market 
evolution during the past decade. While Nokia has been the largest mobile phone 
producer from 1998 to 2011, Samsung has overtaken them in 2012. The main 
cause is the small market share of Nokia on the smart phone market, where 
Google (Android) and Apple (iOS) dominate. In this smart phone market, 
Nokia’s market share is not even in the top five. In the overall mobile phone 
market, Nokia’s share has been steadily dropping to 15%. Linked to the 
evolution of devices, customers require an ever increasing bandwidth. The first 
mobile phones were only used for voice communication. The Global System for 
Mobile Communication (GSM) standard describes the protocols for second 
generation digital cellular networks. As data communication became more 
important, new standards were developed, leading to third (3G) and even fourth 
generation (4G) protocols. Long Term Evolution (LTE) already offers a peak 
download data rate of 100Mbit/s, while LTE Advanced can handle data rates up 
to 1 Gbit/s. Another source of technological uncertainty is linked with the 
performance of new technologies and equipment. Achieved speeds of wireless 
technologies are impacted by several environmental factors. Attenuation of 
signal strength is impacted by line of sight, physical obstacles like walls and 
interference with other technologies. And how is such uncertainty handled when 
planning and dimensioning the network? 
Next to general economic environment and technological evolution, a third 
uncertainty driver is regulation. Regulatory regimes can have a large impact on 
the initial viability assessment of business cases, but this regime can also change 
significantly during the project lifetime. For example, in Brussels, the 
government has decided to only allow antennas with a electromagnetic field up 
to 3 volt per meter. In addition, in a radius of 200 meter around the antenna, only 
1.5 volt per meter is permitted. As regulation impacts the technology modelling, 
resulting in the requirement to install a denser mobile network, this increases the 
costs and thus reduces the viability of a 4G network deployment by a mobile 
network operator in the capital of Belgium. As spectrum licences have already 
been acquired for a larger geographic area, this regulation in turn reduces the 
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economic viability of the 4G spectrum investment. In the fixed broadband 
market, European National Regulatory Authorities (NRA) have implemented 
two aspects concerning local loop access. First, incumbents must provide access 
to their local loop to other licensed operators. Providing such access requires the 
installation of extra equipment in the central offices and results in extra 
operational processes when customers are connected or migrated. Secondly, 
price caps for this access to the local loop were introduced. New entrants pay a 
fixed monthly rental fee per customer to get access to the network of the 
incumbent. By enforcing such prices, regulation clearly impacts the profitability 
of both the incumbent’s and new entrant’s business case. 
The second motivation is the continuing trend in market structure. As a result 
from the liberalisation in Western economies, only few industries remain 
protected. All other sectors are characterised by competition between different 
companies. Two examples of such sectors are the energy and telecom market, 
which have undergone significant liberalisation in the last two decades [2.1]. In 
the European energy market, former monopolies have been opened up to new, 
possibly foreign entrants. Today, consumers can purchase energy from different 
suppliers, those suppliers can buy their energy on a market where different 
producers offer energy. Only the transport and distribution networks remain a 
natural monopoly. However, by splitting the previously vertical integrated 
providers, extra operational processes are now required, e.g. in the case of 
billing, customer migration, etc. In the telecom market, a similar trend has 
occurred. In the 1990s, the former incumbents have lost their monopoly on voice 
and data transmission, increasing the dynamism, uncertainty and competition. At 
the same time, other sectors previously populated with multiple firms have 
noticed a trend of continuous consolidation, resulting in oligopolistic markets.  
These two aspects can be categorised as increased uncertainty and competition. 
Within this environment, companies need to make investment decisions, taking 
into account that whatever they decide; the outcome of the investment project is 
subject to a lot of uncertainty and might trigger competitive reaction. Cost 
evolution and customer preference are only two aspects impacting the outcome. 
In addition, within the concentrated market, the company needs to take into 
account the effect of their decision on its competitors, and possible reciprocal 
actions. Price wars are just one example of such competitive interaction. One 
firm decides to lower its price in order to attract a higher market share, churning 
customers from competition. However, when competitors observe this effect, 
they lower their prices as well. With such dynamics, a vicious circle can occur, 
where companies continue to lower their prices, up to the level of their marginal 
production cost. As a result, some firms will be forced out of the market, as they 
can no longer generate profit, while the remaining firms operate at very low or 
even zero profit margins. 
14  Chapter 2 
 
However, competition is not the only possible market interaction. In a 
concentrated industry, cooperation models emerge as well. While overt and tacit 
collusion are forbidden, firms can cooperate in order to gain competitive 
advantage. This can be by striving for cost reductions, but also in search of new 
standards. In case of the development of the successor of the DVD format, 
different industry players cooperated in the Blue-Ray disc Association. Other 
examples are 3GPP and the Wi-Fi Alliance. In case of Wi-Fi, early Wi-Fi 
(802.11) suffered from interoperability problems. As a result of a compromise in 
the standardisation process, two incompatible modulation options were provided. 
A group of vendors founded the Wireless Ethernet Compatibility Alliance (later 
the Wi-Fi Alliance) to resolve this issue and promote their preferred option. They 
set up the testing and certification under the Wi-Fi certification logo [2.2]. 
When operating in this environment, companies face two challenges in managing 
these aspects. The first one links to uncertainty surrounding future evolutions. 
Following your gut feeling tells you it is better to remain flexible to react to 
unforeseen changes, than to commit all your resources into a do-or-die decision. 
In a static environment, the latter would be without risk, but with fast and 
unpredictable changes, the former is the most interesting. Committing without 
flexibility to change comes with high risk. As a result, in every investment 
decision, it should always be checked if you can react flexibly to a changing 
environment. In absence of competition, it is better to wait with the investment 
until no more uncertainty remains. 
The second challenge is managing competition, and more specifically, gaining 
and maintaining a competitive advantage. In this case, gaining a first mover 
advantage is typically the key to gain the advantage. When moving first, the 
company cam pre-empt competition. Research and Development (R&D) efforts 
in order to obtain patents or the purchase of a wireless spectrum licence fit under 
gaining such a competitive advantage. However, the decision to make the 
investment in R&D or in licences must thus be made under a large amount of 
uncertainty. The chances of R&D in resulting in the discovery of new medicine 
are small, and a wireless license is acquired before introduction of the new 
service, thus resulting in a large uncertainty on the potential customer uptake and 
the related revenues, or even on the performance of the new technology in the 
field. 
As a result, companies operating in the current environment are constantly 
balancing these two opposite ideas. They want to remain as flexible as possible, 
postponing investment until the uncertainty clears, and trying to move as fast as 
possible to keep ahead of their competitors. Translating these two concepts so 
they are reflected in the project valuation is a main question arising today. 
Traditionally, such valuations are conducted through a techno-economic 
analysis. 
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A typical techno-economic analysis consists of modelling cost and revenue 
predictions. The modelling is based on a clear understanding of the underlying 
technologies, hence techno-economics. Performing a techno-economic analysis 
of the deployment of a mobile broadband access network (e.g. 4G) requires 
insight in the provided data rates, cell capacities, impact of line of sight, etc. 
From this modelling, an interpretation of the economic viability of the project 
can be made. However, this approach can only be followed when the actor 
conducting the project has financial objectives. In reality, actors have additional 
non-financial objectives. Or even no financial objectives at all, e.g. regulators. 
More background on players and their objectives can be found in Chapter 3. 
2.2 Standard techno-economic approach 
All investment problems are economically assessed before they are started. In 
general, this analysis consists of obtaining a clear view on the underlying 
technology, predicting the future incoming and outgoing cash flows of the 
investment project for each discrete time period, discounting them with an 
appropriate discount factor and then adding them to come to the Net Present 
Value (NPV) (eq. 2.1) [2.3]. When this NPV is positive, the project is assessed 
as profitable and the project is executed. This is the approach typically followed 
by network planners. We refer to Section 3.5.1 for an in-depth discussion of 
NPV. 
 
 
     
   
      
 
   
 (2.1) 
2.2.1 Techno-economic methodology 
In [2.4], Verbrugge et al. introduced their techno-economic methodology (Figure 
2-1). The approach consists of four steps, covering all required aspects in the 
analysis, going from identifying and delineating the problem, over modelling of 
the different sub-problems to economic evaluation with possible extensions. We 
refer to their work for a detailed description. This methodology will be applied to 
analyse the case study in Section 2.3. 
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Figure 2-1: Techno-economic analysis methodology [2.4].  
 
The first step is scoping the problem and it consists of three phases. To start an 
economic evaluation, all necessary data needs to be collected. This includes 
information about the targeted area, the market situation and the technologies 
that can be used. In the second phase, the problem as a whole is divided into 
smaller, more manageable problems. The targeted area is divided in smaller 
areas, and users are put in target groups. In addition to that, the services offered 
are discussed, and cost and revenue impact factors are summed up. In the last 
phase of planning, the input data collected from the previous steps is processed. 
Business modelling, technical design and user adoption are covered. Already in 
this first step, the impact of uncertainty, flexibility and competition comes into 
play. How correct is the gathered input data on user adoption and technical 
parameters like data rates? In addition, if two technical designs are compared, 
they will differ in the amount of flexibility they offer towards future migration. A 
Fibre to the Cabinet (FTTC) network using Very high speed digital Subscriber 
Line (VDSL) can offer comparable data rates as a Hybrid Fibre Coax (HFC) 
network using DOCSIS 3.0 or a point-to-multipoint FTTH network, but the 
upgrade possibilities of each physical infrastructure and network technology 
differ. 
In the modelling step, using all the input data from the planning step, the costs 
and revenues structures are developed. Both capital expenditures (CapEx) and 
operational expenditures (OpEx) are considered. Top-down and bottom-up 
approaches are possible. The modelling performed here will be impacted by the 
additions proposed to the first step. Uncertainty in customer adoption impacts the 
modelling of the required equipment through the bill of material. Is spare 
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capacity provided to host all households in an area or is only a partial rollout 
performed. In the first case, sufficient capacity is present in all cases, but this 
obviously comes at a higher initial cost compared to the second option. In the 
second case, capacity could run out, requiring the operator to provision for 
flexible extensions of the initial installation. 
In the evaluation step, the economic evaluation is carried out. The standard 
method to evaluate financial feasibility is the NPV analysis. This figure gives a 
first indication of the financial feasibility of the project. When multiple actors are 
present in the value network, a NPV calculation needs to be performed for each 
one of them. The total NPV of the project is then equal to the sum of the 
individual NPVs. 
In the fourth step, the initial analysis is refined. This refinement is driven by the 
several shortcomings of the NPV analysis to reflect the underlying challenges 
and opportunities the technical design and the environment offers. The main 
focus of this dissertation is on the various refinements possible in techno-
economic analysis. The topics investigated in this dissertation and their relation 
with the techno-economic analysis are indicated in Figure 2-2. We discuss the 
driving factors for these refinements and their solutions in the next section. 
 
 
Figure 2-2: Investigated topics and their relation with the techno-economic 
analysis methodology 
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2.2.2 Shortcomings of NPV methodology 
Conducting a standard NPV analysis can yield unintuitive results, both in light of 
uncertainty and competition. These unintuitive results are linked to the two main 
drawbacks of the NPV analysis. 
2.2.2.a Measuring uncertainty and flexibility 
In an NPV analysis, the future cash flows of the investment are projected. In this 
cash flow projection, several assumptions on future evolutions are made, but 
they are assumed certain. In reality, this assumption does not hold. When the 
required equipment is dimensioned for the rollout of a Fibre to the Cabinet 
network, several aspects are driven by the number of customers. A street cabinet 
can only host x cards, each card can only host y users, etc. However, this number 
of customers comes with a certain degree of uncertainty and is impacted by the 
level of competition with other installed infrastructures. In addition, it will differ 
between several regions. Business areas could for example require more 
connections compared to rural ones.  
Secondly, the project path used in the NPV analysis is considered fixed. Once 
the decision to invest is made, no deviation from the initial project path is 
possible. Again, in any business environment, such an assumption does not 
reflect reality. In case of the FTTC network, the initial street cabinet could reach 
full capacity, e.g. due to an underestimate of the customer uptake. Once this 
happens, the operator can install extra capacity, or even upgrade its network.  
As such, it can be stated that the NPV analysis does not indicate the impact of 
uncertainty and flexibility on the analysis. However, it still remains the most 
widely used tool to assess investment viability. 
Although the standard NPV analysis suffers from these serious drawbacks, 
extensions to this method have been proposed to tackle these problems. In order 
to include the impact of uncertainty on the analysis, two extensions have been 
proposed, namely the scenario analysis and the sensitivity analysis. In a scenario 
analysis, the investment project is assessed in a small number of possible 
scenarios. While NPV analysis offers only one view on the future, scenario 
analysis compares several alternative futures. For instance, an application 
provider could compare a scenario of low, normal and high customer uptake and 
how this impacts the required equipment. A scenario analysis approach can also 
consist of comparing different investment projects to assess them based on 
economic feasibility. Scenario analysis has been applied to different cases in 
telecommunication research [2.5], [2.6].  
The second extension is the sensitivity analysis [2.7]. While a scenario analysis 
only studies a few possible scenarios, the sensitivity analysis studies the impact 
of uncertainty in the input factors on the output of the analysis. In a scenario 
analysis, the input values only take some discrete scenario-dependent values, like 
low and high market potential. In the sensitivity analysis, this input is extended 
with a statistical uncertainty distribution. It allows one to systematically change 
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variables in the model to determine the effects on the final result. In techno-
economic research within telecoms, the sensitivity analysis has been used in 
different papers [2.6], [2.8], [2.9]. 
While incorporating uncertainty in the analysis might still be a straightforward 
exercise, flexibility cannot be handled as intuitively [2.10], [2.11]. In NPV 
analysis, the project is seen as a now or never decision, with no possibilities for 
the decision makers to alter the project during its lifetime. In a realistic business 
case, this condition is not fulfilled. Real Option (RO) Theory has been 
formulated to capture the value of managerial flexibility in practical cases. In 
addition, the concepts offered by this theory make it also of great value for non-
financial specialists, as it helps to identify and catalogue intuitive notions of 
flexible design. The concepts of RO are introduced in Chapter 4. 
2.2.2.b Measuring competitive and cooperative interaction 
The second drawback of the NPV analysis is the lack of possibilities to 
incorporate competitive and cooperative interaction. When conducting the 
analysis, the decision maker has to define the future cash flows. However, once 
the project is conducted, there might be an impact on the market equilibrium, 
resulting in counteractions by competitors. Two aspects come into play here. 
Take the example of the introduction of a new fixed broadband service offer in 
an already saturated market. The only way this offer can gain market share is by 
churning on the market share of the other existing offers. When conducting the 
techno-economic analysis, it is thus required to be able to model the future 
adoption evolution under competition. More information on market modelling 
can be found in Chapter 5. 
Secondly, competitors might counteract, and these counteractions can impact the 
viability of the initial strategy, and it could be that another strategy was better 
chosen at the beginning. Note that such counteractions can also consist of 
cooperative actions. In order to model such behaviour, it is required to estimate 
the viability of different strategies under different competitive or cooperative 
counter strategies. In this case, the strategy resulting in the highest payoff might 
never be reached, as competitors will not choose the strategy maximising your 
payoff. Here, more advanced tools are required to find the strategy and the 
resulting payoff. Game Theory (GT) methodology provides such a toolset, and is 
described in detail in Chapter 6. 
2.2.3 Other issues in techno-economic analysis 
Up to now, it was assumed that decision makers had one objective, value 
creation, which is measured in financial terms, typically through NPV. However, 
value maximisation is not always the sole goal. Private players have other 
objectives next to the financial ones. Market share, customer satisfaction or 
operational excellence are just a few of these objectives. In case of public 
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players, financial objectives can be absent altogether. In broadband networks, the 
goal of regulators is sufficient competition on the market, large penetration, high 
bandwidths, etc. 
In a multi-objective environment, these – sometimes – conflicting goals increase 
the complexity of the analysis. A correct quantification of these objectives is 
therefore important for a more realistic techno-economic analysis. This issue will 
be tackled in the next chapter. 
2.3 Case – the deployment of a fixed broadband 
access network 
Techno-economics focuses on the analysis of investment problems, taking into 
account both the technical background as the economic implications of the 
problem. Throughout the previous sections, we already referred to various 
telecom related examples in which uncertainty, flexibility and competition 
played an important role. To indicate how the different extensions to this 
analysis discussed in this dissertations work in practice, we will apply them to a 
case study, the rollout of a fixed broadband access network in a city 
environment. However, other applications will be introduced throughout the 
different chapters.  
The first steps of the standard techno-economic analysis of the case is conducted 
in this section, and we will indicate where this analysis fails to capture the 
underlying reality. In the following chapters, we will link back to this case to 
indicate how the different tools introduced impact the case. 
2.3.1 Case – description 
The installation of fibre access networks has been drawing a lot of attention in 
techno-economic research in the last years. In order to meet the increasing 
consumer demands for higher bandwidth, both in downstream and upstream, the 
existing copper based access networks require upgrading towards higher speeds. 
To achieve this access speed increase, the installation of fibre in the access 
network is required. The closer fibre is brought to the customer, the higher the 
potential speed offered to the customer. When the entire access network consists 
of fibre, the network is a so-called Fibre to the Premises (FTTP) or Fibre to the 
Home (FTTH) network. 
Two different approaches can be identified to install such an FTTP network. The 
first approach is typically followed by operators currently operating their own 
physical infrastructure. Since they have their own infrastructure, they opt for a 
gradual migration of this network towards FTTP. Currently, fibre is installed up 
to the Central Office (CO). Following a stepwise migration, towards FTTC and 
FTTP, the investment is spread over time, sweating the existing assets. The 
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second approach consists of building the FTTP network from scratch. Obviously, 
this will require higher upfront expenditures compared to the first approach. We 
will discuss both approaches in this section. In the migration case, the migration 
of the copper network in London will be studied [2.12], while the rollout of a 
Greenfield FTTP network focuses on the city of Ghent. 
2.3.2 Migration to FTTC in London 
When the stepwise migration to FTTC and FTTP is considered, we focus on an 
incumbent currently possessing a nationwide copper access network, which has 
already been upgraded towards Fibre to the Central Office. This allows offering 
Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line (ADSL) services to its customers. In order 
to offer higher access speeds to its end customers, the incumbent has decided to 
upgrade its network towards FTTC, allowing it to offer Very high bit-rate Digital 
Subscriber Line (VDSL) services. Two important upgrades are necessary in the 
access network to migrate towards an FTTC network. First, fibre has to be 
installed between the central offices and the street cabinets. Secondly, the 
cabinets need to be replaced and Digital Subscriber Line Access Multiplexers 
(DSLAM) are required in these street cabinets.  
At the start of the project, the operator first has to decide on the cabinet size. The 
operator can decide to deploy cabinets which are large enough to host a 
connection for each household in the cabinet area. Or he can decide to deploy 
smaller (and cheaper) cabinets initially, only dimensioned for an estimated 
uptake percentage of 30%. 
2.3.2.a Technology overview 
Before the business case is introduced in detail, a short introduction to FTTC and 
FTTH networks is given. In order to provide consumers with higher bandwidths, 
network operators are migrating the current copper access networks towards 
FTTC and even FTTH networks. Research concerning the technologies used to 
provide these higher bandwidths is still ongoing, with Wavelength Division 
Multiplexing – Passive Optical Network (WDM-PON) as the most recent 
technological evolution. However, the focus in the case is clearly on the passive 
network infrastructure and its related costs and revenues. Since research has 
shown that most of the costs for the deployment of new networks are related to 
the initial installation and in particular the physical installation of the cables in 
the access network, we will first focus on the topology design of FTTC and 
FTTH networks [2.13]. This design is a key input in the techno-economic 
analysis, as the choice of the design impacts the resulting installation costs. 
FTTC topology 
The fixed telecom access network can be represented by a tree structure, with the 
local exchange as the source node. From this local exchange, copper cables 
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towards the street cabinets depart. At each street cabinet, there are again copper 
cables running towards distribution points (DP) and finally to single households. 
For the initial installation, VDSL cabinets are installed on the current cabinet 
locations, together with the necessary fibre and ducts in the A and B segments. 
For a local exchange, line cards towards the cabinets and towards the core are 
dimensioned, together with an optical distribution frame (ODF). In the cabinets 
DSLAM line cards will be installed. When more customers connect, extra 
equipment is only installed when necessary, in order to follow operational 
practices. A graphic representation of the access network can be found in Figure 
2-3. 
 
Figure 2-3: Overview of a copper access network topology [2.14] 
FTTH topology 
For the FTTC solution described above, fibre cables have only been installed up 
to the street cabinets. Now, for an FTTH solution, a fibre will need to be 
deployed towards the customer’s premises. Figure 2-4 shows the topology for the 
FTTH network. The C segment is cabinet specific, so it is only installed once. As 
the F segment is customer specific, this can be deployed when the customer 
wants to connect. The D and E segment are splitter specific and should thus be 
installed per splitter. Since customers will be geographically dispersed at the 
street cabinet location, we cannot expect the splitters to fill up gradually. 
Therefore, a splitter fill rate was taken into account, requiring that a new splitter 
and the according D and E segments are provisioned after 40% of the previous 
splitter is full. 
Next to extra fibre deployment in the access network, the migration towards an 
FTTH network also requires new optical equipment in the local exchange. For an 
FTTH network, G.PON cards need to be provisioned in this exchange. At the 
customer’s premises, a Customer Premises Equipment (CPE) is installed. 
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Figure 2-4: Overview of an FTTH access network topology [2.14] 
DSL technology 
Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) is a family of technologies to provide internet 
access through data transmission over the local copper loop of the telephone 
network. Depending on the DSL flavour used, the downstream access speed 
ranges between 8 Mbps (ADSL) and 100 Mbps (VDSL2), while the upstream 
speed is between 1 Mbps (ADSL) and 100 Mbps (VDSL2). These speeds are 
theoretical speeds, and are dependent on the copper loop length. As a rule of 
thumb, the longer the copper loop, the lower the speed achieved in the field is. 
ADSL G.992.1 
ADSL technology transmits data over the local telephone network. It operates in 
full duplex, using frequency division duplex (FDD) to separate the upstream and 
downstream data flows. For the upstream communication, the 26.075 kHz to 
137.825 kHz band is used, and the 138 kHz – 1104 kHz band for downstream 
communication. With the ADSL standard, the bandwidth can be supported over 
ranges up to 4km. 
VDSL2 ITU G.993.2 
The VDSL2 technology allows for higher access speeds compared to the ADSL 
technology. It uses the 25 kHz – 30 MHz band. However, this implies that the 
advertised speed deteriorates quickly with the distance to the source. When the 
copper link is longer than 300 meters, performance degrades as the loop 
attenuation increases. As copper loops are required to be shorter in order to 
operate VDSL (or VDSL2), fibre needs to be brought closer to the customer, 
resulting in an FTTC network. 
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2.3.2.b Business case evaluation 
The standard techno-economic analysis of the FTTC deployment in the UK will 
follow the methodology proposed in [2.4]. In the UK, COs are clustered into 13 
geotypes. These geotypes differ on population density, local loop length and 
number of connections. The model developed in this dissertation allows to 
conduct the analysis for all different geotypes. Here, only the results for a typical 
CO in the London area are described. For the London area, a representative 
exchange is modelled, taking into account average line length, number of 
cabinets, drop points and the amount of lines per exchange. As indicated, the 
operator can choose to install large cabinets, able to offer VDSL access to all 
customers in the cabinet area, or small cabinets, only dimensioned to provide 
access for a percentage of the households. Based on the customer adoption, the 
model calculates the necessary amounts of equipment in the local exchange and 
for each cabinet separately. 
Service adoption modelling 
Modelling the adoption of the offered services is an important aspect of the 
standard business case analysis. Customer adoption is the main driver of 
revenues and variable costs. As such, it has a major impact on the business case 
evaluation. 
While several mathematical models have been proposed to estimate the adoption 
of services and technologies, [2.15] has indicated the Gompertz adoption curve 
as the most appropriate approach to model the adoption of telecom business 
cases as a function of time (Figure 2-5). Three parameters need to be estimated 
in the mathematical formula, inflection point (a), slope (b) and market size (m). 
The inflection point in a Gompertz curve is at 37%, and indicates the time at 
which curve shifts from convex to concave. The higher a, the more stretched the 
adoption curve is. Slope indicates the pace of adoption. The higher parameter b, 
the faster adoption will occur, with b  [0,+]. For telecom cases, values of 4 
(a) and 0.3 (b) have been found realistic [2.13]
2
. The market potential parameter 
(m) of 20% used in the case is based on industry insight [2.16]. 
 
           
       
[2.17] (2.2) 
 
                                                          
2 Actual broadband access adoption data for Belgium was fitted to the Gompertz adoption 
model using linear least squares. 
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Figure 2-5: Gompertz based FTTC service uptake prediction in London 
Network dimensioning 
For the rollout of an FTTC network, fibre needs to be deployed from the local 
exchange towards the cabinets. Each cabinet has a unique fibre section and a 
shared section with the other cabinets (see Figure 2-3). Based on the duct length, 
fibre cable cost and installation cost per meter, the initial deployment cost can be 
calculated. The specific cost parameters can be found in [2.14]. From the 
estimated customer adoption, the necessary amounts of equipment in the CO and 
for each cabinet can be derived (Figure 2-6). The technical dimensioning and 
equipment model are thus important input for the cost modelling performed in 
the next section. 
Modelling costs and revenues 
A detailed cost and revenue model is built to conduct the economic analysis of 
the small and large cabinet scenario. The costs are divided into Capital 
Expenditures (CapEx) and Operational Expenditures (OpEx). The revenues are 
based on the adoption model described above. It is important to incorporate both 
costs and revenues in the techno-economic analysis. When rolling out a fibre 
network, previous research already focussed on a minimum-cost design [2.18], 
but it is important to link the design to the expected revenues, as has been shown 
in [2.19]. 
Capital expenditures 
CapEx are expenditures creating future benefits and are incurred when the 
company spends money to buy fixed assets or upgrade existing fixed assets. 
According to this definition, CapEx costs were subdivided into cable and duct, 
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local exchange, cabinet and CPE costs. The cable and duct costs also comprise 
costs for trenching, if required. 
In the rollout of FTTC or FTTH networks, cable and duct costs are generally the 
largest expense [2.13]. Ducts are installed to host the fibre cables and it is 
estimated that 80% of the existing ducts can be reused. The installation cost for 
cables depends on the installation location, with a buried installation being the 
most expensive (100 GBP/m) and aerial installation the cheapest (15 GBP/m). 
Footpath and grass installation have a cost between these two extremes. The 
installation locations were taken from [2.14]. The dimensioning of the fibre 
cables depends on the rollout scenario chosen by the operator. For the small 
cabinet scenario, the operator estimates that providing for a migration of 30% of 
the lines to FTTC will suffice. As uptake is only expected to be 20%, these 
would suffice. For the large cabinet scenario, 60% of the lines can be migrated in 
the cabinet, since this is the upper level of expected uptake.  
To offer VDSL service to customers, the operator needs to install equipment in 
the local exchange and street cabinet. In the local exchange, an ODF is 
provisioned, together with a chassis to host the Gigabit Ethernet (GigE) cards 
towards the cabinet and the core network. One GigE card has 24 ports, with each 
port capable of hosting one connection towards a DSLAM line card in a street 
cabinet. These DSLAM line cards can in turn host 32 connections to separate 
households. For the initial installation, street cabinets are installed, together with 
one DSLAM line card to host the first connections. When customer adoption 
takes off, additional cards are installed when necessary. 
CapEx at the customer side comprises both hardware cost for the CPE and initial 
installation cost. The installation of this equipment is demand driven, and only 
installed when necessary. An overview of the equipment model can be found in 
Figure 2-6, while cost figures, based on industry insight, can be found in Table 
2-1.  
Table 2-1: Cost of the different hardware components [2.14] 
Hardware component Remark Cost (GBP) 
Street Cabinet Small – 144 households 1.250 
 Large – 336 households 1.375 
ODF 1.440 subscribers 935 
GigE card 24 DSLAMs 3.500 
Chassis 16 cards 6.000 
DSLAM Cost per port in small cabinet 60 
 Cost per port in large cabinet 120 
CPE  200 
Installation cost CPE  100 
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Figure 2-6: Equipment model for FTTC network 
Operational expenditures 
Operational expenditures are recurring and on-going costs to keep the business 
running. Generally, expenses like sales and administration and research and 
development are categorised as OpEx. In this model we have chosen a fractional 
approach to quantify OpEx. A more detailed quantification for OpEx is possible 
and has been conducted in several publications [2.20], [2.21] but the fractional 
approach was chosen here to not overcomplicate the analysis. Two main OpEx 
categories were identified, namely electronic equipment and other operations. 
OpEx for electronics is estimated as a 10 percent fraction of the total CapEx for 
the electronic equipment, like DSLAM line cards and CPEs. For the non-
electronic fixed assets, a yearly one percent fraction is taken into account as 
OpEx. 
Revenues 
Revenues in this model are based on the adoption assumptions from above. For 
each cabinet the adoption curve is modelled independently and the yearly 
number of customers is estimated. The yearly average revenue per user (ARPU) 
is estimated at 500GBP.  
2.3.2.c Business case evaluation 
Above, the first two steps of the techno-economic methodology from [2.4] were 
performed. The scope of the problem was defined, gathering information on the 
technical solutions, network topology, expected customer uptake, etc. From this 
input data, a detailed model can be built. A model was built to calculate the 
required equipment installation, estimates on operational costs were made and an 
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indication of the expected revenues per customer was given. With this input and 
the provided models, the evaluation of the case can be made. This evaluation 
indicated that the installation of an FTTC network is a financial viable 
investment. As both a small cabinet and large cabinet installation was 
considered, we could also conclude that the small cabinet installation offers a 
higher return. The detailed evaluation can be found in Chapter 3, where we 
discuss the quantification of objectives.  
2.3.3 Installation of an FTTP network in Ghent 
In the Brownfield migration, the upgrade of the ADSL network towards an 
FTTC network was discussed. In this section, a network design with fibre 
brought even closer to the customer is discussed.  
Two different approaches can be identified to build an FTTP network. The first 
approach consists of installing a dedicated fibre between the CO and the 
household. This network is called a point-to-point (P2P) network. In the other 
approach, no dedicated fibre is provisioned, but sections in the network are 
shared between different users. These networks are called point-to-multipoint 
(P2MP) networks. 
2.3.3.a Technology overview 
In P2MP networks, the fibre capacity is shared between multiple households. 
The shared section consist of the fibre deployed between the CO and the street 
cabinet, while each household has a dedicated fibre running between the premise 
and the street cabinet. Such networks are Passive Optical Networks (PON), as 
optical (1:N) passive splitters are deployed to power-split the signal from one 
source into N equal signals towards the households. In the other direction, the 
signals are coupled by the splitter into one signal. In PON networks, all active 
equipment is located in the CO, and the street cabinets contain the passive 
splitters. As a result, the OpEx for the street cabinets decreases significantly, as 
no cooling equipment or power connection is required. As the fibre is shared 
between the CO and the street cabinet, PON networks also decrease the number 
of fibres deployed in the network, and thus the maintenance cost for fibre. 
However, PON networks also have a main disadvantage, since they only offer a 
limited flexibility in allowing open access on the network, and thus competition.  
P2P networks are also called active optical networks (AON). As was already 
indicated, in these kind of networks, customers are connected through a 
dedicated fibre to the CO. As a result, there are no intermediate splitters and 
bandwidth is not shared between customers. Depending on the location of the 
active equipment, a further distinction between Home Run Network (HRN) and 
Active Star (AS) can be made. In the first, the equipment is located in the CO, 
while in the latter the active equipment is installed in the street cabinet. Because 
of the higher fibre count in these networks, such a topology is more expensive 
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than a PON deployment, but it is more flexible in allowing open access and 
competition. For both technologies, an equipment tree is provided below (Figure 
2-7 and Figure 2-8). 
 
 
Figure 2-7: PON equipment model 
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Figure 2-8: P2P equipment model 
2.3.3.b Cost and revenue modelling for the deployment 
In contrast with section 2.3.2, this case focuses on the Greenfield deployment of 
an FTTP network in an urban area, the city of Ghent. Here, it was assumed that 
the project is being executed by the municipal government. Since this player 
does not currently have a broadband access network, a Greenfield deployment is 
to be considered. 
The city of Ghent is located in the Flemish part of Belgium. It is Belgium’s third 
largest city by number of inhabitants, counting 243,366 inhabitants (as of 
January 1
st
, 2010) [2.22]. Apart from these inhabitants, Ghent hosts about 65,000 
students in its University and other higher education institutions, of which many 
reside in the city during the week. These residents are not taken up in the official 
statistics. The municipality of Ghent (i.e. the city itself and 11 surrounding 
communities, see also Figure 2-9) covers a surface of 156.18 km², and comprises 
134,041 households.  
The cost and revenue modelling is conducted in a comparable way as for the 
previous case. Starting from adoption predictions, the required equipment is 
dimensioned, and the network topology drives the costs for fibre deployment and 
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trenching. Concerning the revenues, the current used prices for broadband access 
were used. An average monthly ARPU of €37.7 was used. 
As is to be expected, due to the large outside plant investments, the techno-
economic analysis indicated that a deployment of FTTP in this area is a costly 
undertaking, with a long payback period. This payback period is very depending 
on estimated take-up rate. The higher cost for a P2P network deployment 
compared to a P2MP network is also reflected in the results of the analysis. 
 
 
Figure 2-9: The Ghent area, with household location indication 
2.3.4 Shortcomings of the analysis 
In the techno-economic analyses conducted above, it should be noted that any 
results obtained are depending on the initial assumptions made. Three important 
aspects are currently absent in both case analyses, and should be taken into 
account.  
First, both in the FTTC and in the FTTP case, the impact of uncertainty and 
flexibility was left out. In case of the FTTC migration in the London area, it was 
assumed that the estimated uptake was correct. However, deviations from this 
uptake could have a large impact on the outcome. In addition, an average uptake 
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of 20% for the entire London area might be a correct estimate, but no differences 
between cabinet areas were taken into account. In reality, one area could have an 
uptake as high as 50%, while another only reaches 5 or 10%. And as the 
equipment model from Figure 2-6 shows, customers drive the required 
installation. In addition, in case uptake is higher than expected, the small 
cabinets could be saturated at a certain point in time. As no extra customers can 
be connected in this case, this will result in a loss of potential revenues. 
However, the operator has the flexibility to counter this potential loss by making 
extra follow-up investments when required. Possible future installations cover 
the provisioning of an extra cabinet to serve the extra customers, but the network 
could also be upgraded towards an FTTH network to have extra capacity. 
Secondly, no impact of competition is taken into account. When a new FTTP 
network is deployed in an urban area like Ghent, this new network will be in 
competition with the existing broadband infrastructures. In this area, both a 
Hybrid Fibre Coax and FTTC network have already been deployed. The newly 
deployed FTTP network will thus have to churn customers from these networks. 
But these networks can execute counter strategies to decrease this churning. 
Again, the impact of uptake on the dimensioning and equipment modelling will 
need to be taken into account. 
The third aspect covers the objectives captured in the analysis. In the FTTC case, 
the operator is a private player, so using financial objectives is the correct 
approach to value investments. However, the second case discussed the network 
rollout of a municipal player. Here, this player aims at additional objectives, next 
to financial viability. Universal access, decreasing the digital divide, increasing 
competition, etc. are only a few other objectives. These objectives should also be 
captured in the techno-economic analysis. 
2.4 Conclusions 
Increasing interactions and uncertainty in the current economic environment has 
an impact on the investment decisions companies need to make. However, the 
tools these companies have at their disposal fail at incorporating and valuing the 
impact of both aspects. The migration towards FTTC and FTTH was introduced 
as case study to indicate how traditional techno-economic analysis is conducted. 
The results of such an analysis give an indication on the economic viability of 
the project, but this conclusion is depending on initial assumptions made. A 
change in an input factor will be reflected in the final result.  
In addition, the analysis only captures the financial objective of the decision 
maker. In reality, as was also indicated in the case study, this decision maker has 
additional drivers, which cannot be captured through an economic assessment. 
This dissertation aims at providing insight in the available extensions to techno-
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economic analysis, incorporating the value of uncertainty, flexibility and 
competition. 
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3 
Actors and their Objectives 
“Management by objective works – if you know the objective. Ninety 
percent of the time you don’t”, Peter Drucker 
The need for advanced evaluation techniques in techno-economics was 
introduced in the previous chapter. It was indicated how competitive and 
cooperative interaction must be taken into account when making decisions, as 
these interactions influence the viability of the investment decision. Not only 
does customer uptake impact the revenue potential, it is also the main driver for 
the network dimensioning and equipment modelling. However, before these 
competitive influences can be identified and captured, it is required to know the 
impacting actors. In this chapter, the basics of multi-actor analysis will be 
introduced.  
A multi-actor analysis serves a double purpose. First, it helps at defining the 
different roles that must be taken up to produce a good or offer a service. From 
these role definitions, a detailed cost-benefit model can be built, starting from the 
underlying technological requirements. Secondly, by sketching the broader 
picture of the environment in which the company is active, other actors can be 
identified. Cooperation possibilities and competitive interactions can be 
indicated in this value network. Following this introduction, some of the 
important actors in the telecom environment will be discussed.  
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Building upon the qualitative description of the value network, the detailed 
quantitative modelling is performed. For this modelling, it is important to have a 
clear view on both the financial and non-financial objectives of the different 
actors. For financial objectives, there exists a plethora of metrics. The translation 
of non-financial goals is more challenging. Specifically for the fixed broadband 
market, a composite index was developed to measure the regulatory and policy 
goals. 
3.1 Identifying roles and interactions 
Before conducting a quantitative analysis of a new investment decision, it is 
important to identify the possible interactions with other market parties and have 
a clear view on the scope of the project. The first aspect allows to assess the 
impact of other players on your own case, while the second aspect serves as 
input for the delineation of the investment problem, making sure all roles are 
incorporated. Different models exist to perform such an analysis. We will 
introduce four models, the Porter five forces model, the Osterwalder model, the 
PEST analysis and value network analysis. 
3.1.1 Porter five forces model 
The five forces model was introduced by Michael Porter in 1979 [3.1] (Figure 
3-1). It was built as a model for industry analysis and strategy development. The 
framework introduces five forces that shape competition within a market. 
Typically, competition focuses on the existing competitors in the industry. The 
more competitors within your industry, the less attractive the market is. The 
incumbent telecom operators were and still are operating in a market with few 
competitors. As they owned and operated the sole network infrastructure, 
customers had no choice but to buy services from them. However, regulation has 
stepped in to decrease their power, introducing competition by enforcing local 
loop unbundling at regulated prices. However, limiting the analysis to only 
include existing competitors narrows the problem too much and risks a 
misevaluation of the attractiveness. Therefore, Porter identified four other forces 
shaping competition. In addition to the existing competitors, two other horizontal 
forces are included in the framework, namely the threat of new entrants and 
substitutes. If the market is very attractive at the moment, and no or only low 
entry barriers exist, the threat of new players entering the market is high. In 
telecom, such cases are e.g. present in application development. Substitutes pose 
an analogue threat. These players do not offer the exact same product or service, 
but one with similar functionalities. Again, the more possible substitutes, the less 
attractive the market is. For example, if your own product or service is priced too 
high, customers will look for substitutes offering more or less the same 
functionality. This behaviour can be noticed in the mobile telephone market. The 
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emergence of data based services, like Skype for voice telephony or WhatsApp 
for messaging has churned customers away from the traditional operators. 
Next to the three horizontal threats, i.e. industry competition, new entry and 
substitutes, Porter also identified two vertical threats, the bargaining power of 
suppliers and consumers. If there is only one company supplying the input you 
require, you have no other choice than to buy it from him. This puts the supplier 
in a strong bargaining position. A mobile operator can only acquire a spectrum 
licence from the government. The same rationale can be followed for the 
consumer power.  
Conducting a Porter five forces analysis offers an indication to the possible 
interactions between different market parties, but it does not allow a clear view 
on the detailed breakdown of the roles you need to perform to bring your product 
or service to market. As such, it offers no guidelines for the quantification 
required in techno-economic analysis. 
 
 
Figure 3-1: Porter five forces model [3.1] 
3.1.2 Osterwalder business model canvas 
The business model canvas by Alexander Osterwalder offers a template for 
describing existing or developing new business models [3.2]. It divides the 
business activity in four main functional blocks: infrastructure, offering, 
customers and finances (Figure 3-2). 
The model is centred around the value proposition, the collection of goods and 
services offered to the customer that distinguishes the company from its 
competitors. Both a quantitative and qualitative value proposition are possible. 
On the left of the value proposition, the main inputs of this value proposition are 
found. Clustered under infrastructure, the key partners, activities and resources 
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are defined. Activities aim at executing the value proposition, resources are 
required input for the value creation and can be human, physical, financial or 
intellectual. By identifying the key partners, the canvas allows to indicate the 
important actors impacting your value proposition. 
The value proposition is aimed at customers. Differentiation between customers 
is included by identifying different customer segments. These segments are 
differentiated on customer needs. In order to reach the different customer 
segments, channels are included. These channels can be company channels, but a 
company can also rely on partners to operate the channel. The third aspect of the 
customer functional block is consumer relationship. This aims at building a 
relationship with the different consumer segments. Co-creation, self service or 
personal assistance are possible relations. 
The flow from infrastructure over value proposition to customers are built upon 
the finance functional block. This block is subdivided in the cost and revenue 
structure. For techno-economic cases, the cost structure entails the detailed 
equipment model, operational processes, etc. 
Analogue to the five forces model by Porter, the business model canvas allows to 
identify customers and suppliers for the value proposition. In addition, it offers a 
basic overview of the cost and revenue structure, which is absent in the five 
forces model. However, it lacks an overview of the possible competitive impact 
on the value proposition. Compared to the five forces model, the canvas 
identifies key activities to perform the value proposition, which are required to 
solve the second aspect of the research question, building a detailed quantitative 
techno-economic model. 
 
 
Figure 3-2: Osterwalder business model canvas [3.2] 
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3.1.3 PEST analysis 
The four corner PEST or SEPT model is an extension of the Porter model to 
capture the business environment. The four dimensions of this model are 
Political/regulatory, Economic, Socio-cultural and Technological drivers [3.3, 
3.4]. 
The Porter five forces and Osterwalder model focus on industry analysis and 
business model development, the PEST model has a broader scope to scan for 
macro-environmental factors. Indeed, such factors could have a clear impact, but 
are not included in the previous two models. Political factors refer to the degree 
government intervenes in the economy. Trade regulations, tax laws and 
privatization moves are examples of such political and regulatory factors. 
Related to the telecom environment, political and regulatory factors will play an 
important role. Examples are regulatory intervention in local loop access pricing, 
spectrum auctioning, etc. 
Economic factors encompass macro-economic factors like economic growth, 
exchange rates, inflation, labour productivity and interest rates. Labour 
productivity has a direct impact on the cost structure of a company, while interest 
rates influence the cost of debt capital. In a globalised environment, changing 
exchange rates affect the cost for imported goods and the revenue for exported 
goods. 
Socio-cultural factors include demographics, like age distribution and population 
growth. An aging population can result in increasing labour costs, but also in 
changes of demand for certain services. However, socio-cultural factors are not 
limited to these demographics. Environmental awareness and consumption habits 
also fall in this category. 
Technological factors cover new scientific breakthroughs, innovation and R&D 
activity. Again, such factors influence costs, but they can also determine barriers 
to entry. 
 
3.1.4 Value network analysis 
The three models described above each have their own merits and drawbacks, 
but they fail at offering an integrated view on the entire value network in which 
the company operates. An approach is required that can indicate both 
competitive and cooperative interactions, like the five forces model, an 
identification of the roles and activities (business model canvas) for the 
quantitative evaluation of the value proposition and the impact of politics, 
regulation and technology. 
Allee [3.5] defines a value network as any web of relationships that generate 
tangible and intangible value through complex dynamic exchanges between two 
or more individuals, groups, or organizations. Within the scope of this 
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dissertation, we define a value network analysis is a methodology for visualising 
internal and external value networks. Its building blocks are roles, actors and 
flows in the environment. Roles are the basic building block of a value network 
and are defined as the lowest granularity in which an activity can be split up. A 
role thus refers to an activity with only one responsible. Roles are 
interconnected, with one role interacting with one or more other roles. These 
interactions can be information flows, product flows or financial flows. Such a 
network of roles and their interactions is a value network. For any case studied, 
there is only one value network.  
In the next step of value network analysis, the different roles are attributed to 
different actors. These actors can be current market parties, but new entrants also 
need to be considered. This is especially the case when innovative markets are 
investigated, e.g. the changes in the energy market resulting from a smart meter 
introduction, as will be described below. While the value network is unique for 
every case considered, since roles can be attributed to different actors, different 
value network configurations emerge. 
As a value network configuration visualises the different roles taken up by the 
different actors in the ecosystem, it offers a starting point for the quantitative 
technology modelling of the business case for the different actors. Additionally, 
as the value flows were identified, these offer insight in the interactions with 
other market parties, comparable to what the five forces model offers. However, 
as different configurations can be identified on the same value network, it can 
also be used to indicate how competitors address the same value proposition. 
3.2 Actors in the environment 
In the following section, we will introduce two value network analyses that were 
conducted during this research. We have chosen for two distinct cases, one in the 
emerging smart meter market [3.6], one in the Fibre to the Home (FTTH) 
market. Both cases lend themselves ideally for value network analysis, as both 
are emerging markets. From the value network introduced, different possible 
configurations can be built. A comparison of the different configurations can 
then indicate the pros and cons of each configuration. 
Mapping actors on the value network is the key step in building the value 
network configuration. As such, it is important to have a clear view on the 
existing actors, but also on possible new emerging actors that can take up roles in 
the network. In this section, we will introduce the most important actors in both 
the smart meter and the FTTH market. 
3.2.1 Smart meter market actors 
The introduction of smart meters in the residential setting is expected to change 
the existing electricity market value network significantly. Currently, metering at 
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the consumer side is performed using mechanical meters, which are manually 
read once a year by the distribution system operator (DSO). The meter is also 
owned by this DSO. The main functionality of smart meters is providing data 
connectivity between the meter and the backend. As this is the main business of 
telecom operators (Telco), this actor is also included. The third actor we identify 
is the energy service company (ESCO). With the availability of a smart meter, 
companies, like energy providers, but also new non-existing actors, have a direct 
connection with their customers. This opens opportunities to have tailored offers 
for different customer segments, steering of appliances, etc. With these three 
actors, the different value network configurations will be built in section 3.3.1. 
3.2.2 FTTH market actors 
In the broadband market, different players can be observed. When taking a closer 
look at the market in e.g. Belgium, the DSL incumbent and the cable operator 
(CO) are the two dominant players. They are vertically integrated, covering three 
streams, infrastructure, connection and content and application. The DSL 
incumbent is the former monopolistic operator, which was forced to open up his 
infrastructure for new entrants, the so-called other licensed operators (OLO) or 
alternative network operators (ANP). This decision to open up the network was 
enforced by the national regulatory authority (NRA). While the other players are 
typically (partially) private owned companies, the NRA is a government 
institution. As a result, this player will have clearly different objectives 
compared to the private players. 
In more recent years, different other players have entered the broadband market, 
trying to claim a share of the revenues. The most well-known players are the 
over the top (OTT) players. These players have a clear focus on content and 
applications. Examples are multinationals like Youtube, Google, Facebook, etc. 
Since we observe a clear tendency away from vertical integration, the different 
actors can be clustered according to the three streams, infrastructure, network 
and services. These actors are the physical infrastructure provider (PIP), the 
network provider (NP) and the service provider (SP). These actors can be 
separate market players, e.g. an OTT and an OLO, but can also be integrated in 
different business units from the same player, e.g. the vertical integrated CO. 
There exist a lot of examples in Europe today where new players emerged as PIP 
actor. In Sweden, municipalities have been the driving force in the deployment 
of FTTH infrastructure. Other players, like utility providers, can also participate 
in this role. 
The final important actor we want to introduce is the consumer. He is typically 
the one at which the total value network configuration is aimed. By purchasing 
services or products, he injects the necessary money flow into the value network. 
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3.2.3 Interactions between actors 
From the description above, it is clear that with different actors active in the 
same value network, interactions between these actors will emerge. These 
emerging interactions can be identified through the value network analysis, 
where value exchanges are indicated between different roles. When actors are 
mapped on these roles, the value exchanges will be either internal for the actor, 
or between different actors. In addition, different value network configurations 
will result in different interactions between actors. By comparing these 
configurations, it will be possible to indicate the interactions between the 
different actors and how they impact the value network.  
The assessment of the interactions can be performed on four different 
parameters. The technical design reflects how the chosen configuration impacts 
the underlying technology of the proposed solution. For example, when the value 
network configuration requires an open access model, where different players 
can interact with the underlying product or service, the technical design will 
require an interface capable of handling multiple players. The business 
implications of the chosen configuration are equally important. These cover the 
operational aspects of the interactions. Again, in an open access model, with split 
responsibilities between different streams in the value network, the 
implementation of service level agreements (SLA) is a business implication. The 
third parameter covers the impact on the consumer. The more actors are active in 
the value network configuration, the higher the possible impact on the customer, 
especially if he interacts with all these players. Typically, a single point of 
contact (SPOC) is preferred for the customer. Finally, competitive aspects of the 
value network configuration are assessed. In a vertical integrated model, where 
roles are taken up by a single actor, the possibilities for competition are very low. 
However, when moving towards a value network with multiple actors involved, 
the opportunities for competition and cooperation increase. 
3.3 Selected value network analyses 
In this section, we will introduce the value network analysis of two different 
cases. As already introduced above, the first case tackles the value network of 
the smart meter market, with a clear focus on the residential level [3.6]. The 
second case analyses the value network of the FTTH market. By introducing two 
distinct cases, we aim at indicating the value network analysis methodology in 
practice. As roles are the basic building block of the value network analysis, the 
value network configuration offers insight in the required building blocks for 
modelling the actor in a detailed quantitative techno-economic cost-benefit 
analysis. 
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3.3.1 Consumer-oriented smart meter value network 
The smart meter market is an emerging market, and is the extension of the 
typical mechanical metering of electricity streams as performed by the DSO 
today. Such a mechanical reading reports only aggregate consumption data based 
on the consumption of the different circuits, and thus appliances, in each house. 
The data is reported annually by the customer via phone, Internet or post, or by a 
technician coming to your premises. This legacy scenario is the ‘as-is’-scenario 
where intelligence and communication ability is not implemented in the meter or 
in the appliances present in the household.  
A smart meter extends the existing electricity provision and mechanical metering 
role with two extra streams, namely a telecommunication stream and a data 
stream. These extensions of the existing value network at household level are 
presented in Figure 3-3. This figure depicts the translation of a value network 
towards a technical architecture. The technical parts, e.g. electrical meter, 
communication module, etc. can however be directly mapped to the underlying 
role. For the electrical meter, this is metering of electricity production and 
consumption, for the communication module this is providing communication. 
The three named arrows on Figure 3-3 (P1, P2, P3) are the names of the 
interfaces of the communication module towards the three connected roles. To 
not overcomplicate the model, abstraction was made of the higher layers outside 
the customer’s premises (telecommunication infrastructure for the 
telecommunication stream, central control server with data repository and smart 
meter switching capabilities, and hardware and software developments in the 
data stream) in the model. 
The first additional stream towards smart metering is the telecommunication 
stream. This comes down to extending the value network with two roles, the 
implementation of a communication module and a gateway, allowing a two-way 
communication between the household and the central repository system. These 
two modules combined, the metering and communication module form the smart 
meter. Secondly, to move towards a real smart energy management system, 
intelligence needs to be included in the meter. A home energy controller (HEC) 
is a gateway with software capable of aggregating information and controlling 
the different appliances within the household in an intelligent way, based on the 
different signals the smart meter sends to or receives from the central control 
system. The functionality of the HEC can be installed on different locations: 
within the smart meter, the telecom router, a separate device in the household or 
even a cloud based solution. It only needs to be able to communicate with the 
sub-meters and appliances within the house. External devices such as a stand-
alone display or a web-based platform can be used for visualisation of the 
consumption and production patterns in all of these settings. It may be clear that 
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the choice of value network configuration will impact the technical design, and 
thus the modelling of the technological requirements. 
 
 
Figure 3-3: The consumer oriented smart meter value network 
 
As already indicated, when different actors take up different roles, other value 
network configurations emerge. Three different models are described here, the 
DSO centric model, a Telco model and the ESCO centric model. Additionally, as 
different configurations result in different interactions between the different 
actors, the value network configurations can also be assessed on four parameters, 
their technical design, the business implications, the impact on the customer and 
the level of competition possible. 
3.3.1.a DSO centric value network configuration 
In this DSO centric value network configuration, the DSO takes up all roles 
concerning the smart meter: metering, communication and HEC functionality. 
This vertical integrated model is the most straightforward model (Figure 3-4). 
The DSO can take up the role of communication as he can use power line 
communication (PLC) on his infrastructure to send the meter data. The 
implications of such a vertical integrated model are discussed below. 
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Figure 3-4: DSO centric value network configuration 
 
Technical: As the meter comprises all functionality, i.e. the mechanical meter, 
communication component and HEC software, installation of this system is 
relatively easy. However, as an integrated solution is provisioned, it is required 
that the installation of the meter is performed by a recognised electrician. In 
terms of operational processes, the existing meter needs to be decoupled and 
replaced by a smart meter (including communication module), thus the meter 
data needs to be re-updated in the back office of the DSO, as well as some other 
administrative issues need to be changed and updated. When problems occur 
with the meter, such as the replacement of communication module for a new 
technology, the recognised electrician will need to come down to each house, 
shutting down the full smart meter including the electricity component, making 
the replacement and resetting the system. This will require a lot of additional 
administration in the back office.  
In terms of communication, the DSO can make use of its own electricity network 
to connect the smart meters to its own telecommunication infrastructure via PLC. 
Additional investments are required in the access network installing amplifiers 
and connections points in order to cope with all the data (two-way) taking into 
account a low delay and latency. One of the questions will be the openness of the 
smart meter, thus what are the ways or standards in which other companies and 
devices can communicate with the smart meter, for instance in the case of 
automatically switch on/off devices in the house.  
 
DSO
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Business: As the DSO is taking care of all activities, everything can be arranged 
in a more organised and efficient way. He also acts as the SPOC for the end 
customer. When faults would occur in the network, either in the electricity, 
telecom or HEC component, the DSO is the only responsible party. This states 
that all required competences for all these components are available within the 
DSO organisation. Also a new monopoly is created with control over the smart 
meter. No innovation is stimulated for services inside the house e.g. additional 
displays with consumption information, savings on energy, apps, etc. It all 
depends on the possible interfaces the smart meter offers to the external parties. 
As the regulation moves towards the energy supplier as SPOC for the end 
customer, this would require that all the information retrieved from the meter is 
available for the supplier as well in an open way. The major question is if this 
kind of service provisioning is a role for a party who offers a public service. As 
recent regulation required a division between network and services, this vertical 
integrated model could result in a re-integration. 
 
Customer: For the end customer a single solution with one SPOC would be 
preferred. Disadvantages are the low possibility of innovation by other parties, 
the forced placement of the meter and the idea of needing to pay for a service 
which is enforced by the DSO and with a low (perceived) potential for the end 
customer. All consumers would be offered the same service, independent of the 
segment that offers them the highest benefits. 
 
Competition: The level of competition is very low. The DSO is monopolist and 
controls the ports / interfaces of the smart meter and thus the introduction of 
innovative services by other actors. 
 
It was indicated that the DSO can use its existing electricity grid as data 
communication network. However, this would require large investments in these 
networks. In addition, in most Western European countries, nearly all households 
have access to either a fixed or wireless broadband access network. A solution to 
decrease the investment cost for the DSO in the telecommunication stream 
would be the outsourcing of the communication module. However, this would 
require some changes in the meter architecture. The existing integrated meter 
should be changed towards a modular meter, with the two important modules 
being metering and communication. With such a kind of plug-and-play 
communication system, maintenance and replacement of the communication 
module will have no effect on the meter component, reducing the need for a 
recognised electrician to perform these actions. Additionally, as the meter itself 
will not have changed, the administrative overhead would also be avoided. This 
alternative model could thus benefit in many ways. It should be noted that the 
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DSO still takes up all roles in the value network, and a preferred Telco partner is 
selected by the DSO. 
 
Technical: Splitting up the electricity and telecommunication streams between 
separate operators will benefit those actors mostly in the operational phase. 
Mechanical electricity meters have an average lifetime of over 25 years, while 
the lifetime of typical telecom components is considerably shorter. This shorter 
lifetime is mainly driven by a shorter mean time between failure (MTBF). In 
addition, technological evolution could push operators to replace the 
communication module with a new module supporting a new communication 
technology. As mentioned before, if the electricity component needs to be 
stopped for changing the communication component, this is very costly and 
causes a lot of administrative issues. When this could be done separately with a 
modular meter system, this would benefit the customer and the DSO. This 
change can be done by everyone, not only by an electrician, which would be 
more convenient and cheaper. 
 
Business: As the cost of the communication module could be paid by the 
telecom operator, this would lower the total investment cost of the DSO. A fee 
for data communication can then be paid to the telecom operator on a monthly 
basis based on the type of network used, also covering the communication 
module cost. As mentioned above, this would not lead to additional operational 
processes and costs. The total investment cost of the smart meter (split 
mechanical electricity en communication module) is more expensive than the 
fully integrated meter, but in operational costs it is more beneficial. When 
comparing the total cost of operations over 25 years, it shows a better and 
cheaper solution compared to a fully integrated solution. In our analysis, we have 
found that the total initial investment expenditures for a modular meter are about 
8% higher compared to the integrated meter for a full rollout in Flanders [3.6]. 
However, this initial cost is completely offset by the operational costs over the 
total meter lifetime. When taking only the reduced wages for the personnel 
making the repairs and the cheaper hardware costs, since only a communication 
module is required, the modular meter turns out to be 45% less expensive. In 
total, this comes down to a gain of 6% in the total cost of the smart meter project 
[3.7]. When taking the reduced administrative overhead into account, even more 
gains could be achieved with the modular meter system. 
 
Customer: The benefits are relatively the same as in the previous DSO model, as 
the DSO chooses the telecom operator.  
 
Competition: The level of competition is still very low. The DSO controls the 
telecom operator and forces the customers to make use of this service. It also 
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controls the ports / interfaces of the smart meter and thus the introduction of 
innovative services by other actors 
3.3.1.b Telco value network configuration 
In the Telco model, a telecom operator is introduced in the value network 
configuration to take up the communication roles. As telecom operator, they are 
best placed to install and operate the communication module and gateway. In this 
value network configuration, introducing this actor will require similar changes 
in architecture of the smart meter as presented above. Historically, the DSO will 
continue to provide the electricity metering role. However, as communication is 
not one of their core competences, the communication roles are taken over by the 
telecom operator (Figure 3-5).  
A solution to the communication competences of the DSO would be the 
outsourcing of the communication module. The difference compared to the 
model described above, is the ability of the user to choose his preferred Telco 
instead of the designated operator choice by the DSO.  
 
 
Figure 3-5: Telco scenario value network configuration 
 
Technical: The same solution as described above can be used. The only 
difference is that all the modules by the telecom operators must be compliant 
(standardised) with the modular approach of the meter and the data sending 
format. SLAs must be dealt with in order to guarantee the service delivery. 
Another option is that the currently available modem of the telecom operator can 
be reused. For households with an existing internet connection, which consist of 
DSO
Telco
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70% of the households in Flanders [3.8], the smart meter signals could travel 
over this connection towards the central system. When looking at the cost for 
communication, this could result in lower recurring expenses. For consumers not 
having an internet connection, Power Line Carrier (PLC) or mobile (GPRS, 3G) 
communication could be introduced. 
 
Business: The cost of the communication module could thus be paid by the 
telecom operator, and thus lower the total investment cost of the DSO and its 
financial risk. A fee for data communication can then be paid to the telecom 
operator on a monthly basis based on the type of network used. The operational 
benefits also apply. The risk / SLA lies with the telecom operator, who has the 
knowledge and competence of offering these communication services, which is 
advantageous for the DSO.  
 
Customer: The benefits are relatively the same as the model presented in the 
DSO centric model. Additionally the customer can choose its own preferred 
telecom operator. In case of issues, the main problem would be the SPOC: who 
to contact when problems occur: the DSO or telecom operator?  
 
Competition: The level of competition is better. The customers can choose their 
preferred telecom operator. As different players will be interested in offering this 
connection from the smart meter to the data centre, lower prices for the end 
customer could be obtained.  
 
Up to now, the attribution of the HEC role to an actor was not yet discussed. 
While the previous DSO centric scenario attributed the HEC roles to the DSO, 
the Telco value network configuration can be adapted to split the HEC 
functionalities from the metering roles. As a result, the HEC functionality role 
can be taken up by the telecom operator. In this case the previously installed 
modem used for regular Internet and IPTV services can be upgraded to be used 
as gateway for new services such as HEC, aggregating all data from the different 
devices within your home.  
 
Technical: This scenario poses some additional requirements for the technical 
architecture. The modem where the HEC is installed on should be able to 
interoperate with the smart meter, so a standardised interface is required. 
Additionally, the HEC functionality needs to be open and independent of the 
organisation sending the signals to the smart meter. We already mentioned the 
need for SLA in the previous scenario, where the Telco assures the delivery of 
signals. Here the communication modem should be always on. 
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Business: The most important issue with this configuration is that Telco 
operators currently could lack the knowhow of the energy market to offer this 
type of services. However, offering energy services would result in extra added 
value next to the existing offer of broadband, TV and mobile and fixed 
telephony. In addition, Telcos have good knowledge on marketing and 
advertising to help boosting the customer uptake of energy services. Although it 
still remains to be seen if the current players on the energy market will allow the 
telecom operators to enter the market via this model. 
 
Customer: The advantages for the consumer listed in the previous model also 
apply here. If Telcos would also offer energy services, this would result in a 
single bill for the consumer for all his services, voice, broadband, television and 
energy. Also, no additional point of contact will be necessary.  
 
Competition: When different providers could offer comparable energy services 
to the end consumer, competition on the market should increase, resulting in 
lower prices. However, if Telcos offer this service, the risk on a digital divide on 
the smart metering service market emerges, next to the existing digital divide on 
the broadband market.  
3.3.1.c ESCO centric value network configuration 
The last scenario we propose is the third party model (Figure 3-6). This scenario 
is in fact a logical extension of the previous Telco scenario, where the HEC is 
provided by yet another actor, an ESCO who can be independent of the previous 
two players or even a device developer who currently is not active on the energy 
market. In our opinion, this scenario will result in the most competition on the 
smart meter market, but will also require the most regulation. In addition, each 
actor focuses on the roles he has the most competences in. Unlike the DSO 
centric model, the DSO is responsible for the metering and does not move 
towards the more service oriented roles. This does not mean the DSO has no 
impact on the signals sent to the households, but they will have to pass via an 
aggregator party, responsible of combining signals and sending one aggregated 
signal to the households. The Telco only manages the communication roles and 
does not interfere with the electricity market specific roles. The HEC role is here 
taken up by an electricity service company. This could be an electricity supplier, 
but could also be a currently non-existing company which focuses on specific 
niche markets. For example, a new ESCO could focus on Plug-in (Hybrid) 
Electric Vehicle owners or solar panel owners. They could provide specific 
service to these niche markets like internalising production or charging schemes. 
In turn, the ESCOs could use their consumer portfolios to offer balancing service 
to Balance Responsible Parties. Notice that consumer segmentation is clearly 
implemented in this model. 
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Figure 3-6: ESCO value network configuration 
 
Technical: When the technical issues are considered, they are comparable to the 
remarks given in the telecom driven service scenario. Standardisation of 
interfaces will be key, to allow any player who wants to offer the HEC service to 
communicate with the smart meter. 
 
Business: Since any company interested can offer services via this model, they 
can focus on niche markets most interesting for them. Different companies with 
different background and interests will be able to offer tailored services for a 
specific segment. 
 
Customer: With a broad range of companies offering services, customers can 
choose the ESCO offering the package most benefiting them. However, this can 
also have a disadvantage if the number of offers is that large that it becomes very 
difficult for the end user to pick this best package. This results in inefficiencies 
for all players. Consumers do not get the benefits they could and companies 
cannot build the customer portfolio most suited for their offers. 
 
Competition: The third party centric model offers the most possibilities for 
competition. However, as for the scenario described above, a digital divide on 
the smart metering market could emerge. Consumers with only low consumption 
could be deemed uninteresting by the active companies. They would only bear 
the costs of the smart metering system, e.g. via higher distribution tariffs and no 
benefits. Regulation could step in here, e.g. by enforcing an actor to offer basic 
DSO
Telco
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smart metering services, like awareness to improve energy efficiency. This is 
much like the current social supplier model. 
3.3.1.d Smart meter value network conclusions 
The development of the residential smart meter value network serves a dual 
purpose. First, as it allows for a mapping of different configurations, the decision 
maker can depart from the value network to indicate different possible 
interactions with other players. Above, this was conducted for three different 
configurations. In the vertical integrated model, we identified a cooperation 
possibility between the DSO and a designated Telco. By focussing on their own 
core competencies, such a cooperation can result in cost reductions for the entire 
cooperation. When the ESCO configuration is considered, we identified different 
levels of competition opportunities. The electricity distribution remains a natural 
monopoly, but competition is possible on both the communication stream and on 
the data stream. However, this competition will also triggers extra costs for the 
different actors, so-called transactions costs [3.9]. Transaction costs are costs that 
occur when an exchange is made. Actors will need to negotiate on contracts, 
standardised interfaces will need to be developed, etc. 
Secondly, as all roles have been identified in the value network, it allows the 
decision maker to have a clear view on the required roles in this market. As 
every role represents an activity, it offers the building blocks for the cost benefit 
modelling. When an actor takes up the TelcoGateway and Communication 
module role, he will also need to bear the underlying costs, e.g. hardware 
investment, maintenance of components, etc. The technical design used in the 
techno-economic modelling can also be based on the chosen value network 
configuration, like the modular or integrated meter choice introduced above. On 
the other hand, the data flows mapped on the value network offer an indication 
of possible revenue flows. Customers interested in using a HEC can be required 
to pay a monthly sum to a Telco to guarantee connectivity. 
3.3.2 FTTH value network  
The analogue exercise is performed for the fixed access network case introduced 
in Chapter 2, more specifically the Greenfield rollout of an FTTH network. By 
performing the value network analysis, light will be shed upon the detailed 
activities and their resulting costs and benefits. Secondly, by assessing the case 
on four aspects, possible cooperation and competition scenarios can be 
identified. To perform this analysis, existing fibre deployments were investigated 
to define a set of possible value network configurations and the most suitable and 
likely ones were identified
3
 [3.10].  
                                                          
3 Within the scope of the TERRAIN project, several workshops with industry and 
academic experts were organised to analyse the possible value network configurations. 
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Comparable to the smart meter value network, the FTTH value network is based 
on three streams: the infrastructure stream, connection stream and content and 
application stream, indicated on the y-axis of the value network. The 
infrastructure stream includes the planning, deployment and operations of the 
passive infrastructure: the dark fibre network. The second layer, the connection 
stream, refers to the installation and maintenance of the active equipment, 
needed for offering connectivity (and thus broadband connection). On top, we 
find the content and application stream, that refers to all additional services that 
end consumers can subscribe to, like digital television, video on demand, eHealth 
services, storage services in the cloud, HEC services, etc. These streams already 
offer a first indication for the required activities and their related costs.  
Depending on who takes up the roles identified in the value network, different 
value network configurations can be subtracted. Typically, the same types of 
actors take up the roles located in one stream in these value networks 
configurations: the Physical Infrastructure Provider (PIP), the Network Provider 
(NP) and the Service Provider (SP). The PIP is responsible for deploying the 
dark fibre network, and therefore corresponds to the roles in the infrastructure 
stream. The operations role of this infrastructure stream can be done by the PIP 
itself or outsourced to the NP, which is a company specialised in 
telecommunications networks and equipment. The NP will therefore take up all 
the roles in the connection stream. At the top of the value network 
configurations, we see the SP, responsible for offering services, contents and 
applications to the end-user. In the remainder of this section, we will focus on the 
infrastructure and connection stream.  
3.3.2.a Base case: vertically integrated PIP +NP 
In the first value network configuration (Figure 3-7), all roles (infrastructure and 
connection stream) are taken up by one (public or private) actor. The content and 
application stream is left to service providers. The historic incumbents typically 
apply this vertically integrated model, and even include the service provisioning 
roles. 
This case is considered as the base case. In the absence of multiple players, no 
extra negotiation costs between parties are incurred, nor does extra equipment 
need to be installed to allow multiple network providers to use the same dark 
fibre connection. However, such costs will be incurred when adding different 
SPs on the network. Competition is only possible on the service stream. 
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Figure 3-7: Value network configuration 1: integrated PIP and NP 
 
3.3.2.b Separated deployment of passive infrastructure, combined 
operations 
The second value network configuration splits the integrated actor in an actor 
responsible for the deployment of the passive infrastructure and one responsible 
for the deployment of the active infrastructure, and assumes that the operations 
of the entire network are in the hands of this entity, namely the NP. A visual 
representation of this model can be found in Figure 3-8. 
This value network configuration was designed to allow non-telecom centric 
actors (such as municipalities, other utility network owners, public private 
partnership (PPP) etc.) to take up an active role in the network deployment. This 
entity gets the responsibility of planning and deploying the passive infrastructure 
(which mostly comes down to geographical network planning and trenching), 
while the operational part, for which more technical expertise is required, is 
taken up by a specialised company. Cooperation between both parties only 
occurs when “switching” from deployment to the operational phase. Like in the 
previous value network configuration, competition is only possible on the service 
layer. 
In
fr
as
tr
u
ct
u
re
 
st
re
am
C
o
n
n
ec
ti
o
n
 
st
re
am
C
o
n
te
n
t 
&
 
ap
p
lic
at
io
n
 s
tr
ea
m
Planning & design OperationsDelivery
C&A 
Development
Service-specific 
Equipment 
Development
Content 
integration
Application 
integration
C&A 
Packaging
C&A 
Provisioning
Service 
Operation and 
Management
Active 
Equipment 
Operation
Passive 
Infrastructure 
Operations
Active Equipment Deployment 
(active customer connection)
Network 
Infrastructure 
Deployment
Passive 
Customer 
Connection
Network 
Planning and 
Design
Equipment 
Design
stream
s
network lifecycle phases
City/Utility/PPP
Market
Actors and their Objectives 57 
 
Figure 3-8:Value network configuration 2: Separate PIP, separate NP (taking up 
the operations in both streams) 
3.3.2.c Separated passive infrastructure with operations tender, 
competition on connection stream 
The third value network configuration can be found in Figure 3-9, and includes 
three different types of actors. At the infrastructure stream, we find one entity 
that is responsible for the planning and deployment of the passive infrastructure, 
but once deployed, the operations of the dark fibre network are left to a tender 
winner. On the connection stream, multiple network providers can install their 
own active equipment and compete for end customers. 
This value network design is the most “open” one, since it allows for competition 
on both NP and SP layer. However, to allow competition on the NP layer, extra 
upfront and operational costs are entailed, as extra equipment, i.e. an open access 
interface, must be installed and maintained. Since this interface connects the 
different network operators to their respective customers, it should be done by a 
neutral entity.  
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Figure 3-9:Value network configuration 3: PIP with separated operations in a 
tender, multiple NP 
3.3.2.d Infrastructure based competition 
In the previous three value network configuration, it was assumed that only one 
infrastructure is present. In reality, multiple infrastructures have already been 
deployed. In most European countries, customers can choose between two fixed 
infrastructures, a copper based DSL network operated by the incumbent and a 
Hybrid Fibre Coax (HFC) network owned by the CO. On top of these networks, 
different players are again active, resulting in a value network configuration as in 
Figure 3-10. Different infrastructures compete, with on top again different NPs 
and or SPs. We indicated in gray possible vertical integration between the 
different layers. With infrastructure competition, the same NP or SP can be 
active on different infrastructures. 
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Figure 3-10:Value network configuration 4: infrastructure competition 
3.3.2.e FTTH value network conclusions 
Designing the value network and building different possible configurations 
offers important insight in two aspects. By defining all required activities to offer 
the value proposition, decision makers get more information on the underlying 
cost models. In the FTTH value network, an actor taking up the infrastructure 
stream will need to take costs for network deployment and passive customer 
connection. Choosing for an open access infrastructure has an impact on the 
technical design of the network. And as important, it also shows which costs not 
to take into account. While roles link to cost models, the different value streams 
between roles reflect the revenue streams between different actors. The 
functional separation between the infrastructure stream and connection stream 
will result in a revenue stream from the top stream to the bottom stream. The 
same goes for the streams between the tender winner and the city/utility/PPP. 
The latter deploys the network and will require a fee from the tender winner. 
Secondly, when the different value networks are compared, actors can identify 
possible cooperation and competition impacts. This was e.g. performed in the 
PIP with separated operations with multiple NPs. Here, cooperation is possible 
on the infrastructure stream, and competition between different players on the 
connection stream. 
3.3.3 Why perform a value network analysis? 
A value network analysis was performed for two different cases, one in the 
consumer oriented smart meter market, one in the fixed broadband access 
network market. Both cases indicated the advantages of value network analysis. 
Performing a value network analysis has two main advantages. First, it allows 
identifying all key roles required in offering the value proposition. As a result, 
the decision maker knows which activities to take into account in the cost 
modelling, and how they impact the technical design. Secondly, when the 
different value streams are identified, revenue models can be mapped on the 
value network. Such a mapping shows from which roles and actors value can be 
Infrastructure 
stream
Connection 
stream
Content and 
application 
stream
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gained, and which actors will need to be paid. Thirdly, from the selected value 
network configurations, one can identify possible cooperation or competitive 
opportunities. 
3.4 Objectives 
When there is a clear view on the value network and the configuration has been 
identified, the decision maker needs to assess the viability of the project, taking 
into account the roles identified and the interactions with other actors. When 
making the analysis, this viability is assessed by checking the impact of the 
project on the objectives of the decision maker. As different players have 
different objectives, more detail on these objectives is provided in this section. 
3.4.1 Private player objectives 
Private players primarily focus on value creation in the long run. This value 
creation can be measured through different financial parameters. Such 
parameters include the net present value (NPV), which is typically applied in the 
standard techno-economic analysis. This analysis comes down to building a 
detailed model of expected costs and revenues based on the underlying technical 
design, as was performed in Chapter 2. However, next to NPV, profitability, 
solvability and liquidity are other factors to take into account. 
Private players have other goals in addition to the financial objectives. They can 
strive for consumer satisfaction, operational excellence or Six Sigma process 
quality (improving quality by removing causes of defects and minimising 
production variability). However, most of these objectives are typically directly 
proportional to value creation. Increased consumer satisfaction will result in 
higher sales, operational excellence and Six Sigma aim at reducing costs. As a 
result, these goals can be directly translated in a financial parameter, typically the 
NPV. 
3.4.2 Public player objectives 
Determining the objectives of non-profit oriented players is a whole different 
story. The different public players identified in section 3.2 are municipalities, 
governments and regulators. Decisions made by such actors are not aimed at 
generating cash flows, but at increasing social welfare.  
When taking the example of broadband performance, the European Commission 
has made an effort to indicate the different objectives in the Digital Agenda for 
Europe (DAE). The implementation of its 101 actions in seven priority areas are 
expected to stimulate innovation, economic growth and improve the quality of 
life. As such, the DAE is an action list to get the most out of digital technologies 
and aims at delivering sustainable and inclusive growth [3.11]. To achieve the 
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digital transformation, 13 specific goals are put forward, of which progress is 
annually measured in the Digital Agenda Scoreboard. For example, full 
broadband coverage with minimum speeds of 30Mbps and 50% of subscribers 
having speeds of 100Mbps are two main targets for 2020. For 2015, the Digital 
Agenda targets look to stimulate internet use, by setting targets for the use of 
eServices like eCommerce or eGovernment. For 2013, focus is on full broadband 
coverage. Here, broadband is defined as speeds equal or higher than 144 Kbps. It 
may be clear that such goals can no longer be measured in financial terms. As 
such, other tools are required to quantify these parameters. 
3.5 Quantifying financial and social objectives 
The quantification of the identified objectives is the next step in the techno-
economic analysis. With such a quantification, the decision maker can assess if 
conducting a project is profitable (e.g. NPV) taking into account the required 
return on investment. In addition, the quantification allows ranking different 
alternatives. First, the background on quantifying financial objectives is given. 
This is an established field, and several metrics are available. The exercise is 
more challenging when social objectives need to be quantified. A composite 
broadband performance index was developed in this work to quantify and rank 
broadband objectives [3.12]. 
3.5.1 Net Present Value 
The goal of an NPV analysis is to indicate the economic viability of an 
investment project. The question an NPV analysis answers is the following: “Is 
the investment creating value for the company and the shareholders?” An 
investment is basically an expense done today, aimed at generating income later. 
Obviously, this future income should be larger than the initial expense and 
generate a required minimal surplus return. 
In order to conduct the investment analysis, one should determine the cash flows 
generated through the investment period. This period equals the economic 
lifetime of the project, the time after which the investment no longer generates 
cash flows. It is clear that only cash flows directly linked to the project should be 
taken into account. While this is a simple principle, it typically is the most 
difficult phase in valuing the investment project. The following basic rules help 
to determine the cash flows in any investment project.  
 
 Only incoming and outgoing cash is to be taken into account. It is important 
to notice that there exists a difference between cost and revenue on one side 
and income and expense on the other. The yearly depreciation of an asset is 
a cost, but no expense. As this is no cash flow, it should not be included. 
 Cash flows which are independent of the project should not be taken into 
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account. Only the incremental or marginal cash flows related to the project 
are to be included. 
 Cash flows are independent of the financing of the project. As a result, 
interest payments or dividends are excluded. The cost of financing is 
included in the required rate of return of the project. 
 Tax cash flows are to be included, since expenses and income influence the 
taxable profit. 
 
Once the cash flows during the investment period have been determined, the 
calculation of the NPV is straightforward (eq. 3.1). As the name says, it returns 
the present value of the future cash flows (CF) based on a given minimum return 
(r). The NPV thus reflects the cumulative discounted incoming and outgoing 
cash flows. This return is based on the return requirements for both shareholders 
and interest payments for loans. More information on determining r can be found 
in [3.13]
4
. The formula for the NPV calculation is given below. All cash flows of 
the project are discounted with the minimum return r and summed up.  
 
 
     
   
      
 
   
 (3.1) 
 
The NPV indicates the value the investment creates, since it reflects the total 
value of the future cash flows, taking into account the required return. When the 
NPV is larger than zero, the investment returns, in addition to the initial 
investment and the required return, an extra value equal to the NPV. 
However, conducting such a standard NPV analysis can yield unintuitive results. 
Network solutions that are thought of as more flexible or less risky turn out to be 
less economically interesting according to the NPV analysis. A wireless access 
network design that can be expanded or contracted for lower cost is more 
flexible in handling uncertain future customer demand, but is typically more 
expensive in initial deployment. 
3.5.1.a Business case evaluation: standard NPV analysis 
In Chapter 2, a detailed cost and revenue model was built for the rollout of an 
FTTC network in London, starting from a network and equipment model. With 
this input, the NPV analysis can be conducted. Based on adoption percentages 
and the geotype input parameters, a network dimensioning model was built for 
both the small cabinet and the large cabinet scenario, calculating the bill of 
material in each year of the 15-year project. Other general input parameters were 
added, like cost erosion for optical and electronic equipment and a discount 
                                                          
4 The required return on investment is typically based on the average cost of capital, 
taking into account required returns for equity and debt. 
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factor of 10%. This discount factor reflects perceived financial risks and hence 
the required returns, and is based on industry insight. The cash flows for each 
year are calculated, discounted with the discount factor and summed up.  
With an NPV over 5 million GBP (€5.3 million) for a central office in London, 
both installation scenarios prove to be highly profitable, but the small cabinet 
FTTC rollout scenario turns out to be the best choice (Figure 3-11). Due to the 
lower cost for the small cabinet and the lower incremental cost per customer 
connecting, the total NPV over the 15 year investment period is above the NPV 
of the large cabinet scenario. Since this cost difference is limited, the curves 
remain close together. The initial investment in cabinets and fibre outside plant 
results in a negative NPV in year 0, but when customers start connecting to the 
cabinets, the yearly cash flow from customer revenues improves the NPV over 
time. Between year 3 and 4, the NPV becomes positive. From this point on, the 
initial investment is paid back and the project starts generating value. Under the 
static assumptions, the small cabinet is dimensioned large enough to host all 
connections in the future, while it is cheaper than the large one. This concludes 
the standard NPV analysis. Management should choose to install small cabinets 
to offer VDSL services to its customers. However, it should be noted that this 
conclusion is completely dependent on the initial assumptions concerning 
customer adoption. 
 
 
Figure 3-11: NPV analysis for an FTTC rollout 
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3.5.2 Other financial parameters 
Different other aspects were already identified above. Liquidity, solvability and 
profitability are three other parameters companies strive for. Liquidity is the 
level at which a company is able to mobilise cash and fulfil short term expenses. 
As such, it is very important for creditors on the short term. Indeed, if the 
company has no available cash, these cannot be paid. Different ratios exist to 
measure the liquidity of a company. The average number of days of customer 
and suppliers credit, or stock rotation are just a few existing measures. The 
liquidity ratio is defined as the total value of current floating assets on the short 
term debt capital (eq. 3.2). Current floating assets are assets that can be 
converted into cash in short time, while the short term debt capital represents 
debt the company needs to repay within one year. The higher this ratio, the 
higher the liquidity of the company. If it is above 1, the current floating assets 
suffice to pay back all short term debt capital. 
 
 
              
                       
                       
 (3.2) 
 
Solvability refers to the capability of the company to repay its financial debts and 
the resulting interest payments. It can be expressed by the ratio of debt capital on 
shareholders’ equity (eq. 3.3). As such, it reflects the amount of debt capital per 
1 euro equity. The higher this ratio, the lower the protection for creditors is. 
 
 
               
            
      
 (3.3) 
 
The last ratio reflects the profitability of the company. This profitability can be 
measured in relation to sales, assets or equity. Profitability of equity is expressed 
by the profit or loss (before or after taxes) on equity (eq. 3.4). 
 
 
                            
              
      
 (3.4) 
 
3.5.3 Broadband performance index 
A broad toolset exists to quantify financial objectives. When the decision maker 
aims at other goals, the tools introduced above no longer suffice. A regulator is 
no profit oriented actor, but executes broadband policy within the regulatory 
framework. Such a player is responsible for ensuring sufficient competition, 
achieving broadband penetration, etc. Several indices have already been 
developed, but the main issue with broadband performance indices is their time 
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dependency. What is considered important today may no longer be required 
tomorrow. Broadband access speeds are an example of this trend. The definition 
of broadband is continuously evolving, together with technical breakthroughs in 
this field. Only ten years ago, broadband was defined as an access speed of 144 
kbps, while new technologies now allow to offer symmetric access speeds up to 
100 Mbps and higher. In this section, we introduce an up-to-date composite 
broadband performance index, capable of capturing several policy goals and 
translating them into a quantitative index. With such an index available, techno-
economic analysis can also take into account non-financial objectives. 
3.5.3.a Existing indices 
The quantification of policy and its impact on broadband has been challenging 
researchers for the last decade. Policy makers typically adopt metrics which rank 
broadband performance, allowing them to compare their performance with other 
countries. The best performers in these rankings are then selected as best policy 
makers and other countries copy their policy. 
However, this approach has some major drawbacks. Penetration has always been 
an important metric to compare broadband performance. Penetration, as 
measured by the OECD, represents the ratio of fixed broadband connections on 
the population of the country (eq. 3.5).  
 
 
                      
                     
             
 (3.5) 
 
Already in 2007, Ford identified the severe shortcomings of rankings based on 
this raw metric [3.14]. Next to the applicable policy, other factors influence 
broadband penetration. Examples are household size, population density, 
broadband price and income. Excluding these factors in a broadband 
performance measure significantly reduces the power of the performance 
indicator (PI). If two countries would have a broadband connection to every 
household, the penetration rate could only be improved by reducing the average 
household size in that country. A first improvement of the penetration metric is 
thus correcting penetration for household size (eq. 3.6). 
 
 
                      
                     
            
 (3.6) 
 
In his 2007 paper on broadband performance, Ford performed a linear regression 
to estimate the impact of different socio-economic parameters on broadband 
penetration [3.14]. With the resulting coefficients, he constructed the Broadband 
Performance Index (BPI), allowing to calculate the expected broadband 
penetration based on socio-economic factors. When comparing the expected with 
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the observed penetration, one can indicate if the country over- or underperforms. 
This divergence is mainly driven by policy, and should thus be used to identify 
good policy. In more recent papers, Ford proposed other PIs, e.g. the Broadband 
Adoption Index and the Broadband Efficiency Index, all based on the same 
rationale, namely penetration is not only driven by policy, but also by socio-
economic parameters [3.15], [3.16]. 
Filtering broadband penetration for socio-economic aspects offers interesting 
insights, but the question today has shifted from “Do you have broadband?” 
towards “What is broadband, how fast is it, and how fast is fast?” Quality metrics 
should be included in measuring broadband performance of regions. The 
Broadband Quality Score (BQS) tries to formulate a solution [3.17]. The BQS 
expresses the quality of broadband as a weighted sum of download speed, upload 
speed and latency. These indicators were normalised using Min-Max, as 
proposed in [3.18]. In the initial proposal, over 50% of the weight was driven by 
the download speed, but the authors already suggested that the weights should be 
constantly adapted to reflect market evolutions. As services requiring a high 
upload speed become more important, the weight of this indicator should 
increase in the BQS measure. In order to subtract the broadband ranking of 
countries, a Broadband Leadership ranking was developed, including penetration 
and the BQS, each with equal weights. 
Quality and penetration are two results of a good broadband policy (and socio-
economic factors), but policy makers and regulators aim at much more. Next to 
adoption, coverage or availability is equally important. People cannot adopt 
broadband if they have no access to it. In addition, competition on the broadband 
market is a focus point of all policy makers. A good PI should thus include 
metrics of all these indicators. 
We discuss two different PIs that include these metrics. The first metric is the 
Broadband Achievement Index [3.19]. Next to adoption and speed, this PI also 
includes availability, competition and digital inclusion. The last indicator 
measures adoption dispersion. The EU Broadband Performance Index is the 
second metric, which was introduced by the European Commission in 2008 
[3.20], and has now been replaced by the DAE [3.11]. The EU BPI includes 
several parameters, very similar to the Broadband Achievement Index, namely 
broadband rural coverage, competition coverage, price, speeds and dimensions 
like eService uptake. Although these composite indicators take a lot of criteria 
into account, still two main drawbacks can be identified. First, there are the 
definitions used for the parameters. For example, the EU BPI uses speed baskets 
to diversify between high and low speed. Low broadband speed is defined as 
offers with a download speed below 2 Mbps, high speed is between 2 and 8 
Mbps. While these speed baskets made sense when the EU BPI was initially 
defined, technological progress has caught up with these definitions. VDSL and 
cable networks can offer theoretical speeds up to 50 Mbps now, while FTTH 
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networks offer speeds over 100 Mbps. As these are both included in the high 
speed basket, a shift from VDSL and cable towards FTTH networks would have 
no impact on the indicator. 
Secondly, there is the impact of weight factors. Estimating weight factors always 
requires a value judgement on the different aspects, and is therefore always 
subjective [3.18]. While one policy maker finds adoption more important, the 
other focuses on competition. As a result, a different focus of a policy maker 
results in a different attributed weight. This drawback can be overcome by 
different approaches. An equal weight approach is possible, or the weights are 
discussed with the different involved parties to come to an agreed weight for 
every parameter. Another approach is used in the Broadband Achievement 
Index. The authors recognise the arbitrary nature of weight factors, and apply the 
benefit-of-doubt (BOD) methodology. Using the BOD method, each policy 
maker attributes the weight factor he wants to each parameter, chosen in such a 
way that they maximise their broadband performance. Sometimes unrestricted, 
sometimes restricted, requiring a minimum weight of e.g. 10% for each 
parameter. The performance indicator is then constructed as the ratio of the 
individual performance to the benchmark performance, being the maximal 
performance. 
Next to the difficulty with determining the weight factors, obtaining the values 
for the different indicators is also challenging. All indicators introduced above 
have their own advantages and shortcomings. Penetration is easy to calculate, as 
the raw data is provided by several institutes, but it is a less correct indicator of 
good policy. The EU BPI includes different aspects, but its definitions are 
outdated. Especially if the PI would be used to estimate the impact of policy ex-
ante, the used metrics should be up to date and explanatory of policy. Therefore, 
we have chosen to adapt the EU BPI towards a Next Generation Access Network 
(NGAN) oriented BPI. The DAE reflects the current European policy goals, and 
its definitions are thus transferred to the updated BPI. 
3.5.3.b An NGAN oriented BPI 
The previous section clearly indicated that a good broadband performance index 
in which current and next generation technologies and the market functioning 
(e.g. competition and pricing) are included is missing. During our research, we 
developed a new broadband performance index for which we started from the 
original EU BPI and made changes where necessary. We used this newly 
developed BPI to assess the impact of policy decisions on the objectives of the 
policy maker. In this section we indicate the different updates made to the 
original BPI. Each dimension of the EU BPI will be elaborated on, and each 
change will be motivated. 
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Broadband rural coverage 
The rural coverage of broadband is the first dimension of the EU BPI, with a 
weight factor of 12.8%. For this parameter, it is important to define both 
broadband and rural coverage. In the original BPI, broadband was defined as 
access speeds over 2 Mbps. Currently, most European countries already achieved 
full coverage according to this definition. It may be clear that the introduction of 
NGAN will not improve this indicator, while this goal is present in the DAE. In 
the NGAN oriented BPI proposed here, the rural coverage definition is altered 
towards NGAN coverage. NGAN is defined as a network offering access speeds 
over 30Mbps, so it includes both the upgrade of existing cable and copper 
networks as well as the rollout of FTTx networks. However, while we continue 
to work with fixed speed to define broadband, a future BPI could include a time 
independent definition of broadband. This could be based on an equation 
including the current available access speeds and next generation technologies.  
The definition of rural coverage can be maintained, although NGAN rollout will 
initially focus on urban areas. As such, we relaxed the rural coverage into overall 
coverage for an NGAN. This means that when NGAN is rolled out in urban 
areas, this also improves the broadband performance of the area. 
 
Competition 
Above, we discussed the importance of a PI taking into account the different 
policy goals of NRAs. While the DAE leaves out competition, this dimension 
was included in the EU BPI as competition coverage, weighted at 16.7%. 
Competition coverage is the combination of two factors, namely the market share 
of new entrants and national coverage. In this definition, it is important to define 
what a new entrant is. Alternative Network Providers (ANP) can clearly be seen 
as new entrants, especially since their total market share in most markets is very 
limited. However, the EU BPI also includes cable operators in the new entrants 
segment. While this may hold for most cases, some exceptions should be 
allowed. For example, in Flanders (Belgium), the cable operator entered the 
market about 20 years ago and currently holds a market share of around 55% of 
all broadband users, while the former monopolist only holds 40% [3.21]. In this 
case, the cable operator should no longer qualify as a new entrant. 
This dimension can therefore be altered to only include ANPs. However, these 
can be players that operate on top of either an NGAN or the existing copper 
network. Additionally, when NRAs should decide to open up the cable network 
to ANPs as well, the market share of those operators should also be included in 
this dimension [3.22]. 
However, one can argue that this competition measure fails at capturing market 
concentration. Therefore, the competition indicator can be replaced by any 
measure of competition. For example, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is 
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a typically used to indicate market concentration [3.23]. The NGAN oriented 
BPI can implement different competition measures. 
 
Broadband price 
Broadband price is the umbrella covering three different dimensions of 
broadband pricing, to reflect the affordability of broadband. The first dimension 
is the median broadband price, corrected for speed (weight = 8.7%). This 
indicator is retained for the NGAN oriented BPI, with a minor change in the 
calculation method: the median is changed for the average price, which will 
allow using this index in more specific smaller scale (e.g. city networks) 
situations and theoretically abstracted (e.g. with less offers) studies. The two 
other dimensions of the broadband price are the average price for broadband 
slower than 2 Mbps and for broadband offering speeds between 2 and 8 Mbps 
(weights 3.8% and 3.4% resp.). While these were the typical speed baskets when 
the EU BPI was first launched, technological evolution has resulted in rising 
access speeds, towards 50 Mbps or even higher. Leaving these speeds out of the 
analysis would neglect the positive impact of network investments. Therefore, 
the speed baskets were updated towards more future proof baskets. In the NGAN 
BPI, the ‘low’ speed baskets represent all offers with a download speed under 30 
Mbps, while all retail offers with NGAN speeds (i.e. above 30 Mbps) are 
classified in the ‘high’ speed basket. It should be noted that the NGAN oriented 
BPI is an evolving PI and that these speed baskets are time dependent and should 
be updated to keep up with technological evolution. In addition, speed is now 
defined as (advertised) download (DL) speed. In future work, this could be 
extended towards including a composite index of speed, much like the 
Broadband Quality Score [3.17], thus including download speed, upload speed 
and latency. 
 
Speeds 
Coverage, competition and affordability were all covered in the previous 
parameters of the updated BPI. However, as the introduction of NGAN speeds to 
end consumers will most likely result in an increased uptake of advanced 
services, speed is also an important dimension of the BPI, split up in two 
separate parameters. 
The average speed is the first indicator (weight = 9.8%). It may be clear that with 
more NGAN being rolled out and taken up, the value of this indicator will rise. 
We therefore choose to retain this dimension in the NGAN oriented BPI. 
However, the second indicator, the percentage of subscribers with access speeds 
over 2 Mbps, is no differentiator towards NGAN (weight = 8.3%). For example 
in Belgium, almost 100% of the country is covered with DSL services, so 
upgrading the network towards NGAN would have no impact on this aspect. But 
when translating the Digital Agenda goals, which aim at full coverage of 30 
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Mbps, the change to this parameter is quite straightforward. The speed 
dimension in the NGAN oriented BPI now includes both average speed and 
coverage of 30 Mbps. 
 
Other dimensions 
The original BPI also includes dimensions like the take-up of advanced services 
and the socio-economic context (weights 19.6 and 17.4 resp.). Advanced services 
was interpreted as the number of customers using eServices, like eGovernment, 
eCommerce or eBanking. Socio-economic factors include ICT spending and PC 
penetration. We believe it is important to also include such parameters to assess 
the impact of regulatory decisions ex-post. However, when using performance 
indices to predict the impact of regulatory decisions, the quantification of these 
parameters would come with a large degree of uncertainty and subjectivity. 
Therefore, these dimensions are left out of the analysis. For a visual comparison 
of the original BPI and the new NGAN oriented BPI, we refer to Figure 3-12 and 
Figure 3-13. 
3.5.3.c What about the weight factors? 
When adapting the composite index EU BPI, the same arguments on the 
arbitrary nature of the weight factors can be made, as with every composite 
index. We have chosen to retain the weight factors, as these were the result of 
discussions between the national regulatory authorities of the European 
countries. However, since the eService uptake based metrics were excluded, the 
weight factors need to be rescaled so their sum is 1. In addition, it should be 
noted that the index we developed is built in such a way that weight factors can 
be easily changed by the user. This way, the user can differentiate between the 
importance of each of his objectives.  
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Figure 3-12: From the broadband performance index 
 
 
Figure 3-13: To an NGAN oriented BPI 
 
3.5.3.d Comparing countries on NGAN oriented BPI 
The NGAN oriented BPI developed serves as a composite index representing the 
impact of policy or investment decisions on the objectives of public players. In 
order to indicate how the NGAN oriented BPI works in practice, three countries 
will be compared in this section. The Netherlands, Sweden and Germany were 
selected due to their differences in DSL, cable and FTTH coverage and 
penetration. 
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The Netherlands 
The Netherlands are characterised by a high broadband penetration of 87.3%. 
Additionally, a strong cable presence (34%) can be observed, but only marginal 
take-up of fibre (2.7%). For the BPI, speeds and price levels are also required. 
According to point-topic [3.24], the market share of other licensed operators is 
around 10%. The values used can be found in Table 3-1. Broadband coverage in 
the Netherlands is currently 100%. However, this includes VDSL and cable 
coverage. FTTP coverage is only at 12.8% [3.25]. 
Table 3-1: Market parameters in the Netherlands 
Player Price Level Speed (DL) Market Share 
DSL €35.00 20 Mbps 40.60% 
ANP €35.00 20 Mbps 10.00% 
Cable €36.67 30 Mbps 34.00% 
Fibre €55.32 60 Mbps 2.7% 
Germany 
Compared to the Netherlands, the total broadband penetration in Germany is 
considerably lower (66.1%), with the largest market share for DSL. Fibre only 
accounts for 0.1%, and the presence of cable is also smaller than in the 
Netherlands. Coverage of FTTP in Germany is at the moment around 2.6%, 
while NGAN coverage is at 41.5%. On the DSL market, the incumbent still has a 
strong presence of over 50% [3.24]. The values used in the calculations of the 
BPI can be found in Table 3-2.  
Table 3-2: Market parameters in Germany 
Player Price Level Speed (DL) Market Share 
DSL €29.95 20 Mbps 30.00% 
ANP €29.95 20 Mbps 24.00% 
Cable €33.28 30 Mbps 12.00% 
Fibre €40.46 60 Mbps 0.1% 
Sweden 
Compared to the previous two countries, Sweden has the largest fibre 
penetration. Coverage is up to 34.8%, and uptake of fibre subscriptions already 
reaches 15%, five times higher than uptake in the Netherlands. Several reasons 
for this high uptake can be found. First, DSL and DOCSIS 3.0 coverage is low 
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compared to the other countries. In Germany, coverage of these technologies is 
around 40%, for the Netherlands this is almost 100%. On the contrary, in 
Sweden, VDSL coverage is only at 10% and DOCSIS 3.0 just over 25%. As a 
result, FTTP has the largest coverage, and can thus reach more people. Secondly, 
fibre broadband services are put at an interesting price level, below the average 
DSL and cable services (Table 3-3).   
Table 3-3: Market parameters in Sweden [3.24] 
Player Price Level Speed (DL) Market Share 
DSL €36.81 20 Mbps 26.00% 
ANP €36.81 20 Mbps 7.30% 
Cable €34.00 30 Mbps 12.20% 
Fibre €29.34 60 Mbps 15.00% 
3.5.3.e Measuring broadband performance - example 
First, we calculated the EU BPI for these three countries. Obviously, due to the 
small sample and the normalisation method used for the different parameters, the 
scores will diverge. Normalisation is performed using the Max-Min method 
[3.18]. With this approach, the highest scoring country receives a 1 score, while 
the lowest scoring country receives a score of 0. Obviously, due to our small 
sample, even with small difference between e.g. coverage, the impact on the EU 
BPI will be significant. For example, a coverage difference of 2% between the 
highest and lowest scoring country will still result in a 0.123 EU BPI difference. 
The scores thus indicate a ranking, but no conclusions can be drawn from the 
differences between the scores. Additionally, one should note that the maximum 
attainable NGAN BPI is 1, but this does not mean that this specific country could 
not improve its broadband performance. It only indicates that it is the best 
scoring country on all metrics. 
Based on the current data ([3.11], [3.24], [3.25]), Sweden (0.917) ranks highest 
on broadband performance, followed by the Netherlands (0.209) and Germany 
(0.165). Sweden is the best performing country on all but one indicator, namely 
coverage. However, the country shows a coverage of 97%, so there is little room 
for improvement. If coverage would reach 100%, the BPI of Sweden would be 1. 
Based on this analysis, one could conclude that broadband performance in 
Sweden is already very high, and there is even almost nothing left to do. 
However, this conclusion is only valid if the old definitions for broadband used 
in the EU BPI are applied and if the absolute scores would represent broadband 
performance. 
This indicates the importance of evolving metrics, following technological 
evolution, especially for metrics based on broadband speed definitions. The 
74 Chapter 3 
 
NGAN oriented BPI overcomes this issue. The ranking remains the same, with 
Sweden still outperforming the other two countries, but analysing each metric in 
detail still indicates room for improvement in all countries. It also unveils one of 
the greatest shortcomings of using composite indices to measure broadband 
performance. If all countries score poorly on all metrics, the best scoring country 
among them will still achieve a high score on the PI. Scores on PIs should 
therefore not be used as an indication of absolute performance, only of relative 
performance compared to peers. Only an analysis of the different underling 
metrics can offer such insight on absolute performance. 
It was indicated that the competition measure used in the BPI is flawed as 
measure for competition, as it cannot distinguish between high competition in a 
small area and low competition in a large area. We have replaced this metric by 
the HHI index. However, the results of the analysis stay the same. 
3.5.4 The importance of objectives 
As Peter Drucker, the founder of management by objectives said: “Management 
by objective works – if you know the objective. Ninety percent of the time you 
don’t.” Having a clear view on the objectives of the different actors is thus key 
when performing a techno-economic analysis. For private players, financial 
objectives are the most important, as they focus on shareholder value creation. A 
broad toolset exists to quantify these objectives, of which the NPV is the most 
widely used. For public players, which have additional non-financial oriented 
goals, the identification of their objectives is less straightforward. 
In the broadband market, a lot of non-profit oriented players are active. 
Governments and NRAs are two important actors who try to influence the 
outcome of the market. They aim at coverage, affordable prices and sufficient 
competition. The NGAN oriented BPI developed in this chapter allows to 
quantify their objectives. With this composite index, techno-economic analysis 
can also be conducted for these players. In addition, when private players try to 
optimise their strategy in light of possible future policies, the NGAN oriented 
BPI can be applied to indicate the impact of their strategy on policy makers, and 
vice versa. 
3.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter, we introduced two important aspects of techno-economic 
analysis, namely value network analysis and identification of actors’ objectives. 
Value network analysis offers valuable insight for the quantification steps of the 
techno-economic analysis. As it identifies roles, value flows and actors, it 
provides the building blocks for the techno-economic modelling of costs and 
revenues, an indication of the value exchanges between different roles, and an 
overview of the possible competitive interactions or cooperation opportunities.  
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Once the actors are identified, it is important to know the objectives of these 
actors. Private players typically have financial objectives, but when public 
players, like governments or regulators make decisions, they do not aim at 
creating monetary value, but typically at increasing social welfare. 
As the quantification of such policy goals is not straightforward, we have 
developed a composite broadband performance index. This index allows to 
assess the impact of policy decisions concerning broadband, like open access 
policy, price regulation, subsidisation, etc. on the objectives of public players. 
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4 
Real Option Methodology to 
Quantify Flexibility 
 “Flexibility has become a modern day value that everyone wants. But 
flexibility comes with a cost”, Maynard Webb 
In standard techno-economic analysis, when the actor’s objectives are quantified 
using net present value (NPV) to analyse the financial viability, the investment 
project is seen as a now or never decision without uncertainty. This assumption 
does not reflect reality. Initial estimates of customer uptake or operational costs 
turn out to be over- or underestimated, decreasing the return on investment. 
When this occurs, it is untrue that the decision maker will do nothing. If possible, 
necessary steps will be undertaken to increase the return. This concept is defined 
as managerial flexibility. Decision makers continuously have the flexibility to 
adapt the course of a project to act on positive and negative events to optimise 
the outcome of the project. Capturing this impact of both uncertainty and 
flexibility cannot be done by performing the NPV analysis introduced in the 
previous chapter. As a solution, options methodology has been introduced for 
investment projects. Real options (RO) offer a solution to better fit the economic 
analysis tools for investment problems to the underlying reality. In multi-period 
planning, the bill of material is calculated over more than one time period. This 
way, long term effects of the decision can be taken into account. In this 
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approach, building a decision tree for different options is a standard approach. 
Using real options, the flexibility to switch between different options can be 
calculated. 
Here, we offer an introduction to real option analysis and indicate how 
uncertainty and flexibility impact the valuation of an investment project, 
resulting in changing initial decisions made. 
Although research on real option theory has been ongoing for over four decades, 
it is only slowly getting accepted as valuation tool for investment problems in 
telecom. During this doctoral research, we have classified the existing research 
on real options in telecom and we have applied this technique ourselves to a 
plethora of different cases, showing how the real option concept is a natural 
extension of existing methodologies. These cases include sensor network 
deployment [4.1], core and access network migration [4.2], [4.3], but also pricing 
problems in network unbundling [4.4]. This work resulted in a real options 
tutorial, covering definitions, identification of options and methodologies to 
value real options in telecom [4.5]. In this chapter, we present the real option 
methodology, together with two applications of real options theory, namely the 
migration of existing core and access networks. We show how uncertainty 
impacts the business case valuation, and how real options can capture the value 
of managerial flexibility.  
4.1 Identifying flexibility in telecommunication 
The rollout of a new broadband access network, as analysed in detail in Chapter 
2, offers a broad range of flexibilities to the network owner in future stages. One 
flexibility we already indicated was the possibility to install extra capacity when 
the initial installation reached its limits.  
However, several other types of flexibility are present, and these can already be 
identified during the planning phase. The rollout of a new broadband access 
network requires large infrastructure works, which are typically spread over 
time. During the planning phase, operators will focus on rolling out first in areas 
where costs are low and expected revenues are high. As these areas are being 
connected, the operator gains insight in performance of the network in the field 
and customer uptake. Based on this progressing insight, the operator can adapt its 
initial deployment plan. New areas can be installed faster than initially planned, 
while other installations are postponed.  
Next to flexibility during the deployment phase, a network also offers 
opportunities once it is installed. As already indicated, extra capacity can be 
installed, serving multiple purposes. The extra capacity can be used to connect 
new customers in the same area, or users can be offered higher access speeds. 
Incumbents have upgraded services from dial-up to VDSL and higher. Cable 
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operators followed the same track, upgrading to subsequent generations of 
DOCSIS.  
And by using the same network, operators can offer additional services to their 
customers. While the copper infrastructure was originally used for telephony, 
operators extended their product portfolio towards data and television. And they 
now not only offer residential services, equipment has been installed to support 
local loop unbundling. As a result, other operators can use the incumbent’s 
network to offer their own broadband services. 
It may be clear that in telecom, there is a long history of players having and 
exploiting the flexibility the technology and equipment offers. Flexible 
deployment planning, subsequent technology upgrades or new services are all 
examples of telecom operators acting flexibly to changing opportunities. 
However, the question arises how to incorporate this flexibility into the techno-
economic analysis. Real options provide a solution. 
4.2 An introduction to real options 
4.2.1 Real option basics 
For telecom projects, the feasibility of new project proposals is assessed through 
a techno-economic analysis, introduced in Chapter 2 and an NPV analysis, as 
performed in Chapter 3. To implement the value of flexibility, the real option 
concept was derived from financial literature. An excellent definition of real 
options is given in [4.6]. “Real options is a systematic approach and integrated 
solution using financial theory, economic analysis, management science, 
decisions sciences, statistics and econometric modelling in applying options 
theory in valuing real physical assets as opposed to financial assets, in a 
dynamic and uncertain business environment where decisions are flexible in the 
context of strategic capital investment decision-making, valuing investment 
opportunities and project capital expenditures.”  
As this definition states, the real option (RO) theory is based on the option 
concept as used in financial markets. A financial option is defined as the right to 
buy or sell an asset for a predefined price during or at the end of an agreed 
period. When the option can only be exercised at the end of the period, it is a 
European option. In the other case it is an American option. Hybrid options also 
exist; the option can be exercised on several dates during the agreed period. 
These are categorised as Bermuda options. Next to a differentiation between 
options based on the time they can be exercised, they can also be divided into 
call and put options. While a call option is the right to buy, a put option refers to 
the right to sell an asset. Other additional terminology from option theory is the 
option price and strike price. The first is also known as the option premium, or 
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the price to acquire the option. The latter refers to the price to exercise the 
option. Options on options also exist and are called compound options. 
The value of an option is dependent on several aspects. The first is a time 
component. During the time period before (possibly) exercising the option (at the 
strike price), an option can be in, at or out of the money. Assume an American 
call option, the right to buy a stock for a predetermined price X. In addition, 
consider that currently the value of the stock is S. When S < X, the option is out 
of the money and it is useless to execute the option today, since it is more 
interesting to buy the stock on the market. However, this does not mean the 
option has no value. As long as the option has not expired, the underlying asset 
can go up in value. This probability of S > X, or the option being in the money, 
before the final exercise date of the option, results in a value for the option. 
Obviously, the longer before the exercise date, the higher the probability the 
option will be in the money on this date. As such, the value of an option 
increases with the time left to the final exercise date. At this date, either S < X, 
and the option will expire, having zero value or, when S > X, the option will be 
exercised with a value of S – X. In summary, the value of an option on the 
exercise date equals MAX(0,S – X). 
Transferring the financial option concept towards business investment decisions 
is quite straightforward. For an introduction to the foundations of real option 
theory, we refer to [4.7 - 4.12]. 
Making an initial investment typically results in future flexibility during the 
entire investment lifetime. RO analysis implements this flexibility in the 
previous static NPV calculation. For example, the initial static NPV analysis 
showed the rollout of a Long Term Evolution (LTE) network to be profitable 
under certain uptake assumptions. These assumptions may have changed after a 
few years. The static NPV analysis does not allow any flexibility here but a RO 
analysis offers the possibility to value the possibility to perform a small scale 
rollout and expand to neighbouring regions later on during the project if uptake 
exceeds initial expectations. Conducting the RO analysis calculation will result 
in the value of this option to expand.  
4.2.2 Real option categories 
Different examples of real options were already introduced in the previous 
sections. In general, these examples can be subdivided into three distinct 
categories, namely growth, shrink and learning options (Figure 4-1). The 
category of growth options are related to possible follow up investments during a 
later stage in the project. When telecom projects are concerned, examples of 
growth options are the expansion of the network to adjacent regions, a 
technology upgrade from ADSL to VDSL2, or even an extension of the product 
portfolio from double play to triple play. The shrink option category consists of 
the opposite type of options. When the initial assumptions overestimated the 
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consumer adoption or technology evolution makes some products redundant, 
management has a disinvestment option. A project can be completely abandoned, 
like the mobile TV broadcasting service from British Telecom. Regarding the 
telephony market, the ISDN product was withdrawn when it had no more 
potential. Learning options are a specific type of options, where investments are 
postponed until extra information or experience is gained. Conducting market 
studies or rigorous testing of a new technology before its implementation are 
only two examples.  
The most well-known real options categorisation is the 7S framework by 
Copeland and Keenan [4.7]. The different real options categories are summarised 
in Figure 4-1 and some typical telecom examples are added. The different 
categories are described in the following paragraphs. 
 
Description
Sequential investments in a 
later stage as market grows
Switch products, process or 
plants given a shift in underlying 
price or demand
Enter another industry when 
cost-effectively possible. Link 
and leverage.
Delay investments until more 
information and/or skills are 
acquired
Shrink or shut down a project if 
new information changes the 
expected payoffs
Switch to more cost-effective 
and flexible assets as new 
information is obtained
Limit the scope of operations in 
a related industry when there is 
no further potential
SCALE UP
STUDY/
START
SCOPE UP
SWITCH UP
SCALE DOWN
SCOPE 
DOWN
SWITCH 
DOWN
INVEST
GROW
LEARN
SHRINK
DISINVEST
Telecom examples
Phased network 
rollout
Acquiring licenses
Technology upgrade, 
e.g. ADSL to VDSL2 
or 2G to 3G
Triple play
Bitstream access
Trial project
Testing of LTE
Market studies
Adapting network rollout 
scenario
Abandoning project
Withdrawal from 
ISDN market
Lease wavelengths 
instead of dark fiber in 
case of lower demand
 
Figure 4-1: Overview of the 7S framework [4.7] and telecom examples 
4.2.2.a Scale up and down options 
The scale of the project can be expanded or reduced. A scale down option 
indicates that the scale of the project is reducible. During the rollout phase, 
opting for a slower rollout is a form of scale down option. The ultimate form of 
scale down consists of abandoning the project. In this case, revenues are gained 
from selling the infrastructure. Under positive circumstances, the scale up option 
becomes more attractive. Rollout can be sped up, or the zone can be expanded to 
neighbouring regions.  
In literature, most of these options have been applied in the telecommunication 
industry. Infrastructure rollout of both wired and wireless networks and the 
related investment costs are one of the major topics. The scale of such projects 
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covers large areas and both rollout area and speed can be changed to optimise 
investment return. Abandoning the project due to unsatisfactory results is a 
special case of a scale down option, where the rollout speed is reduced to zero. 
One must take into account that abandoning a project results in exceptional 
revenues from the sale of the assets. After acquiring a 4G licence, management 
can abandon the rollout of the 4G network in worst case scenarios and put the 
licence up for sale. The value of such a sale will be very case specific. Selling a 
spectrum license for which no market existed will have only low value, while the 
sale of infrastructure with multiple purposes can have a higher value. Buildings 
are an example of the latter category. 
4.2.2.b Study or start options 
Another important option for telecom related projects is the study/start option. 
When a new technology enters the market, several parameters remain uncertain. 
The first one is the uncertainty linked with the technology itself. Is it efficient 
enough to handle high bitrates over long distances? What is the mean time 
between failure of the different components? Rigorous testing of the technology, 
field tests and trials can offer more insight into the technological performance 
and after the testing period, management has the option whether or not to go with 
the new technology. For example in Belgium, Telenet decided to wait with the 
nationwide rollout of LTE and started testing it on a small site.  
Next to technological uncertainty, adoption of the new product is also a 
problematic parameter. Before introducing a new product, management can only 
make an educated guess about the market potential and adoption speed. A wait 
and see strategy can therefore be interesting. During this period, customer 
surveys can offer extra insight into the market. For example, in the wireless 
broadband market, only 0.40% of the world population uses mobile broadband, 
but this is region dependent [4.13]. Instead of hitting the national market with 
mobile broadband offers, an operator could use a wait and see strategy and 
perform customer surveys to gain better insight into the customer demands.  
The last uncertain parameter that can offer study/start possibilities is the 
regulatory evolution. In the Fibre to the Home (FTTH) debate, uncertainty about 
the future regulatory actions taken by the European Commission in the local loop 
access postpones the rollout of fibre networks in Europe. 
4.2.2.c Switch up and down options 
Next to the scale of the project, several other parameters also render flexibility. 
In a production environment, managers can choose to upgrade machine 
technology during the project, e.g. to produce better quality products. Changing 
technology can prove useful during the project lifetime, but results in an extra 
cost at the start of the project. So it is important to make the trade-off between 
the flexibility value and the initial cost of this flexibility. Switching from ADSL 
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to VDSL is an example of a switch up option in fixed access markets. The 
consumers are offered higher speeds, but this requires an investment by the 
operators. Fibre needs to be brought closer to the customer, so large deployment 
investments are typically required. 
4.2.2.d Scope up and down options 
The last possible option is the scope up or down option. While a scale option 
changes the geographical region and the switch option allows flexibility in the 
technology, the scope option focuses on the flexibility of the product portfolio. 
Management can choose to offer extra products to the customers, or reduce their 
offer. The move towards triple play is an example of operators lifting their scope 
up options. 
4.3 Real option methodology 
In this section, the methodology commonly used to perform real option analyses 
is discussed [4.8], [4.9]. However, before the RO analysis can be conducted, the 
business case must be assessed on three conditions. First, there needs to be 
uncertainty in the project. During the standard NPV evaluation, some 
assumptions influencing the future costs and revenues have been made. 
However, some of these assumptions come with a certain degree of uncertainty. 
Future customer uptake, the future price of raw materials and components can 
only be estimated. When this is the case, the project meets the first condition. 
Secondly, the project should offer some kind of flexibility. This flexibility can 
easily be recognised if one of the options in the 7S framework is present in the 
case. Such flexibility allows the decision maker to counter the uncertainty. The 
last condition concerns the timing aspect. A real option analysis can only be 
performed if the investment decision covers a two (or more) phased project. An 
initial decision is made at the start of the project, but extra decisions can be made 
during later stages of the project. For example, an operator can, after completion 
of the first part of the network, still decide in later stages what his next steps will 
be. Will he do nothing or extend the network to other regions? After the case has 
been assessed, based on these three conditions, a clear methodology needs to be 
followed to perform the RO analysis. In this dissertation, we use the 
methodology proposed in [4.14], which is based on [4.8] and [4.9]. While a 
standard techno-economic analysis results in an NPV analysis, the RO analysis 
methodology extends the techno-economic methodology with three extra steps. 
The RO analysis thus consists of four steps. First, a standard NPV analysis is 
conducted. The second and third steps of the methodology are closely linked 
with the preconditions. In essence, the second step comes down to identifying the 
uncertain input parameters of the project influencing the result. The third step 
links back to the second and third condition listed above and consists of 
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identifying the options. When the management has no options to act against the 
changing parameters, performing a real option analysis is pointless. To identify 
the different options present in the studied case, the 7S framework can be used. 
In step four, the actual calculation of the option value is performed. The 
conditions and methodology are summarised in Figure 4-2. Before indicating 
how the different steps work in practice by elaborating a simple toy example, 
more detail is given on the different calculation techniques for real options. 
 
 
Figure 4-2: Conditions and methodology to perform a real option analysis 
4.3.1 Real option valuation techniques 
As was already introduced above, a real option analysis always starts from the 
standard NPV, which is currently used by network planners. In fact, the standard 
discounted Cash Flow (CF) approach is a special case of the real option analysis, 
evaluating the project as if no flexibility is present. It is therefore vital to start 
any RO analysis with a correct standard NPV valuation. The total value of a 
Uncertainty
Can I identify 
different future 
scenarios?
Flexibility
Can I counter 
uncertainty?
Phased decision
Can the final 
decision be 
postponed?
RO 
analysis?
1. Execute a standard NPV analysis
Perform a regular techno-economic analysis, as if no 
real options were present.
2. Identify the uncertainties
Find out which parameters impact the result the 
most, and how certain their value is. Typical numbers 
on customer adoption come with a degree of 
uncertainty.
3. Identify the flexibility
Use the 7S framework to indicate how the 
uncertainty in the project can be countered during the 
project path.
4. Calculate the option value
Compare the value of the case with the option with 
the standard case. Different calculation methods 
exist.
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project is expressed by the following formula (eq. 4.1)
5
. 
 
 Project value = NPV + Option value (4.1) 
 
Three different solution methods have been proposed to calculate the value of 
real options in investment projects. We will give a short description of each of 
them in the following sections. 
4.3.1.a Black and Scholes model 
Since real options are derived from financial options, it is logical that the 
calculation methods for financial options were transferred to real option 
valuation. The mathematical Black and Scholes model is one of the most used 
option valuation models in the financial sector [4.15]. It was developed in 1973 
to evaluate the value of a European option. This indicates the first underlying 
assumption of the model, namely the option can only be exercised at the end of 
the time period. Most of the parameters of the mathematical model are 
straightforward but others cannot be directly transferred to investment projects. 
Calculating the static NPV refers to the first step of the proposed methodology. 
Parameters like the exercise price and lifetime can also be directly linked to the 
investment problem. The exercise price of the option for an investment project is 
the income from exercising the option, and can again simply be calculated using 
the standard NPV analysis. The lifetime equals the time period (in years) during 
which the company has the opportunity to execute in the option. For the risk free 
interest rate, the return on assets that are considered risk free is typically used. 
Examples of such assets are German or US government bonds. However, the 
parameter posing most problems is the project uncertainty (σ), expressed in 
percentage terms. For financial assets, this is linked with the volatility of the 
underlying asset, e.g. stock or oil prices. As these options, or the underlying 
assets are traded on financial markets, it is easy to calculate this volatility. For 
real options, where such a market is absent, this calculation cannot be made and 
should be estimated. Estimating this value for an investment project is not that 
straightforward. What is for example the project uncertainty of a wireless licence 
purchase and the investment in base stations? Another assumption of the Black 
and Scholes model is that S(t) is a geometric Brownian motion, i.e. 
     
    
 
           where      is a Wiener process. Hence, 
  
    
    
                 where      is normally distributed with mean 
0 and standard deviation   . Again, for stocks this is a reasonable assumption, 
but not for investment projects. These drawbacks make this calculation method 
less suited for realistic business cases.  
In addition, there is an important difference between financial and real options, 
                                                          
5 The option cost is included in the NPV term of the equation.  
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which results in the Black and Scholes formula being less accurate for real 
option valuation. Financial options are by definition independent of each other. 
Exercising a call or put option has no influence on the value of other options, or 
on the value of the underlying asset. Real options typically do interact. In a 
simple example, a company has a scale up option to expand a factory and a scale 
down option where the factory is sold. When executing the scale down option, 
the scale up option loses its value. As Black and Scholes calculates the value of 
an option portfolio as the sum of the values of the independent options, this 
cannot be translated to a real option portfolio. As a result, the Black and Scholes 
model outcome overestimates the value of the real option. These drawbacks 
make the Black and Scholes formula less suited for real option valuation. 
 
                        
           (4.2) 
With: 
   
   
 
       
  
   
   
 
(4.3) 
           (4.4) 
 
S    = future cash flows 
X   = exercise price 
t     = option lifetime  
σ    = project uncertainty 
rf    = risk free interest rate 
N    = cumulative normal distribution 
 
The Black and Scholes formula to calculate the value of a call option is shown 
above (eq. 4.2 – 4.4). When having a closer look at the two terms of the 
equation, the two important parts of the Black and Scholes model can be 
observed. The first term returns the expected benefit of doing the investment 
right away, while the second term reflects the value of paying the exercise price 
on the expiration date, weighted by the probability of exercising the option. The 
formula also indicates the impact of time on the option value. Increasing t will 
result in a higher d1 and a smaller d2, resulting in a higher option value. 
In order to calculate the value of a put option through Black and Scholes, the 
concept of call-put parity for European options can be used (eq. 4.5). This parity 
states that the sum of the value of a call option and the present value (PV) of the 
strike price equals the sum of the value of a put option and the current value of 
the underlying asset. For more background on financial option valuation 
information, we refer to [4.16]. 
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             (4.5) 
 
With: 
  C  = value of the call option 
  PV(X)  = present value of the exercise price 
  P = value of the put option 
  S = future cash flows 
Application of Black and Scholes to real option valuation 
In this simplified illustrative example, the Black and Scholes formula will be 
applied to the valuation of a put option. However, we would like to stress again 
that the underlying conditions for Black and Scholes are not fulfilled for realistic 
cases. 
A telecom operator bought a licence for €3.1 million, valid for 5 years. The 
expected future cash flows of this fictitious example during this period can be 
found in Table 4-1. Conducting the NPV analysis with a required return of 10%, 
results in cumulative future expected cash flows of €2.975.339, insufficient to 
cover the initial expense, and thus a negative NPV of €-124.661. According to 
this analysis, the project would not be executed. However, the operator has the 
option to sell the licence back after one year for €2 million. As stopping the 
project is a clear put option, both the Black and Scholes formula for a call option 
and the call-put parity will be applied here. 
 
Table 4-1: Fictitious yearly cash flows from licence 
Year Cash flow 
1 €582.000 
2 €687.000 
3 €821.000 
4 €929.000 
5 €1.010.000 
 
In the first step, the required parameters are calculated or estimated (Table 4-2). 
Above, the expected future cash flows (S), the lifetime of the option (t) and the 
exercise price (X) were already given. In addition, the formula requires the risk-
free interest rate (rf) and the volatility of the underlying cash flows (σ
2
). As 
already indicated, the return on risk free government bonds is typically used for 
rf. However, the volatility of the expected cash flows is much harder to estimate. 
Here, a value of 50% is used. Choosing a high value indicates that the project is 
very risky and the prediction comes with a large degree of uncertainty. With 
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these parameters, the Black and Scholes formula for a call option returns a value 
of €1.191.295. 
Using the call-put parity, the value of the put option in this example can be 
calculated straightforwardly. The PV of the exercise price is €1.902.459, 
resulting in a put option value of €260.067. The total value of the project now 
equals the sum of the NPV and the option value, €135.406. 
It is important to notice that the estimation of the project uncertainty has a major 
impact on the option value. If the future cash flows are assessed as less uncertain, 
and the operator uses a volatility of 25%, the option value drops to €118.415. 
With this option value, the total project remains value destroying. 
The effect from timing on the option value was already indicated above. The 
longer the time before expiration, the higher the probability of the option 
becoming in the money. In this example, if the operator can wait two years 
instead of one before he has to make the decision to abandon or continue the 
project, the put option value rises to €432.787. 
 
Table 4-2: Black and Scholes parameters 
Parameter Value 
S €2.975.339 
X €2.000.000 
T 1 
   50% 
   5% 
 
4.3.1.b Binomial tree model 
The binomial tree model is a discrete time model. A binomial tree model is 
applicable to simple processes. The main assumption is that the uncertain input 
can only take discrete values. This allows modelling the problem by a tree 
structure. The main assumption results in both the greatest advantage and 
disadvantage of the model. An uncertain parameter only taking discrete values 
largely simplifies the analysis, but realistic cases are generally subject to 
continuous uncertainty. Detailed examples using the binomial tree method can be 
found in [4.9]. The toy example used to indicate the methodology in Section 
4.3.2 is an application of the binomial tree model method. 
4.3.1.c Monte Carlo simulation 
The Monte Carlo simulation is the last calculation method we will discuss. While 
the two previous models allow for a simple option value calculation, they both 
have their own drawbacks. Their underlying assumptions do not always match 
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reality. A Monte Carlo simulation solves these problems but results in a more 
complicated calculation method. Sawilowsky defines the Monte Carlo simulation 
as a repeated sampling to determine the properties of a phenomenon [4.17]. 
To perform a Monte Carlo analysis, spreadsheet based solutions exist. In general, 
these consist of extending a standard NPV analysis with the existing options. 
Since an option comes down to maximising payoff, this procedure is quite 
straightforward. After indicating all uncertain input parameters with an 
appropriate probability distribution, the Monte Carlo simulation can be 
conducted. Choosing these probability distributions for the input parameters is 
the most delicate task in the Monte Carlo simulation. For every simulation, the 
input parameter is randomly sampled from the defined probability distribution 
and the best project path is selected. The NPV is calculated for thousands to 
hundreds of thousands of possible combinations of input parameters sampled 
from the predefined distributions. As indicated, the model automatically selects 
the best option in each scenario. The result from a Monte Carlo analysis is a 
probability distribution of the expected payoff. From this distribution, an 
extended NPV can be derived, together with the option value for the studied 
case. This extended NPV is the average of the probability distribution, while the 
option value is the additional value of this average compared to the standard 
NPV. Additional information that can be drawn from such a probability 
distribution is the impact of the option on the risk associated with the project. 
Typically, an option decreases the probability of a low payoff, and increases the 
probability of more positive result. Existing software solutions exist that allow 
extending an existing spreadsheet techno-economic analysis with specific 
uncertainties and conduct the Monte Carlo analysis [4.18]. More information on 
Monte Carlo basics can be found in [4.19].  
4.3.1.d Comparison of the valuation methods 
The three valuation methods introduced above each have their advantages and 
disadvantages (Table 4-3). 
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Table 4-3: Comparison of valuation methods 
Technique Pro Contra 
Black and Scholes 
Simple to use 
Spreadsheet calculation 
Not suited for real options 
Conditions not satisfied 
Parameter estimation 
(volatility!) 
Option portfolio valuation 
Binomial tree 
Discrete choices 
Spreadsheet calculation 
Intuitive 
No continuous uncertainty 
What about additional 
uncertain parameters? 
Monte Carlo 
Realism 
Based on typical 
spreadsheet model 
Requires advanced software 
Estimating uncertainty 
4.3.2 The methodology in practice: a simple example 
Before moving to a realistic application of RO analysis, the methodology is 
applied to a toy example, to allow the reader to become familiar with the 
different concepts. By following the four-step methodology, the toy example will 
indicate how uncertainty and flexibility can be identified, categorised and 
quantified. The following investment project is considered. A mobile network 
operator bought a licence for 100 and has to decide today if he will roll out the 
network in a large or in a small area. But due to uncertain market perspectives, 
he does not know exactly how many customers will be willing to buy his 
product. The entrepreneur believes the probabilities of a small or large market 
equals 50%. The investment cost for the small area is 50 at t1, while an 
additional 200 is required to deploy the network in the large area. The expected 
costs and revenues can be found in Figure 4-3. Notice that in this short case 
description, two of the three different conditions to perform a RO analysis are 
present. We will discuss all conditions in more detail. 
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Figure 4-3: Expected cost and revenues for two installation options in the toy 
example 
Uncertainty 
The network operator is not sure about his customer potential and the 
revenues related to these customers. He estimates that there is a 50% chance 
of high sales and a 50% chance of low sales. 
Flexibility 
The operator has two choices. Either he installs the network in a large area, 
or he deploys a network in a small area. 
Phased process 
Looking at this case, we do not see two phases in the investment process. 
However, nothing forces the network operator to decide today if he deploys 
the network in the large area. He can decide today to only deploy a small 
network and expand next year. 
 
The results of the first step of the methodology, the standard NPV analysis, are 
presented in Figure 4-4. Where the operator installs the large network, his payoff 
is the weighted average of 50 and 450, or 250. The additional cost for the larger 
rollout was subtracted from the expected revenues. In the other case he will only 
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gain €175. The standard NPV analysis thus indicates that the operator should 
deploy the large network from the start, since this maximises his payoff. Notice 
that in order not to overcomplicate the toy example, the required return was set 
to zero. 
 
Figure 4-4: A simple example - Step 1: NPV analysis 
 
The second step, identifying the uncertainties in the case, was performed when 
describing the three preconditions. The operator is uncertain about the customer 
uptake of his service and on the type of area to cover. When checking the third 
condition, the operator has the flexibility to wait and postpone his investment 
decision until he has more information on the customer uptake. For the 
investment decision, he has the choice between keeping the small network or 
expand to the large area. The value of the real option can now be calculated. 
We start by analysing the different scenarios under the uncertainty. In case there 
is a low customer uptake, staying with the small network has the best payoff. In 
case of high customer uptake, the expansion towards the larger area clearly 
returns the best result. 
Now remember this project consists of two stages. When identifying the 
flexibility, we indicated that the operator had the option to postpone his 
investment decision until he had gained extra information on the customer 
uptake. What is now the value of the option to wait? If he waits, he will be able 
to better assess the customer uptake on the day he makes the investment decision 
for the expansion. Within the constraints of the example, where no competitive 
800400
400250
250
175
low
uptake
high
uptake
5
0
%
5
0
%
uncertain user uptake
NPV
t2 t3
large
roll-out
small
roll-out
cost: 350
cost: 150
Real Option Analysis Methodology to Quantify Flexibility 95 
interaction is present and no revenues are lost, waiting ensures the operator will 
make the best decision in the future. If he notices a low uptake he will keep his 
original small network, in the other case he will expand towards the larger area 
(Figure 4-5). In both the low and high uptake case, he chooses the scenario 
having the highest payoff. With the option to wait, our operator knows he has a 
50% chance on a payoff of 450 and 50% chance on a payoff of 100, or a total 
value of the project of 275. It is now straightforward to get the option value from 
this analysis. Compared with the standard NPV case analysis, the RO analysis 
returns a RO value which is 25 higher. This is exactly the value of the option to 
wait. 
 
 
Figure 4-5: Step 4: Value of the option to wait 
4.4 Application domains of ROA in telecom 
Real options have been applied to a wide range of investment projects from mine 
valuation to initial public offer valuation [4.9]. Some more telecom related 
examples are described below. A literature review of real option application to 
telecom examples can be found in Table 4-4. 
Most of the existing literature applies real options to telecom infrastructure 
rollout [4.9], [4.20-4.23]. This rollout is related to a large investment covering 
several years and thus allows for flexibility in the rollout path. The scale of such 
projects covers large areas, and both the rollout area and speed can be changed 
during the project to optimise the return on investment. Abandoning the project 
due to unsatisfactory results is a special case of a real option. A quantitative and 
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simplified example to illustrate real options is the M-commerce project, 
describing an investment by a telecommunications firm [4.9]. This is a typical 
example of a scale up and scale down option. During the project, management 
has two options, either expanding the project scale by 60% if expectations are 
exceeded, or abandoning the project completely and reaping the salvage value. 
Another paper describing scale options in telecom networks is [4.20]. The 
feasibility of Mobile WiMAX as an alternative for fixed DSL and HFC networks 
is analysed, with the possibility of extending the scale of the project. Several 
rollout scenarios are studied, changing the rollout location from nationwide to 
only in urban areas and with the option to change rollout speed. 
Table 4-4: Real options in telecom literature 
Option Flexibility Reference Uncertainty 
Scale 
up/down 
Rollout area 
[4.1], [4.9], [4.20], 
[4.22 – 4.23] 
Adoption 
Costs 
Tariffs 
Speed up/slow 
down rollout 
[4.1], [4.20] 
Adoption 
Costs 
Tariffs 
Abandon 
project 
[4.9], [4.26] 
Adoption 
Costs 
Tariffs 
Switch 
up/down 
Technology [4.22] 
Firm value 
Adoption 
Costs 
Regulation 
Scope 
up/down 
Offering bit 
stream access 
  
Study/start 
Trial project [4.21] 
Technology 
Performance 
Market 
 [4.21 – 4.23] 
Technology 
Regulation 
 
Study/start options have also been applied extensively to telecom network 
problems. In [4.21], the rollout of a WiMAX network in Eindhoven is studied. 
Before starting the complete rollout, the operator has the choice to do a field trial 
to analyse the technological performance. In the second phase, based on the 
results from the trial phase, the operator can decide to invest or abandon the 
project. 
Licences for wireless networks are known to be very expensive, so it is important 
to correctly evaluate the licence investment. For example, in the UK, 35 billion 
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dollars was paid for the 3G licences. In [4.24], the authors try to estimate the 
value of these licences based on a real option approach. Buying the 3G licence 
resulted in acquiring a strong market position and a broad range of options, 
including scale up, switch up and down and temporarily halting the project. This 
research showed that with the correct valuation techniques, the value of the 3G 
licence was close to the price paid for the acquisition. Spectrum management is 
closely linked with telecom licences. Dynamic spectrum management, with a 
two stage assignment through the use of options was proposed in [4.25]. The 
option concept allowed calculating the penalty value and the overbooking ratio. 
A lot of research has been performed on the impact of regulation on investment 
decisions by network operators. Regulatory bodies imposed local loop 
unbundling (LLU) on the incumbent operators to improve competition. For new 
entrants, LLU has the advantage that they do not have to make large investments 
in network infrastructure before they can offer network services. However, fixing 
the price for network access is not straightforward. One should take into account 
that new entrants should also pay for the financial risk of the incumbent since he 
did invest in the network infrastructure. LLU in fact offers a study/start option to 
new entrants, while the incumbent gave up his option when he invested. 
However, the starting position for the deployment of the copper infrastructure 
was monopoly. Today, this rationale is applicable to the deployment of fibre 
infrastructure. Operators have the option to wait before deploying new access 
network infrastructure. Gradually migrating towards more fibre-rich networks 
also reflects this. In [4.4] and [4.26], this problem has been discussed in more 
detail. Next to large infrastructure investment cases, real option valuation theory 
has also been applied to service oriented cases, e.g. [4.27] applied real options to 
the case of the Belgian rail operator offering internet services on board. 
With the real option methodology at hand, the next section will extend on 
different cases. The first case applies RO valuation to the migration towards 
FTTC networks [4.3]. In Chapter 2 and 3, this case was already introduced, and a 
standard NPV analysis has been performed. However, it was already indicated 
that during this analysis, the impact of uncertainty and flexibility was not taken 
into account. By extending the analysis with a RO analysis, we show how this 
uncertainty and flexibility impacts the initial valuation. 
The second case studies the migration of core networks from fixed grid networks 
to flexible-grid networks [4.2]. Comparable to the FTTC migration case, 
operators here have different options and uncertainty impacts their results. 
However, this case is particularly interesting, as the extended valuation shows 
that having the flexibility does not pay off. We included this case to show how 
options not directly result in an increase of the investment value, but that options 
sometimes can be worthless. A third and fourth example, researching the option 
value in sensor network deployment and determining the flexibility value in 
access pricing, are also included [4.1], [4.4]. 
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4.5 Migrating towards FTTC networks 
To indicate the power of real options on realistic business cases, the RO analysis 
technique will be applied to the telecom infrastructure network project 
introduced in Chapter 2. The studied case consists of the rollout of an FTTC 
access network in the UK [4.3]. FTTH networks are the final stage in the 
continuous upgrade of the copper access networks. However, many networks 
still require upgrading towards FTTC networks. It is this infrastructure 
investment that is considered (Figure 4-6).  
In this case, the existing copper access network in London is migrated towards 
an FTTC network. An incumbent currently possesses a nationwide copper access 
network, which has already been upgraded towards Fibre to the Central Office. 
This allows offering ADSL services to its customers. In order to offer higher 
access speeds to its end customers, the incumbent has decided to upgrade its 
network towards FTTC, allowing it to offer VDSL services. At the start of the 
project, the operator first has to decide on the cabinet size. The operator can 
decide to deploy cabinets which are large enough to host a connection for each 
household in the cabinet area. Or he can decide to deploy smaller (and cheaper) 
cabinets initially, only dimensioned for an estimated uptake percentage of 30%. 
 
Figure 4-6: Overview of copper access network topology 
 
After conducting the standard NPV analysis in Chapter 3, it was concluded that 
the installation of small cabinets was the most profitable investment. However, it 
should be clear that basing the investment decision on the outcome at this point 
of the analysis could prove to be suboptimal. In Chapter 2, scenario and 
sensitivity analysis were introduced as methods to capture uncertainty.  
A scenario analysis will be conducted comparing the initial installation of small 
and large cabinets under different customer uptake scenarios. This scenario 
analysis will be extended with a sensitivity analysis to indicate the impact of 
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uncertainty on the outcome and as such on the final decision made. Thirdly, we 
will indicate the different real options present in this case and show how they can 
be quantified using the methodology presented in the previous section. Indeed, 
when checking for the three conditions necessary to make a business case 
eligible to extend with a RO analysis, we find all three of them present.  
Uncertainty 
There is undoubtedly a large degree of uncertainty present in this case. 
The revenues of the project are based on a mathematical adoption 
model, where the chosen parameters are in the best case “guesstimates”. 
Flexibility 
There is flexibility present in the choice of cabinet to install. In case the 
small cabinet is installed in the first phase, the operator has several 
options once the capacity constraints of this cabinet are reached. The 
operator can decide to install a second small cabinet, or he can invest in 
a more future proof access network by migrating towards FTTH. 
Phased decision 
The network operator is not obliged to stick with the small cabinets 
when they cannot host extra connections under larger customer 
adoption. This is where the timing condition can be found. On a later 
date in the project, the network operator can decide to expand the 
capacity or to start offering extra services. 
  
This business case lends itself to a real option analysis, since all three conditions 
are met. Additionally, most option types from the 7S framework can be 
identified (Figure 4-7). Once a cabinet is full, a simple scale option exists in 
placing a second cabinet to host the extra connections. A switch option for full 
cabinets is the installation of an FTTH solution for the extra customers. When a 
scope option is considered, installing extra equipment in the local exchange to 
upgrade your internet service portfolio towards IPTV and gaining extra revenues 
is possible. Since realistic business cases generally possess a wide variety of real 
options, we also introduce compound real options. It will also be shown how 
they influence the decision process in the standard case. 
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Figure 4-7: Possible installation paths for an FTTC network 
4.5.1 Impact of uncertainty on the final decision 
The standard NPV analysis identified the installation of small cabinets for the 
London geotype as the most profitable scenario (Section 2.3). Step two of the 
RO analysis methodology requires identifying the uncertainties present in the 
case. As always in long term infrastructure projects, all input parameters are 
uncertain, especially in the long run. In order not to overcomplicate the analysis, 
we have chosen user adoption as the major uncertainty, as this is also the main 
driver for the bill of material. 
User adoption is typically the most uncertain factor in an economic analysis. 
Before the introduction of a new product or service, it is very hard to estimate 
how many consumers will buy it. On the other hand, it is a factor with a high 
impact on the final economic assessment [4.28]. Research into the adoption of 
new services and products has indicated that consumer adoption generally can be 
modelled using a bell curve, with the Rogers’ bell curve as the most well-known 
for technology adoption [4.29]. These models have been translated to 
mathematical S-curve penetration models, from which we have chosen the 
Gompertz curve in this business case [4.30-4.32]. However, while these models 
ex-post show a good fit with the observed adoption, it is hard to estimate the 
different parameters ex-ante. This is especially true for the market potential, 
since this can typically only be quantified through market studies. Another 
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difficulty with the adoption of the service for a larger area like London is that the 
average market potential estimated for the entire area might be correct, but large 
differences can exist between different subareas. For example, one cabinet could 
have an FTTC uptake over 40%, while another cabinet only has a final uptake 
potential of 5%. A scenario analysis was conducted for the small and large 
cabinet scenario with changing market potential. The results can be found in 
Figure 4-8. As long as the market potential stays below 30%, the small cabinets 
are clearly the correct rollout choice. Once a higher market potential is achieved, 
large cabinets result in a higher payoff. This is of course a logical conclusion, 
since for all uptakes below 30% the large cabinet is over dimensioned. Once over 
30% adoption, the small cabinet can no longer host new connections, and these 
revenues are lost. However, it is still assumed that all cabinets will follow the 
same adoption evolution. 
 
 
Figure 4-8: Small and large cabinet market potential scenario analysis 
 
When we extend the scenario analysis towards a sensitivity analysis, a triangular 
probability distribution on each cabinet potential uptake between 0 and 60 
percent, with 20 percent as the most likely was added. Now, two cabinets can 
have a different uptake.  
To check the impact of these parameters on the total outcome of the business 
case, a Monte Carlo analysis was conducted. Crystall Ball, a commercial tool, 
was used to perform the simulations [4.18]. This tool allows one to indicate the 
different uncertainties in a spreadsheet. After selecting the cells to forecast, the 
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tool runs a predefined number of simulations (100.000), resulting in a 
distribution of the value of the forecasted cells, based on the uncertainty 
distributions added to the assumption cells [4.17]. The small and large cabinet 
rollout scenarios are compared, now with uncertainty added on some input 
parameters. Before the rollout of the FTTC network starts, the management has 
to decide which scenario it will choose. However, we would like to indicate that 
no options are implemented in the model yet, so once a small cabinet is full, no 
extra customers can be connected to this cabinet, resulting in a loss of potential 
revenues. While the previous static NPV analysis results in a fixed number, the 
sensitivity analysis returns two distributions to compare (Figure 4-9). It is 
immediately clear that the best rollout option is the installation of large cabinets 
in all areas. On average, the large cabinet scenario outperforms the small cabinet 
scenario with over 260.000 GBP (+3.88%).  
This sensitivity analysis clearly indicates the impact that uncertainty has on the 
decision process. However, a sensitivity analysis alone does not allow us to 
implement the flexibility in the project. The assumption that the operator will not 
act when the small cabinets are full does not hold in reality. In the following 
section, the different options are identified and the last two steps of the RO 
analysis methodology are conducted. Real options thus clearly manage to capture 
the value of multi period planning. 
 
 
Figure 4-9: Impact of uncertainty on the business case outcome 
4.5.2 How managerial flexibility impacts the result – a real 
option analysis 
It is straightforward that when a small cabinet is installed, the option to expand is 
available. This expansion option can be broken down into three different options 
from the 7S framework. When the first cabinet is full, the operator can decide to 
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go for a standard scale up option by installing a second small cabinet on the 
location to offer FTTC services to the new customers. However, he could also 
choose a technology upgrade by connecting the extra customers via a more 
future proof technology over an FTTH network. A third expansion option is 
raising the average revenue per user (ARPU) per customer by offering extra 
services to the existing customers, for example by starting to offer IPTV 
services. Note that at first sight, the option comes for free in this case. No initial 
expense needs to be made in order to buy the option. However, when taking a 
closer look at the cost for the small and large cabinet, we notice that a full small 
cabinet would cost 9.890 GBP, while a full large cabinet costs 18.530 GBP. Or 
68 GBP per user in case of a small cabinet and 55 GBP for a large cabinet (see 
Table 2-1). The higher price per user reflects the price for future flexibility in 
case of the small cabinet. In this section, we will apply these three options to the 
business case and show how they impact the previous results. 
4.5.2.a Scale up: installing extra small cabinets 
The first identified flexibility is the scale up option. Once the small cabinet is 
full, the operator can install a second cabinet to host the extra connections. Of 
course, this comes with an additional capital expenditure for a small cabinet and 
DLSAM line cards (the exercise price). This capital expenditre also includes the 
installation costs. The business case presented above was extended with this 
scale option. In the small scale scenario, the extra customers on a full cabinet are 
now connected to an additional small cabinet, and their ARPU is added to the 
business case. However, the option will only be executed when it is 
economically interesting. It is as such a simple maximisation function of the 
small static case and the scale up case. 
When comparing the results for the large cabinet and the small scale scenario, we 
notice that the small scale case is the most interesting for the operator. It yields 
an average payoff which is 2.23% higher than the large cabinet scenario, which 
was initially the best choice after the sensitivity analysis (Figure 4-10). 
Compared to the small static case, it is even 6% higher. While the large cabinet 
scenario is definitely the most future proof option in the scenario analysis, the 
RO analysis indicates there is an extra scale option value in the small cabinet 
scenario. The scale up option offers the operator the possibility to initially install 
the small cabinets and only invest in additional capacity when necessary. Large 
cabinets offer enough capacity to host all connections, but in most cases this 
capacity is never used. 
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Figure 4-10: Overlay chart large cabinet scenario and small scale case 
4.5.2.b Switch up: additional capacity through a more future proof 
network 
It was already indicated that the operator could migrate the extra customers on a 
full cabinet towards a more future proof FTTH network. To implement this 
switch up option in the business case, some extra additions are necessary in the 
model. Fibre cables need to be installed in the last mile and extra G.PON 
equipment provided in the local exchange. In the access network, passive 
splitters ensure the connectivity. The cost parameters are based on industry 
insight and can be found in Table 4-5. 
The impact of the switch option can be seen in Figure 4-11. Again the business 
case for the small cabinet scenario is greatly improved. However, when 
comparing with the scale option, we see that an FTTH extension is more 
expensive and does not improve the small scenario enough to outperform the 
large cabinet scenario. 
Table 4-5: Cost parameters for an FTTH deployment [4.33] 
Hardware component Cost (GBP) 
G.PON card (256 customers) 6.000 
Cost per G.PON port 500 
Passive splitter 210 
CPE 80 
CPE installation cost 100 
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Figure 4-11: Improvement of the business case with a switch up option 
4.5.2.c Scope up: offering extra services over the existing infrastructure 
One of the examples given as a scope up option is the extension of the typical 
telephone and internet incumbent product portfolio towards triple play. We will 
indicate in this section how offering an IPTV service can be implemented in the 
business case as a real option. The operator can decide to extend his product 
portfolio towards triple play in the fourth year of the project. 
Before the standard business case is extended, some extra input parameters are 
required. Offering IPTV to end customers will require extra equipment in the 
local exchange. In order to avoid unnecessary complexity in the business case, 
we added a fixed cost for video server per local exchange and other equipment to 
the scope up business case extension. At the customer’s premises, a new CPE 
needs to be installed (Table 4-6). 
Typically, the adoption of such a service will again follow the S-shaped adoption 
curve. Since it is not straightforward to translate this adoption into a 
mathematical model, we have combined given adoption percentages [4.34] 
together with statistical software to fit the historic adoption percentages to the 
mathematical Gompertz model. All parameters were found to be statistically 
significant. The resulting parameters are summed up in Table 4-7.  
The results of this RO analysis can be found in Figure 4-12. Apparently, the 
extension of the product portfolio towards triple play services has only marginal 
value compared with the small cabinet scenario. This means that offering triple 
play to customers will be not interesting in this scenario, so the option is almost 
never executed. 
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Table 4-6: IPTV cost parameters [4.33] 
Parameter Cost / Revenue (GBP) 
Video server 20.000 
CPE 250 
CPE installation cost 200 
Extra ARPU 100 
 
Table 4-7: IPTV Gompertz adoption parameters 
Parameter Value 
a 4.667 
b 0.366 
m 0.405 
 
 
 
Figure 4-12: Scope up option 
4.5.2.d Combining options: scope and switch up combined 
In the previous analysis only single options were presented. However, realistic 
business cases generally possess a wide spectrum of different options. Consider 
the three options discussed above. It is clear that the scale and switch up options 
are mutually exclusive. If a given area is extended with an extra cabinet, the 
FTTH switch up option will become redundant. However, the scale and switch 
up option can be easily combined with the scope up option. 
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Consider the case where the triple play service requires a network with extra 
capacity. If the operator chooses to upgrade its network capacity with an FTTH 
network once the first cabinet is full, they can start offering IPTV to these 
customers. This is in fact a compound option, or an option on an option. The 
same adoption curve as before was used but is now only applied to the customers 
who are connected via the FTTH network. In contrast with the single scope up 
option, this now results in a positive option value. The total NPV for this case 
results in an even larger payoff compared with the small cabinet scenario with 
the scale option (Figure 4-13). 
 
 
Figure 4-13: Compound options: switch up and scope up combined 
4.5.3 Rollout of an FTTC network – case conclusion 
The considered business case evaluates the economic feasibility of the rollout of 
an FTTC network in the UK. To achieve the FTTC coverage, the network 
operator can follow two investment paths, full coverage or coverage following 
demand. The traditional NPV analysis showed the coverage following demand 
scenario was the most profitable. However, when checking the requirements for 
an RO analysis, it was clear that uncertainty surrounding the initial assumptions 
most likely would have an impact on the analysis results.  
Therefore, we followed the proposed four-step methodology to extend the case 
with the real option approach. After every step, we indicated the impact on the 
results of the analysis. The effect of uncertainty on the business case was 
assessed by both a scenario and sensitivity analysis. The initial results from the 
traditional approach were contradicted when the customer uptake assumptions 
were questioned. When flexibility was implemented in the business case, to 
allow the decision makers to react to this uncertainty, all option categories were 
identified in the following demand scenario of the business case. The initial 
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network could be expanded with extra capacity, either via a scale up option or a 
switch up option. The scale up option installs more of the same, while the switch 
up option gradually migrates the existing network towards an FTTH network. 
The third scenario investigated offering extra services, following a scope up 
option path. 
In this case, a scale up option is the most designated, as it improves the result of 
the small cabinet scenario to a level higher than the large cabinet scenario. The 
switch up option also improves the small cabinet scenario. However, when 
compared to a static large cabinet scenario, the latter remains more interesting. 
The scope up option only had marginal value and was almost never executed. 
However, in realistic business cases, options almost never occur in isolation. 
Here we extended the example case with a compound option by implementing 
the scope up option on the switch up option. Using the proposed methodology, 
this remains a rather straightforward exercise. 
4.6 Valuing flexibility in core network installation 
In this second case study, we will investigate the migration of the existing core 
networks. In these networks, network demand is continuously growing, 
especially with the adoption of more bandwidth hungry applications by users in 
the access network, which obviously also translates in an increase of traffic in the 
metro and core networks. However, this increase in transported bits is not 
reflected in the revenues for network operators, since the average revenue per 
user remains flat. To maintain profitability, there is a pressure on network 
operators to decrease the average cost per transported bit. Typically, this cost 
reduction is achieved by installing cost efficient equipment and network 
architectures. Currently, in the core network, Dense Wavelength Division 
Multiplexing (DWDM) equipment tuned to the 50 GHz ITU grid is used. 
However, with increasing traffic, higher line rates per channel will be required. 
In addition, the underlying assumption that spectrum requirements pose no 
restriction has been challenged. This will result in networks where the capacity 
in the core falls behind demand.  
To meet the increased demand, the channel capacity will need to be increased 
beyond the current 100G per channel, together with an increase of spectral 
efficiency. Additionally, the dynamic functionality of networks should be 
increased, allowing for dynamic re-optimization.  
To achieve the goals stated above, spectral flexibility – or flexible-grid – has 
been identified as the key type of expected flexibility within DWDM systems. 
Present day DWDM systems operate under the Fixed Grid – or ITU G.694.1 
grid, introduced in 2002 [4.35]. Multiplexers, optical network nodes and 
transponders are all tuned to this grid. The core network is based on IP 
offloading, transponders with fixed bit rate and modulation format. But traffic 
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growth would require the use of several 10G or 40G channels between adjacent 
IP routers. 
Flexible-grid, making the wavelength switched optical network (WSON) elastic 
by moving away from the ITU grid, can accommodate both sub- and super 
wavelength traffic. It allows an adjustable use of optical spectrum within a 
certain granularity. This granularity is the minimum bandwidth slot that can be 
switched in the optical spectrum (6.25 and 12.5 GHz are possible) [4.36]. This 
technology is slowly coming available, and operators have to decide whether or 
not to install this flexible-grid capable equipment in their network.  
However, various aspects influence this decision. First, under the current 
predicted traffic growth patterns, Fixed Grid DWDM equipment is expected to 
suffice for the next years, until the next replacement investment in the core 
network equipment. Additionally, since the flexible-grid technology is still in its 
infancy, an installation today will be expensive or risk poor reliability [4.36], 
[4.37]. Also, the performance of this equipment might still be lacking the full 
functionality that may appear later. 
In order to make the correct investment decision, a techno-economic analysis is 
conducted for the future installations in the UK core network, as described in 
[4.38]. The trade-off between a 50Ghz spaced fixed grid installation and a 
flexible-grid installation is studied. However, an intermediate installation option 
exists, where the initial installation is flexible-grid ready. Choosing for this 
installation reduces the investment in later stages when migration towards 
flexible-grid would be required. As such, the operator buys the option to wait 
with the migration to full flexible-grid and the option for a cheaper future 
migration. 
4.6.1 Replacing the UK core network equipment 
To assess the flexible-grid installation investment decision, a techno-economic 
case study analysis is conducted for the UK core network (Figure 4-14). This 
network consists of 27 nodes and 40 edges. There is a distinction between the 
gray and white nodes in Figure 4-14. The gray nodes represent the current core 
network nodes, while the white nodes are metro network nodes that have been 
incorporated in the analysis. In the model, the current traffic matrix of the UK 
core network is entered, together with a yearly traffic growth prediction of 37% 
for the entire network [4.39]. As a result, the model calculates the traffic for each 
source-destination path for the entire time period assessed in the model. Routing 
the traffic through the network allows to assess the required equipment in the 
different nodes, taking into account optical bypass. Since the typical replacement 
period for equipment is five years, this is the period we are interested in. 
Initially, two distinct scenarios can be assessed, analysing the investment in the 
WDM layer (Figure 4-15). The first scenario evaluates the installation of a fixed 
grid core network, while the second studies the flexible-grid capable installation. 
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However, these two installation options result in a loss of flexibility for the 
operator. When installing a fixed grid network today, the initial investment is 
low, but the operator risks either losing money, since he is not able to route all 
traffic, or he will be putting in a next generation DWDM network (presumably 
flexible-grid this time) earlier than he would have expected to based on the 
original planning and demand requirements, also leading to additional costs 
(fixed grid migrate scenario) under high traffic growth. On the other hand, he can 
opt to install a full flexible-grid network today. The advantages of such an 
installation are clear, under any future traffic growth; the operator is ready for it. 
However, under low traffic growth, a lot of money will be spent in vain, since 
the installed network equipment is overqualified for the current traffic matrix. 
Additionally, as was already indicated, the performance of current flexible-grid 
equipment might considerably improve during the following years. By installing 
this equipment today, the operator risks higher maintenance costs. And as the 
learning curve is followed, this will also result in a decrease of the cost for such 
equipment in the future. 
 
 
Figure 4-14: The UK core reference network [4.38] 
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Figure 4-15: Core network installation choices 
 
However, there exists a third installation option which was not explored yet. This 
intermediate installation path offers future flexibility for the operator (flexible-
grid migrate scenario). By installing flexible-grid capable nodes, but using fixed 
grid DWDM muxponders instead of flexible-grid capable muxponders, the 
operator buys the flexibility for a cheaper migration towards flexible-grid if 
necessary. Additionally, since the nodes are used with fixed grid DWDM 
muxponders, the performance risk linked to the use of flexible-grid and the 
initial higher capital expenditures (CapEx) associated are decreased. The 
decision tree now looks as in Figure 4-15. 
Next to these three possible installation paths, the operator obviously has many 
other options. He can overbuild routes or install a fixed grid network with higher 
channel spacing. When the investment decision is made in practice by an 
operator, he should take all these options into account. We limit the scope of our 
study to these three paths, as we aim at indicating the managerial flexibility 
thinking in telecom infrastructure investments.   
Note that under the 37% yearly traffic growth prediction used, no migration to 
flexible-grid is required during the five year evaluation period. To assess the 
capital expenditures for both installations, the cost input from the STRONGEST 
CapEx model is used [4.37], [4.39]. 
Based on the traffic prognoses, a dimensioning is performed for the nodes and 
links in the network. As was indicated in [4.38], no standard node model exists 
for the WDM layer. The node is dependent on the nodal degree N, and this 
rationale is also applied here. For an N = 2 an OADM, otherwise an OXC is 
modelled.  In addition, based on the number of channels, the building blocks of 
the nodes vary, and can include Arrayed Waveguide Grating (AWG) or 
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Wavelength Selective Switches (WSS). Currently the modelled nodes are not 
contentionless or directionless [4.40]. These nodes consist of wavelength 
selective switches (WSS) and amplifiers. Their amount is based on the node 
degree. We refer to [4.37] for a more detailed description of the node model. 
Based on the traffic matrix and its expected evolution, the amount of 
muxponders for each source-destination pair are calculated. For example, a link 
with a demand of 30Gbps will result in the installation of a 40G (line rate), 
4X10G (client requirements), 2500km (reach) muxponder. Traffic of 120Gbps 
requires one 100G, 10X10G, 2000km and one 40G, 4X10G, 2500km 
muxponder. With 400G muxponders only becoming available later during the 
project lifetime, these can only be installed from that year on, in the selected 
scenarios from above (Table 4-8). This means that once 400G muxponders are 
available, a link which initially required four 100G muxponders could then have 
a 400G, 10X40G, 150km muxponder. The operator can thus make the choice 
between installing an additional parallel 100G path, or replacing the parallel 
paths with one high capacity path. Here, it is assumed that this migration is 
performed. Of course, this installation can only be made if the reach constraint of 
the specific muxponder is satisfied. In addition, when muxponders are replaced 
by higher capacity muxponders, the initial expense for the first muxponder is not 
refunded. This calculation results in a number of muxponders required on the 
start and end node of every link. From this number of muxponders, it is 
straightforward to calculate the total number of muxponders and wavelengths 
required per node. The model is extended with three other aspects. As optical 
bypass is used, regenerators need to be included. For each muxponder, a 
comparable regenerator is available in the model. Their cost is 1.6 times higher 
than the comparable muxponder [4.37]. Secondly, amplifiers are modelled every 
80 km. The cost of the various types of equipment is expressed in STRONGEST 
Cost Units (SCU). One SCU represents the cost of a 10G WDM transponder, 
with a reach of 750km. Notice that for both DWDM and flexible-grid equipment, 
a cost erosion factor is included. For DWDM, this cost erosion is currently 
estimated at 10%, while it is put at 15% for the flexible-grid equipment. The cost 
erosion for amplifiers was considered equally; as this equipment is identical for 
both systems. This reflects the lower maturity of flexible-grid compared to 
DWDM. These numbers are based on the extended learning curve [4.41]. It 
allows modelling the cost evolution of components based on time, and not on the 
number of units produced. This makes it more suited for the prediction of cost 
evolution. 
Real Option Analysis Methodology to Quantify Flexibility 113 
Table 4-8: Available muxponders [4.37] 
Muxponder Reach Year available SCU 
40G, 4X10G (50GHz) 2500 2012 5 
100G, 10X10G (50GHz) 2000 2012 13 
100G, 10X10G, AUA 40G (50GHz) 2000 2012 16 
400G, 10X40G (50GHz) 150 2014 29 
400G, 10X40G, AUA 400G, 200G, 100G 
(75GHz) 
500 2014 46 
*AUA = Also Usable As 
 
Thirdly, to allow for a fair comparison of the different migration paths, an 
operational cost for energy was added to the model. The energy use of different 
muxponders is included, based on industry insight. 
In Table 4-9, the total cost (in SCU) can be found for the three scenarios. The 
total cost of the fixed grid scenario and flexible-grid migrate scenario is 
considerably lower than the flexible-grid installation, as is to be expected. In 
[4.37], it was stated that flexible-grid equipment is about 1.3 times more 
expensive than fixed grid equipment. Here, a full flexible-grid installation is 2.5 
times more costly. This difference with [4.37] is driven by the overdimensioning 
of the flexible grid network for the current traffic matrix. The operator uses 
higher capacity muxponders from the start, which are considerably more 
expensive. The flexible-grid migrate scenario is more expensive than the fixed 
grid scenario, as more expensive nodes are installed from the start. This cost 
difference reflects the option price. 
Table 4-9: Total cost for the installation options 
Scenario Cumulative Discounted Cost 
Fixed grid 30.020 SCU 
Flexible-grid 75.710 SCU 
Flexible-grid migrate 30.663 SCU 
 
When looking at the cost breakdown for different installation scenarios (Figure 
4-16), it is clear that the capital expenditures for regenerators and muxponders 
comprise the largest share of the total cost, around 95% for both scenarios. The 
cost for nodes, amplifier and energy is negligible. 
With this result, the operator would clearly choose to install a fixed grid core 
network, since this technology choice clearly is the most cost efficient. However, 
what would happen if traffic growth would be higher than expected? This result 
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is based on the assumption that no migration from fixed grid to flexible-grid is 
required, but it was already indicated that traffic growth might force operators to 
undertake this migration when spectrum becomes scarce. This will be studied in 
the following section. 
 
Scenario Cost distribution 
Fixed grid 
 
Flexible-grid 
 
Figure 4-16: Cost breakdown for different scenarios 
4.6.2 Checking the three conditions 
In order to conduct a RO analysis, the case must meet the three conditions. We 
will check these conditions below. 
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Uncertainty 
There are various potential sources of uncertainty in the case presented here. 
These can be linked either to future traffic or the future cost. 
 The bandwidth growth evolution is the major uncertainty in this case. 
The initial traffic matrix is clear, but its evolution in time is bound to 
an uncertain evolution. What is this expected evolution? And is there 
any indication of the uncertainty on the expected traffic evolution? 
 Current flexible-grid equipment, muxponders and regenerators are 
still a new technology, and there are still some risks related with 
using them. For example, it is not very good at distinguishing 
between wavelengths. The equipment will become cheaper and more 
trustworthy in the future. As such, the future maintenance and 
replacement costs of this equipment is uncertain. 
 Technological evolution can lead to cost erosion in flexible-grid 
equipment. While the application of the learning curve can model this 
cost erosion, it is still required to estimate this yearly cost decrease 
upfront when making the investment decision. 
 Early installation of a flexible-grid network is more expensive, since 
the equipment has not hit mass market yet. 
Managerial flexibility 
A graphical overview of the managerial flexibility can be found in Figure 4-15. 
In case of the migration scenarios, operators have to decide on the upgrade of 
their core network. Three possible scenarios were taken into account in this 
study.  
 Flexible-grid scenario 
The operator installs flexible-grid ready equipment. If traffic grows 
faster then expected, the operator is ready for it. If it does not grow 
fast, a lot of money was spent in vain. 
 Fixed grid migrate scenario 
The operator does not install flexible-grid ready equipment. If traffic 
follows the expected growth path, then this solution will be the most 
cost efficient, as was indicated in section 4.6.1. If traffic grows faster 
than expected, the operator will end up either losing money not being 
able to route all traffic or they will be putting in a next generation 
DWDM network (presumably flexible-grid ready this time) earlier 
than they would have needed to, which will lead to additional costs 
 Flexible-grid migrate scenario 
The operator buys the option to migrate to flexible-grid by installing 
flexible-grid capable nodes, but he continues to use fixed grid 
muxponders and regenerators. In case the traffic grows faster than 
expected, the operator is ready for it and the investment in flexible-
grid ready nodes can be avoided. In case traffic grows at its expected 
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growth rate, the operator can use the less expensive fixed grid 
muxponders. 
 
In the flexible-grid scenario the operator looses all its flexibility. The core 
network is fully upgraded towards flexible-grid, and there is no way back. The 
same goes for the fixed grid migrate scenario. Under high traffic growth, the 
operator has no other choice than to install flexible-grid. The flexibility is present 
in the last scenario. The upgrade towards full flexible-grid can be performed 
when necessary. In addition, he does not have to decide on this upgrade today, 
but can do this when the uncertainty surrounding future traffic and flexible-grid 
equipment is reduced. 
Other options are available as well. The operator could overbuild, or install a 
fixed grid network with larger channel spacing. When an operator performs this 
investment analysis to indicate its best investment options, these should be 
included as well. However, we aim at indicating how real options can be 
identified and applied in telecom infrastructure problems, so we only model the 
ones presented in Figure 4-15.  
Phased decision 
Typically an option-based investment is characterised by a phased decision. One 
makes a small initial investment (buying the option at the option price) which 
allows a follow-up investment later on leading to additional revenues (exercising 
the option for the exercise price) or deciding not to go forward with the follow-
up investment in case the market conditions do not turn out favourable.  
In this case, such an expansion option can be seen in the flexible-grid migrate 
scenario. The operator makes an additional initial investment, i.e. the installation 
of flexible-grid capable nodes instead of standard fixed grid nodes. Initially the 
operator uses standard (cheaper) fixed grid muxponders, but when the traffic 
grows faster than expected, a follow-up investment in flexible-grid muxponders 
can be done. In this case, the operator saves the replacement cost for new nodes. 
The other option that can be found in this case is the option to wait. By initially 
installing fixed grid equipment and transponders, the operator can wait and 
decide at every point in time to migrate to flexible-grid, depending on the 
bandwidth growth and technological evolution. The longer the investment can be 
postponed, the higher the value of the option to wait. However, the value of 
waiting can also be found in the fixed grid – migrate scenario. Here the operator 
waits with the installation of the flexible-grid muxponders and nodes. 
4.6.3 Impact of traffic growth uncertainty 
It was already indicated above that traffic growth is a major uncertainty when 
performing dimensioning studies, and it has a large impact on the expected 
result. If traffic grows at a faster pace, it would require the installation of 
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additional muxponders and regenerators to provision for parallel paths earlier. As 
a result, the total available spectrum will be reduced or even run out, requiring a 
migration towards flexible-grid in case the operator has chosen a fixed grid 
installation.  
Under the expected traffic growth of 37%, this migration towards flexible-grid 
could be postponed to the next re-installation time, in five years. However, if 
traffic grows faster than expected, this installation will be required earlier, 
resulting in an additional investment cost. Here, it is assumed that if total traffic 
grows by 500%, such a migration would be required, which is in line with the 
current capacity limits of the UK core network. Although this threshold is 
inserted artificially, it allows assessing the impact of traffic growth uncertainty. 
Under the basic assumption of 37% growth p.a., this threshold is not exceeded 
within the evaluation period of five years for the majority of the links. However, 
links already currently experiencing high traffic would need to be migrated 
anyway. The advantage of this migration scenario is that it allows a gradual 
migration towards flexible-grid, while the operator loses all flexibility in the 
flexible-grid scenario. 
Under these assumptions, the advantages of the Fixed grid migration scenario are 
clear. Since only a small number of links would require a migration, the cost 
increase is negligible compared to the investment in a full flexible-grid network. 
But what would be the impact on the total cost for both scenarios under other 
traffic growth conditions? When the flexible-grid migration scenario is 
considered, the same rationale as for the fixed grid migrate scenario holds. 
However, as the nodes are installed flexible-grid ready, the migration will come 
at a lower cost, as only an investment in muxponders and regenerators will be 
required, not in nodes.  
To indicate the impact of this uncertainty on the analysis, a scenario analysis for 
the different migration paths to flexible-grid is presented below (Figure 4-17). It 
is clear that for the lower traffic growth scenarios, the installation of Fixed grid 
DWDM equipment is to be preferred compared to the flexible-grid migrate 
installation, as was also concluded from the standard techno-economic analysis. 
When no migration is required, the operator would clearly opt for the cheaper 
fixed grid installation. However, as is clearly visible from the high traffic growth 
scenarios, the total investment cost for the migrate scenarios rises, while the 
flexible-grid scenario is traffic independent. Although the flexible-grid migrate 
scenario offers a cheaper migration in the future, this does not result in a lower 
total investment cost during the project lifetime. It is thus to be expected that 
flexibility does not pay off in this case. 
In order to indicate the impact of uncertainty clearer on the result, the scenario 
analysis is extended towards a real option analysis. The traffic growth is now 
distributed triangularly between 30% and 60%, with 37% as the most likely. The 
impact of this uncertainty, and the resulting value of flexibility in the migration 
118 Chapter 4 
 
decision in time on the results for the migrate scenarios can be found in Figure 
4-18. From the cost distributions, it is clear that the traffic uncertainty has a 
major impact on the cumulative discounted cost (CDC) cash flows evaluation of 
both scenarios. For both scenarios, an increase in the traffic growth results in an 
increase of the total cost. However, when comparing both cost distributions, it is 
clear that the fixed grid migrate scenario remains the most cost efficient. The 
analysis was also performed for the flexible grid scenario. As the total cost is 
always significantly higher than the cost for the other two scenarios, they are not 
depicted on the figure.  
Conducting the ROA thus indicated that uncertainty has a clear impact on the 
CDC evaluation, but there is no value in buying the option for a cheaper 
migration in the future. 
 
 
Figure 4-17: Impact of uncertainty on the investment cost 
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Figure 4-18: Cost evolution under traffic growth uncertainty for the different 
scenarios 
4.6.4 Case conclusions 
The translation of high growth in network demand in the access networks is 
putting pressure on the core networks. In order to maintain profitability, 
operators are continuously looking to reduce the cost per transported bit. Today, 
core networks are based on fixed grid DWDM system, making use of parallel 
light paths between core routers. However, in light of the expected traffic 
increase, the underlying assumption that spectrum availability poses no 
restriction is being challenged. As a solution to increase spectral efficiency, the 
flexible-grid concept has been introduced recently. 
As equipment needs to be replaced often, operators will have to make the 
decision to migrate to flexible-grid within the coming years. This migration 
decision is based on various aspects, which can have a different influence. 
Uncertain traffic growth and performance of equipment are only two of those 
aspects. 
Since the operator aims to reduce costs, the translation of these influences on the 
expected investment needs to be assessed. In this case, such a techno-economic 
analysis of the replacement investment in core network equipment is performed. 
It is shown how uncertain future traffic growth evolutions impact the investment 
decision. Initially, no migration is required, but uncertain traffic growth largely 
impacts the migration need and the associated total investment cost. However, 
since operators can flexibly adapt to changing conditions, reducing risk and 
investment, a real option analysis was performed to capture the value of this 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Fr
eq
u
en
cy
NPV
Fixed grid 
migrate
Flexible-grid 
migrate
Fixed grid 
migrate mean
Flexible-grid 
migrate mean
120 Chapter 4 
 
flexibility. Flexibility should be taken into account when such an investment 
decision is made. Although no value of waiting was identified here, the results 
are case specific and dependent on a broad range of input factors. 
As such, the results of the case study only hold for this specific case. The case 
focused on a dense Western European network. Other network topologies will 
have an impact on the outcome of the analysis, and on the preferred installation 
by the operator. 
As this cases attributes no value to buying an option, it indicates clearly how 
option thinking is not an inventive approach to artificially increase the value of 
techno-economic projects. It is an approach that reflects the possibilities of the 
decision maker to optimally adapt to the underlying environment and the 
opportunities it offers. 
4.7 Other applications of ROA thinking in telecom 
Real options can be applied to a wide range of investment problems in telecom. 
We will shortly describe two problems here, one on the deployment of a sensor 
network in a city environment [4.1], the second on access network unbundling 
[4.4]. 
4.7.1 Deploying a municipal parking sensor network 
Wireless sensor networks (WSN) have multiple applications. They offer 
possibilities for monitoring all kind of parameters, going from detecting 
environmental aspects, traffic flow and network control.  
Techno-economic studies on WSNs are limited. An extensive study on the 
current state of research in WSNs can be found in [4.42]. However, most studies, 
are limited to technical solutions for energy consumption savings and 
monitoring, rather than the economic viability of the total system. It was studied 
how opting for an initial phased deployment opens up several future options for 
the management. The first phase offers learning possibilities, and the speed of 
the second phase is based on the results of the initial rollout (Figure 4-19). The 
value of these options is captured with a Real Option Analysis.  
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Figure 4-19: Expansion of sensor network to larger area 
4.7.2 Flexibility value in access network unbundling 
Local Loop Unbundling (LLU) is a method to open the access network 
connecting the customer to the central office to other operators. Through this 
open network, other operators can offer services to the end consumers. LLU is 
enforced by regulators, who also fix the price for this network access. Their main 
objective is increasing competition in the previously monopolistic market. 
Setting the access price is a difficult exercise, as it should suffice to cover the 
costs of the network owner. With an LLU offer on the market, new entrants have 
the choice between using the Full Unbundling (FU) or Line Sharing (LS) offer, 
the bitstream access (BA) offer, installing their own network or not provide 
access at all to customers (Figure 4-20). It is clear that they have flexibility in 
their choice. The value of this flexibility should be incorporated in the price 
setting by the regulator, as the network owner gave up his flexibility when 
installing the network. Real option valuation can be used to estimate the 
economic value of this flexibility. It was concluded that the value of flexibility 
clearly should not be neglected when LLU prices are fixed. 
 
 
Figure 4-20: A visual overview of the connection options for the new entrants at 
the end of each year [4.4] 
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4.8 Lessons learned and shortcomings 
4.8.1 Real option analysis guidelines 
The practical RO analysis methodology described in this chapter bridges the gap 
between the financial and technical world in telecommunication firms. In all 
areas of telecommunication, decisions on new investments need to be made. 
Design of passive infrastructures by network planners, testing of new technology 
before implementing it, etc. These decisions are not only based on cost 
optimisations, but intuitive notions on the capability of the chosen design or 
technology to counter uncertainty, the inherent flexibility of the design, or the 
opportunities it offers to reduce risk related to future costs are also taken into 
account. Real options translate this intuition into the language of the financial 
department. The three conditions required for a RO analysis can help network 
planners to identify the presence of real options in their network plan. 
Additionally, the 7S framework can help to categorise these options. With the 
four step methodology, the standard NPV analysis executed today can easily be 
extended towards a full RO analysis. In order to identify real options and 
quantify their impact, the following guidelines are offered. First, when making 
network design decisions, ask three questions. 
 
 How uncertain is the future? 
Uncertainty surrounding future conditions will typically have a large 
impact on your decision. Identifying several future scenarios can help to 
see how this uncertainty would impact your decision. 
 Where is the flexibility? 
If uncertainty is present, different actions may exist to counter it. 
Indicating how to alter the initial project path under different conditions 
helps to identify the different options. The 7S framework can be a 
guideline. 
 When do I have to decide? 
Flexibility and uncertainty are not sufficient to have options in the 
investment case. Flexibility is only interesting if it can be executed in 
later phases of the project. 
 
When these three conditions are met, real options are present in the investment 
project. It is then important to check how they impact your decision.  
 
 Conduct a standard NPV analysis 
Real options extend the standard NPV analysis, and their valuation 
starts with a clear understanding of the value of the project in absence 
of uncertainty and options. 
 Identify the uncertainties 
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Future uncertainty is a condition for RO analysis, and should therefore 
be identified before the quantification of the real option value. The 
impact of uncertainty on the investment project can be checked through 
a scenario or sensitivity analysis. 
 Identify the flexibility 
Without the ability to react against uncertainty, no real options are 
present. Here, the 7S framework can be a guideline to formalise the 
intuitive notions on managerial flexibility present during the project 
lifetime. 
 Calculate the option value 
While the Monte Carlo analysis is designated for extended techno-
economic cases, a more simple back of the envelope binomial tree 
analysis can offer initial insights. 
4.8.2 Pitfalls of RO analysis 
A RO analysis is a helpful tool to value inherent flexibility in typical telecom 
investment projects. However, when conducting a RO analysis, several things 
should be kept in mind.  
First, the value of an option is a function of the uncertainty attributed to the 
different input factors. The higher the uncertainty, the higher the option value. 
This effect can easily be observed in the Black and Scholes formula. Estimating 
this uncertainty remains a difficult exercise and should be handled with care. 
Although commercial software allows the user to attribute uncertainty to all 
input parameters, it is important to focus on the uncertainties with the highest 
expected impact, e.g. customer adoption, lifetime of the technology, etc.  
Secondly, the results of a RO analysis give an indication of the average extra 
value the option generates. In a Monte Carlo analysis, thousands of possible 
futures are calculated and, from the resulting probability distribution, several 
conclusions can be drawn. It indicates how the option impacts the risk associated 
with the investment. An option typically reduces the risk of a low payoff, but it 
does not guarantee a positive payoff. For example, a project with a scale option 
can in the future still turn out to be unprofitable, since the customer uptake is 
much lower than expected, turning the scale option value to zero. In addition, the 
extra value an option generates can be offset by the price paid to acquire the 
option, as was indicated in the core network migration case. 
Finally, a RO analysis always attributes value to waiting. In a project with an 
option to wait, the further the investment can be postponed, the more value the 
option typically generates. This effect was, for example, indicated in the Black 
and Scholes formula. In practice, decision makers do not have the option to 
postpone decisions forever. The threat of competitive entry pushes decision 
makers to move as fast as possible. In a competitive environment, the value of 
waiting erodes quickly, since there is typically a first mover advantage.  
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4.9 Conclusion 
The broad range of uncertainties concerning future technological evolution, 
customer adoption and regulation which is characteristic of the 
telecommunication sector definitely requires flexibility in large investment 
projects in this field. However, the traditional economic evaluation methods 
cannot capture the value of this flexibility. Different extended evaluation models 
have been proposed to solve this problem. In particular, the real option theory 
has shown great potential to integrate managerial flexibility within the standard 
evaluation methods. However, this extended model is only slowly finding 
acceptance. To indicate the importance of real options for telecom investment 
projects, a wide range of realistic examples was introduced showing the broad 
array of options existing in all telecom sectors. The abandon option in the mobile 
broadcast TV service of British Telecom or the testing periods of LTE by 
Telenet in Belgium are just two examples. 
It may be clear that the application of RO Theory in telecommunication projects 
should be a logical extension to the traditional evaluation methods. However, a 
common complaint regarding this theory is the lack of a practical framework for 
realistic cases. Here, we extended the overview of real option basics and the 
application domains in telecom with a practical approach to extend realistic 
business cases with a real option analysis. We stressed the importance of the 
three requirements for a RO analysis and the four-step methodology to 
implement it. Before a business case is eligible for a RO analysis, uncertainty 
surrounding the project should be present. This uncertainty can however be 
handled by the managerial flexibility in the project at a later point in time. When 
these preconditions are met, the calculation of the option value is quite 
straightforward. In the standard NPV analysis model, both the uncertainties and 
flexibilities need to be identified and added to the model. Executing a Monte 
Carlo simulation on this extended model then results in the real option value of 
the project.  
To indicate the strength of such a practical framework, we applied it to two 
cases. The first case studies the investment project for a next generation fixed 
access network rollout. The migration towards an FTTC network in the UK was 
studied. It was indicated that the operator had two rollout choices, either 
installing small or large cabinets. From the traditional NPV analysis, the small 
cabinet installation proved to be the most profitable. However, uncertainty 
surrounding the several input parameters could have an important impact on the 
final outcome. Therefore, the standard NPV analysis was extended with a 
scenario, sensitivity and real option analysis. While the scenario and sensitivity 
analysis allowed adding uncertainty to the investment project, it is only the RO 
analysis that includes the value of managerial flexibility in the decision process. 
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Four different options were identified in the case, each having a different impact 
on the decision process of the management. 
In the second case study the migration options towards future core networks 
were investigated. We identified different future installation options, but the real 
option analysis indicated that flexibility in the initial design was not to be 
preferred, as the cost for the flexibility in the initial installation did not pay off in 
the future. 
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5 
Modelling Market Interactions 
 “Do not hold the delusion that your advancement is accomplished by 
crushing others”, Marcus Tullius Cicero 
The previous chapter detailed how uncertainty and flexibility can impact the 
decision making for telecom firms. However, the aspect of market interactions 
was not touched, while this plays a major role in the current environment. 
Operators, service providers and vendors operate in the existing market 
environment and need to take into account possible competitive interplay when 
making investment decisions. But competition is not always the prevailing 
strategy, as cooperation models also occur. Public private partnerships in 
network rollout, or alliances in standardisation are just two examples. 
In this chapter, the possible market interactions, competition and cooperation,  
are described. Competition with other players will influence the adoption of the 
product or service, and in turn impacts the equipment dimensioning and the 
operational processes and is modelled through a market response model, which is 
described in [5.1]. By dividing the market, revenues are split between different 
actors. Cooperation models on the other hand, aim at cost sharing. More detail 
will be provided on the cooperation possibilities through joint infrastructure 
rollout [5.2]. By rolling out infrastructure in the same trench and coordinating 
work, costs can be shared between different utility owners, resulting in reduced 
total investment cost for every actor involved.  
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5.1 Strategic impact on market share 
5.1.1 Introduction 
Two trends have impacted the market structure in most industries today. First, as 
a result from the liberalisation and deregulation in Western economies, only few 
industries remain protected. All other sectors are confronted with competition. 
Examples of such sectors are the energy and telecom market, which have 
undergone significant liberalisation in the last two decades [5.3]. In the energy 
market, former monopolies have been opened up to new, possibly foreign 
entrants. Consumers can purchase energy from different suppliers, while only the 
transport and distribution networks remain a natural monopoly. In the telecom 
market, similar trends occur. In the 1990s, the former incumbents have lost their 
monopoly on voice and data transmission, increasing the dynamism, uncertainty 
and competition. After the liberalisation wave, the burst of the internet bubble 
resulted in continuous consolidation in sectors previously populated with many 
firms, leading to oligopolistic markets. Obviously, compared to other sectors, 
regulation in telecom and energy still remains high. Although the market has 
been opened to new entrants, the former monopolists still have significant market 
power (SMP), resulting in regulatory authorities to introduce policy to reduce 
this market power. Unbundling of the local loop in telecom access networks or 
the introduction of nuclear taxes on the incumbent energy producer are only two 
examples of new regulation. In addition, the uncertainty on the direction of new 
regulation increases uncertainty for market players. Currently, the future 
regulation on local loop unbundling in fibre access networks is unclear, resulting 
in a decreased rollout of such networks. 
Resulting from these two trends, liberalisation and continuing consolidation, 
companies today face strategic uncertainty when making investment decisions. 
In case of new product or service introduction, the viability of this introduction is 
typically assessed through a techno-economic analysis. Standardised 
methodologies exist to conduct a complete techno-economic analysis of 
investment projects, e.g. the methodology proposed by Verbrugge et al. for 
techno-economic modelling introduced in Chapter 2. This methodology consists 
of four steps, gathering input, modelling costs and revenues, evaluating the 
project and concludes with possible extensions [5.4]. Typically, in the input 
gathering phase, the future market potential of the new product or service needs 
to be estimated. While this factor already comes with a great deal of uncertainty, 
since it is based on guesstimates or market research, it is also the factor with a 
large impact on the profitability of the project, as it drives revenues and variable 
costs from the technical model. As was already indicated in the equipment model 
in Section 2.3, the bill of material is driven by the number of customers (Figure 
5-1). 
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Figure 5-1: Equipment model for an FTTC network 
 
In case of a Fibre to the Home (FTTH) network, the impact of adoption is 
enormous. The network needs to be deployed to all households, resulting in a 
large upfront investment cost. This cost is typically in the ranges of €500 to 
2.000 per home passed. But in the viability analysis, the cost per home connected 
is more important. If 50% of the households connect, the cost per home 
connected is between €1.000 to €4.000. If only 10% connects, this cost rises to 
€40.000 per home connected. The impact of the underlying technological 
dimensioning model and the expected uptake on the results cannot be neglected.  
In the absence of competition, the adoption is typically modelled using diffusion 
models, e.g. Gompertz, Bass or Fisher-Pry adoption models [5.5–5.7]. The 
Gompertz curve was already introduced in Section 2.3.2.b to model the FTTC 
service uptake in London. However, with strategic uncertainty, the impact of 
competition with other offers or services comes into play and the estimation of 
the market potential is much harder. Entering an existing market will have a 
distorting effect, and it can be expected that this will trigger reciprocal actions by 
competitors. Price wars are just one example of such competitive interaction. In 
business case analysis, these dynamics are modelled through game theory [5.8]. 
Although this theory allows modelling the different strategic combinations in the 
market and offers tools to find the prevailing equilibriums, an assessment of the 
market share of all offers is still required in order to conduct the analysis. 
Originating from the field of marketing, market response models offer 
methodologies to indicate the effect of marketing variables on number of 
products sold or market share [5.9]. These variables include price, promotion, 
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but also competition. As such, they can provide valuable insight in the evolution 
of market size as basis for techno-economic analysis. However, uptake of these 
market response models has only been slow by decision makers, mainly due to 
the high complexity of these models, especially if they are built for specific 
markets [5.10].  
Here we propose a modular market response model. Due to the modular 
approach, the ease-of-use is increased for decision makers. The model uses 
generally accepted market parameters, like churn and price elasticity of demand. 
As a result, it is applicable to different sectors, limiting the need for 
mathematical modelling and estimation of market parameters and interactions. 
In the following sections, we will first introduce some existing market models, 
indicating their strengths and shortcomings. Next, we introduce the different 
parameters impacting strategic interaction. As a modular market response model 
was built, we will go into more detail on these different modules. To indicate 
how the model works in practice, it is applied to a realistic case, the introduction 
of FTTH services in the Netherlands. The results of the market response model 
will prove valuable in the network and equipment dimensioning steps of a 
techno-economic analysis of an FTTH network. 
5.1.2 Existing market response models 
Standard diffusion models are the most basic and widespread market response 
models. Gompertz, Bass and Fisher-Pry curves model the adoption of a new 
technology, product or service through an S-shaped curve [5.5–5.7]. Initially, the 
increase in uptake is exponential, but after the inflection point, the penetration 
asymptotically reaches full penetration. Although these models are widely used 
in techno-economic analysis and have even been shown to model technology 
penetration correctly [5.11], some disadvantages exist. While these models can 
be fitted to observed penetrations of technology ex-post, the ex-ante estimation 
of the parameters is more difficult. Additionally, the impact of competition with 
other technologies is typically left out of the analysis. In order to model the 
competitive impact, more complex market response models are required. 
The impact of competition on pricing, output quantity and market share has been 
a research topic for over 100 years. In Cournot competition, individual firms 
compete with each other based on quantity [5.12]. Each firm decides on its 
output quantity independently, without knowing the decision of its competitors. 
Since Cournot competition states that the number of firms is fixed and they all 
have the power to influence market prices with a homogenous product, it can be 
mathematically derived what the output of each player will be. As a result of the 
Cournot model, players price above competitive price (i.e. they have a positive 
profit margin). It has for example been applied to local loop unbundling pricing 
problems [5.13]. In the other case, when players compete on price instead on 
quantity, the Bertrand model applies [5.14]. In this model, firms compete at 
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competitive price, in contrast with the Cournot model. If the number of players is 
increased to infinity, the two models generate the same results. These models 
form the basis of game theory, and will be discussed in more detail the next 
chapter.  
These competition models have been extended and applied to a plethora of 
different cases. For example, the Stackelberg competition model extends the 
Cournot model by introducing sequential moves by different players [5.15]. The 
leader makes the first move, and knows the follower will observe this move. In 
addition, Stackelberg competition assumes the leader has some sort of 
commitment power. Such power can be reflected in holding excess capacity, or if 
the leader was the former incumbent monopoly.  
All these models described above consist of a modelling of the competition, and 
the underlying assumptions, e.g. the homogeneous product, make them less 
suited for realistic business cases. In addition, they allow to evaluate the output 
quantity and price of the different players, but the impact on the total market of 
competitive behaviour is not taken into account. 
Approaches from other fields have also been used in order to model market 
shares of competing operators. The Lotka-Volterra model, also known as the 
prey-predator model, has been used to study the impact of competition and 
market dynamics. This model was developed first to study interactions between 
two species. However, they have proven valuable in economics as well. The 
Lotka-Volterra equations model the number of individuals of two species in an 
environment, a predator and a prey. Concerning the prey, it is assumed that it 
finds sufficient food at all times, while the food supply of the predator depends 
entirely on the prey. The Lotka-Volterra equations can be found below. 
 
Prey 
  
  
        (5.1) 
Predator 
  
  
        (5.2) 
 
The model assumes an exponential growth of the prey population, represented by 
the first term of eq. 5.1. The second term reflects the rate of predation upon the 
prey. This term is dependent on both the number of prey and predator. As such, 
the more predators, the higher the rate of prey population decrease. When the 
predator population is considered, it is clear that the growth rate depends on the 
number of prey present in the environment. If there is almost no prey, or food 
supply, the predator population cannot grow. The death rate of the predator 
population is modelled through the second term of eq. 5.2. 
In telecom markets, the incumbent was modelled as the prey, while new entrants 
where predators. A new entrant can only increase his market share by churning 
on the market share of the incumbent [5.16]. Another application can be found in 
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the television market, where new screen technology pushes the older out of the 
market. The leading CRT technology was replaced by plasma and LCD 
television [5.17], [5.18]. 
While the Lotka-Volterra model is well suited to model competitive effects 
between different actors, it has some shortcomings. First, the carrying capacity of 
the environment is constant. In realistic markets, markets tend to grow and 
shrink. The Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) market and mobile 
phone markets are just two telecom related examples. Additionally, in order to 
model markets with prey-predator behaviour, the market already needs to exist. 
Finally, one needs to estimate the different parameters upfront, which can prove 
time consuming for realistic cases and requires historical data. 
Other market response models are built upon simultaneous equations models. 
These models are an extension of the standard regression analysis. Typical 
regression analysis works with a single equation to estimate a variable based on 
several parameters. As the name suggests, simultaneous equation models is a 
data generation process that depends on more than one equation interacting 
together to produce the observed data. These models require the collection of 
historical data, like price and uptake, to model demand curves for the different 
services. In existing markets, such models have proven valuable [5.19], but in 
emerging markets, the absence of data undermines the usability of such models. 
In [5.19], such a model was developed for the estimation of the market for cable 
television. This demand depends on both the supply and demand of analogue and 
digital cable television.  
The different competition models discussed above each have their own 
shortcoming. Cournot, Stackelberg and Bertrand competition model competitive 
interaction based on price or quantity. Based on an analytical foundation, they 
are however less suited for realistic business cases. In addition, their main goal is 
to estimate the price and output quantity, with less focus on market share 
modelling. This market modelling is the primary focus of the Lotka-Volterra 
model. In [5.16], they were applied to a former monopolistic market, where a 
new entrant appeared. However, the different parameters need to be estimated 
upfront. As this requires historical data, it is less suited for application to 
emerging markets. The final drawback these market response models share, is 
their complexity. While some of them might be easier to use, e.g. the S-shaped 
diffusion models, it remains difficult for decision makers to translate the 
parameters to known concepts. Estimating the death rate or inflection point of 
models is not straightforward, especially since these decision makers are more 
familiar with concepts as elasticity, contract duration, etc. 
As such, market response models based on economic concepts, e.g. price 
elasticity, churn, cross-elasticity, etc., are more suited to use in techno-economic 
analysis. The user of the model is typically familiar with these concepts and 
knows how they relate to his market. In addition, econometrics can easily 
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provide reliable values for these parameters. However, as the typical drawback 
of market response models is the complexity, which reduces the adoption of such 
models, a market response model must be accessible and user-friendly. 
Therefore, we have developed a modular market response model [5.1]. In the 
following section, we elaborate on the different parameters impacting the market, 
continuing with the introduction of the competitive market response model. We 
will also indicate how the different parameters impact the model.  
5.1.3 Market impacting factors 
The market response model developed in this dissertation aims at estimating the 
evolution of market shares of competing offers, taking into account the 
interaction between the prices of these offers. In a competitive environment, 
different market players compete for market share, typically with even more than 
one offer. In telecommunications, operators offer basic subscriptions, high-speed 
subscriptions, triple-play packets, etc. As such, the operators do not only 
compete with each other, intra-competition between their own offers is also 
present. For example, an incumbent rolling out a next generation access network, 
will need to take into account that this might churn the market share of its legacy 
network. Therefore, the market model presented here allows assigning market 
shares to different offers, independently of whether they are offered by the same 
player or not. 
The market response model aims to assess the impact of strategies on the 
competitive equilibrium on the market. Typically, different strategic 
combinations by different players will have a different impact on the underlying 
market, which needs to be reflected in the total market size and the market shares 
of all players. For example, a low average price level for a product will typically 
result in a higher demand. This is also the reason why broadband price is 
included in the next generation oriented broadband performance index described 
in Chapter 2. Additionally, the actor charging the lowest price can expect the 
highest market share in a normal market, where demand has an inverse relation 
with price. As such, strategy is the main driver for the market model. The basic 
strategy used in the model is a price strategy, although price corrected for quality 
can also be implemented. When an operator offers a higher access speed for a 
price premium, this can be reflected in the strategy in the market model.  
Two important parameters of the market model were already indicated in the 
short description above, namely the impact of competition on the total market 
and the impact on the market division. The third parameter that is taken into 
account is the free market. This parameter indicates the amount of the market 
that is free to be re-allocated in every year. In reality, not all customers are able 
to switch supplier at any given moment in time. Due to contract duration, only a 
part of the total customer base can switch, which is the free market. In the 
following paragraphs, we go into more detail on the functioning of the market 
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response model. To indicate how the model works in practice, a stylised example 
will be elaborated on. The example consists of an emerging market, where two 
suppliers compete for market share. The emerging market is modelled through an 
S-shaped Gompertz curve, which was already introduced in Chapter 2. The 
Gompertz curve was chosen, as this has been indicated to be the most 
appropriate approach to model the adoption of e.g. telecom business cases [5.11]. 
In the mathematical formula (eq. 5.3), three parameters are required, point (a), 
slope (b) and market size (m). 
Table 5-1: Gompertz curve parameters for the stylised example 
Parameter Value 
a 4.0 
b 0.3 
m 1 
 
           
       
 
(5.3) 
For simplicity reasons, price was selected as the only factor impacting consumer 
choice in this example. To indicate the effect of price changes on the total market 
and the market division, decreasing prices were chosen. Supplier 1 charges a 
monthly price of €35, with a monthly price decrease of 2%. Supplier 2 charges a 
lower price initially, of €30, but only with a price decrease of 1% per month 
(Table 5-2). The evolution of both prices is shown in Figure 5-2. The prices were 
chosen in order to indicate how evolving prices impact the final market division 
resulting from the market response model. 
Table 5-2: Market parameters for the  stylised example 
Parameter Value 
Initial price offer 1 €35 
Price decrease offer 1 2% 
Initial price offer 2 €30 
Price decrease offer 2 1% 
Price elasticity of demand -0.5 
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Figure 5-2: Monthly price evolution of both offers in the stylised example 
 
5.1.4 Modular approach 
The market model uses a logical stepwise approach to calculate the market share 
of each offer, linking the three parameters together. These links are shown in 
Figure 5-3. As input, the model requires the strategies of the different offers, and 
an initial market. This initial market can be limited to a standard S-shaped 
adoption curve, but can also include the initial market shares of the existing 
offers on the market. In the market model, the market is defined by a maximum 
of four parameters. The expected market potential, together with a minimum and 
maximum potential over time. These can be growing or decreasing over time. 
When these are not defined, the model assumes a minimum potential of 0%, and 
a maximum of 100%. The fourth parameter defining the market is the price 
elasticity of demand.  
By combining an initial market with the strategies of the different players, the 
total market is defined. For example, this total market is the initially defined 
market, corrected for the impact of the price elasticity of demand. Next, from this 
total market, the free market is derived, e.g. based on the yearly market growth. 
Finally, by defining the market division, the free market can be distributed to the 
different offers, resulting in the calculation of the market shares for all offers. In 
the following sections, we go into more detail on the different modules of the 
market model. 
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Figure 5-3: General overview of the market model 
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5.1.4.a Impact of strategy on the total market 
In the first step, the impact of changing strategies on the total market is modelled 
(Figure 5-4). In economics, the elasticity concept is used to model the effect of a 
change in one factor on another economic variable [5.20]. As the market 
response model indicates the impact of strategy on the total market, the 
elasticities of demand are of interest in this model. The price elasticity of demand 
measures the responsiveness of the total quantity (Q) demanded of a good or 
service to a change in its price (P). It is represented by eq. 5.4.  
 
   
    
    
 
(5.4) 
In typical markets, a rising price results in decreasing demand. A price drop for 
computers, cars or smart phones will have a positive effect on demand, and thus 
on the penetration rate of these goods. However, for some products or services, it 
is possible that an increase of the highest price on the market has a positive effect 
on the total demand (in case of Veblen or Giffen goods) [5.20]. This is typically 
the case for luxury products, where the prestige linked with the product rises 
with the price and thus increases demand (Veblen). Otherwise, it can also occur 
for inferior products (Giffen). A rising price for bread results in a higher demand, 
since lower income groups notice a large effect of this price on their income, so 
they start substituting other more expensive food with bread. It should also be 
taken into account what price impacts this demand change. In the standard 
formula included in the market response model, this is the average price level. 
Although this is the most common approach, the market model should also be 
applicable to other cases. The introduction of a new service at a lower price level 
can attract new customers, who previously could not afford the service. 
Therefore, a decrease of the lowest or highest price on the market was also 
implemented as demand driver. A price elasticity calculator is introduced to 
model this behaviour. Also notice that the market model works with a range of 
prices, so the arc elasticities are used, not the point elasticities. The corrected 
total market then serves as input for the following module, which determines the 
free market. 
In order to apply the elasticity impact module to our example case, an estimate of 
the price elasticity of demand for the market is required. In this example, a price 
elasticity of -0.5 is used (Table 5-2). Using the example case from above (Table 
5-1 and Figure 5-2), it will be indicated how these parameters impact the total 
market. The effect of the impacting price will be indicated by choosing the 
lowest, highest or average price level as demand driver.  
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Figure 5-4: Calculating the impact of price elasticity of demand 
Price as demand driver 
In our example, a negative price elasticity was chosen. As the broadband market 
has shown to be a market where decreasing price increases demand, it is clear 
that the price evolution in the example case should result in an increasing market, 
as can be seen in Figure 5-5. As both prices decrease over time, the total market 
is expected to increase. The different behaviour from using different reference 
prices is interesting. When the average price level on the market is used as basis 
for the elasticity impact, this impact is linear. After 20 months, the expected 
market will have grown by 11% due to the price elasticity of demand, compared 
to the case where prices are constant. Since in the stylised example, the highest 
price (offer 1) shows a faster price decrease, this results in a higher elasticity 
impact. Once the two prices cross, and the price of offer 2 becomes the lowest, 
the elasticity impact shows a nod. 
 
 
Figure 5-5: Elasticity impact with different reference prices for the stylised 
example 
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Price elasticity and its effect on market growth 
The effect of the height of the price elasticity will obviously also have an impact 
on the total market. Figure 5-5 showed an inelastic market, but a higher price 
elasticity would even enforce the elasticity impact. As the model is built based 
on time series, it is even possible to have a changing price elasticity over the 
studied period. Once the impact of elasticity is estimated, it can be combined 
with the total market. The impact of price elasticity clearly shows in Figure 5-6. 
The expected market is multiplied with the elasticity impact calculated above. 
Again, as a negative price elasticity was chosen, due to the decrease in prices, the 
market grows faster than initially expected. In addition, the introduction of a 
maximum market potential caps the penetration to 100%. 
 
 
Figure 5-6: Price elasticity of demand increases expected market 
5.1.4.b Determining the free market 
When a player enters a new market, or decides to change his strategy in an 
existing market, the effects on the market division will only be visible after a 
certain amount of time (Figure 5-7). Indeed, at any moment in time, there is only 
a part of the market that can react to the changed strategy and switch offer. 
Churn rate refers to the proportion of customers that leave a supplier during a 
given time period. It is a term used in markets with a contractual customer base. 
As such, it is very typical for telecom markets, who have a subscriber-based 
model. At the end of their contract duration, a part of the subscribers will switch 
provider and leave their current operator. 
However, as the churn rate indicates the number of customers actually changing 
supplier, an important remark needs to be made. In the market model proposed 
below, the free market is used. In that respect, it needs to be taken into account 
that not all customers who are at the end of their contract duration will 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
e
xp
e
ct
e
d
 m
ar
ke
t 
p
o
te
n
ti
al
Time (months)
corrected market
max market
expected market
144  Chapter 5 
 
effectively leave their current supplier. As such, the free market consists of the 
customers inclined to change (CIC) fraction (eq. 5.7). 
In addition to the customers inclined to change, there is a second aspect present 
in the free market. In a growing market, the yearly growth will also be competed 
for by operators, and should as such also be catalogued as free market (eq. 5.6). 
Combining these two concepts results in the total free market per year (eq. 5.5).  
 
 
Figure 5-7: Determining the free market based on initial market and CIC 
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Applied to the example, it can be seen that it uses the outcome of the previous 
module as input to determine the free market (Figure 5-7). Here, we have chosen 
to use a CIC fraction of 20%. The free market in the example is shown in Figure 
5-8. Once the market reaches 100%, the free market is solely determined by the 
CIC. 
 
 
Figure 5-8: Available market with 20% CIC 
 
However, other definitions of the free market are possible. For example, due to 
contract duration, it is possible that customers are locked in, making it 
impossible to change supplier during the contract period. This has also been 
implemented in the market model. After the contract duration, these customers 
become available in the free market. 
5.1.4.c Dividing the free market 
The last question remaining is how the free market from the previous module is 
divided between different offers based on their strategy. The most 
straightforward division is ‘The Winner Takes All’. When using such a market 
division, the total free market is allocated to the best offer during that time 
period. The best offer can be defined as the cheapest, highest quality, or even the 
offer that has been the longest on the market. With the latter, one can model a 
first-mover advantage. 
However, in reality, it is hardly ever the case that one supplier captures the entire 
free market. It will most likely be the case that the best offer captures most of the 
market, but all other offers can still attract market share. Still, the demand of 
each service or good will still be impacted by the price of the other offers. In 
economics, such an effect is indicated by the cross-price elasticity of demand 
[5.20]. It is a measure for the responsiveness of the demand of one good to a 
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change in the price for another good. The other good is not necessarily a 
substitute; it can as well be a complement of the former. Typically, when it is a 
substitute, the cross-price elasticity of demand is positive. A price decrease of 
product B will result in a decrease of demand of good A. When both goods are 
complements, the cross-price elasticity is obviously negative. An increase in the 
price of good B will result in a decrease of demand in good A. In eq. 5.8, the 
calculation method for cross-price elasticity of demand can be found. In case of 
multiple offers on the market, there is a (different) cross-price elasticity between 
any two offers.  
 
    
      
      
 
(5.8) 
Competition for the market between different offers is played on different 
factors. Price and quality of the offer are typical distinguishing characteristics, 
but competition can play on other facets as well. Marketing, innovation or image 
can also influence the perceived utility the offer has for the consumer, increasing 
its attractiveness. 
In the example, cross-price elasticity of demand is used to indicate the 
functionality of this module. Based on the strategies of the different offers, the 
distribution parameters are calculated (Figure 5-9). However, the modular model 
allows using different division concepts in a plug-and-play approach. To 
determine distribution parameters based on cross-price elasticity, the following 
equations are used (eq. 5.9 – 5.12). Suppose there are N offers on the market, 
each with price Pi, i = 1,…,N. The average price of the alternative offers for 
offer j are then calculated based on eq. 5.9. Assuming a constant cross-price 
elasticity between two different offers i and j, the distribution parameter j is 
defined according to eq. 5.11. For further analysis however, we use the 
normalised distribution parameters j  .  
An example of the distribution parameters can be found in Figure 5-10, using a 
cross-price elasticity of 0.5. 
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Figure 5-9: Determining the market division 
 
 
Figure 5-10: Distribution parameters for both offers based on cross-elasticity 
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                       (5.12) 
5.1.4.d Calculating the market share 
The final step consists of bringing everything together to calculate the market 
share of all offers. To determine the net change in market share of every offer in 
every year, both gains and losses in market share need to be calculated for each 
offer j. Each offer virtually loses a fraction of his customers calculated from the 
CIC-fraction (eq. 5.13). The gains are the division of the sum of customers 
inclined to change of all players with any growth in the market (or vice versa for 
a shrinking market) (eq. 5.14). This division is based on the distribution 
parameters introduced ( j  ) above.  
All these methods control for negative market share.  
 
Figure 5-11: Calculating the market shares from strategies and the free market 
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                         (5.14) 
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The total market share for every offer is then given by the formula below (eq. 
5.16). It is also scaled to the total market potential.  
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Initial market 
share
Market shares
(5.13)
(5.14)
(5.15)
(5.16)
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                        (5.16) 
Concerning the stylised example, the evolution of the market shares for both 
offers can be estimated using the above equations. To determine the net change 
in market share every operator has in every year, both the gains and losses in 
market share are calculated. Each operator virtually loses a fraction of his 
customers calculated from the CIC-fraction. The gains are the division of the 
sum of the customers inclined to change of all players together with any growth 
of the market (or vice versa for a shrinking market) with the distribution 
parameters introduced above. As a result, the evolution of the market shares for 
both offers can now be estimated (Figure 5-12). 
Since offer 1 charges the lowest price during the first months, it claims a higher 
share of the market. Once full penetration is reached, no more large growth is 
realised for either offer. However, due to the fact that the second offer becomes 
cheaper than the first, it reclaims some of the market share from offer 1. 
5.1.5 Application of the market model 
In the previous section, the different modules and their interoperation where 
indicated with a stylised example. In order to indicate the full strength of the 
model, it will be applied to a more realistic telecom case. 
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In the liberalised European telecom market, competition between different 
operators is now present.  In addition to this competition, the broadband market 
also matured. On average, broadband coverage reached 95% in Europe [5.21]. In 
Belgium, household penetration is currently around 80% [5.22], in the 
Netherlands it reached 95% in the last quarter of 2012 [5.23]. 
Although the broadband market can be seen as mature, new technologies 
continue to increase the quality of the broadband connections. The rollout of 
FTTH networks will increase speeds to and above 100 Mbps. However, such 
rollouts require large upfront investment, since the legacy copper networks need 
to be replaced by fibre. Typical numbers suggest a cost between €500 and €2000 
per home passed for initial rollout, depending on the building density [5.24–
5.25]. Translating these to the cost per home connected largely depends on the 
estimated uptake. When combining these costs with the typical average revenue 
per user (ARPU), this results in a serious pressure on the fibre business case, 
especially when uptake of the new network remains low. Estimating this uptake 
is thus of key importance in order to conduct the techno-economic analysis of the 
fibre business case. Typical uptake estimations leave out the impact of 
competition by existing offers, and suggest high FTTH uptake levels up to 50% 
within the next five years [5.26]. 
However, in regions where FTTH has already been rolled out, these levels are 
typically not reached. For example, FTTH uptake in the Netherlands currently is 
at 6.22% [5.23]. Of course, the uptake is lower due to the fact that FTTH is not 
available in the entire country, but rolled out regions also notice lower uptake 
than originally estimated.  
Here, the effect of introduction of FTTH in the Netherlands will be estimated 
using the modular market response model. As uptake numbers are available, the 
results from the model can be benchmarked with the observed uptake. The 
historical uptake percentages per type of operator and the total penetration can be 
found in Figure 5-13. It can be observed that the total penetration rose from 75% 
to just over 95% in 5 years. The majority of the customers connected to the DSL 
and cable network, while the other licensed operators (OLO) active on the DSL 
network lost market share. Fibre uptake only grew slowly, with the penetration 
increasing from 2% to 6.2%. 
 
Modelling Market Interactions 151 
 
Figure 5-13: Observed market shares per operator in the Netherlands 
 
The parameters required for the market response model are the initial market 
shares for the different operator, the CIC fraction, cross-price elasticity and the 
retail prices per operator. The initial market shares can be derived from Figure 
5-13 and are depicted in Table 5-3. Notice that the initial market shares are 
normalised to match a total market of 100%. The retail prices per offer can be 
found in Table 5-4. However, as current retail prices for the OLO offer and DSL 
offer are equal, the difference between their respective market shares obviously 
is driven by other factors, e.g. availability, lock-in effect, etc. The retail prices 
should thus be corrected to reflect the actual perceived utility. As CIC fraction, 
5% was chosen. Typical contract duration is five years, so per quarter 5% of the 
total customer base is available to redistribute between the offers. As the total 
market penetration was given per quarter, the observed numbers were used 
(Figure 5-13). We enforced the modelled total market to match the observed total 
market. Finally, cross-price elasticity of demand was chosen relatively high, at 2 
(Table 5-5). The broadband market has been shown to be very elastic [5.27], 
with already high cross-price elasticities between cable and ADSL offers. The 
introduction of a premium FTTH offer is expected to further increase this 
elasticity. 
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Table 5-3: Market shares of different offers in the Netherlands [5.23] 
Provider Market share 
DSL incumbent 46.97% 
Cable operator 38.02% 
Other licensed operators (OLO) 12.17% 
FTTH 2.83% 
 
Table 5-4: Monthly retail prices for different broadband offers [5.28] 
Provider Market price 
DSL incumbent €35.00 
Cable operator €36.67 
Other licensed operators (OLO) €35.00 
FTTH €55.32 
 
Table 5-5: Market response model parameters for the Dutch fixed broadband 
market 
Parameter Value 
CIC fraction 5% 
Price elasticity of demand 0 (observed market growth used) 
Cross-price elasticity 2.00 
 
Applying the market model on this information returns the following evolution 
of the market shares for the different operators (Figure 5-14). It can be seen that 
the observed and modelled market shares are aligned for all offers. In Q3 of 
2012, the largest difference between observed and modelled uptake is 0.42% (for 
the OLO offer). The introduction of the FTTH offer has no disruptive effect on 
the total market. Due to the large cross-price elasticity and the retail price 
difference between this offer and the legacy offers, FTTH only claims a small 
market share. In the growing market, only the OLO offer has a decreasing 
market share. As penetration rises sharply during the observed period, the cable 
and DSL offer notice no market share decline. The OLO offer remains low, as 
the model takes into account the perceived utility of this offer compared to the 
other offers, consistent with the current market division. 
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Differences between the observed and modelled market shares can be explained 
by the reduced complexity in the model. It was assumed that the cross-price 
elasticities between the different offers are constant and equal. Additionally, 
prices are used to model uptake differences as proxy for perceived utility. 
 
 
Figure 5-14: Market share evolution of broadband market with introduction of an 
FTTH offer (M = Modelled, O = Observed) 
5.1.6 Conclusion 
Due to two simultaneous trends, liberalisation and continuous consolidation, 
most Western industries are characterised today by a high degree of 
concentration. When new products or services are introduced in such markets, 
firms face a large degree of strategic uncertainty. 
Typically, the viability of investments is assessed through techno-economic 
modelling. However, this requires a reliable estimation of consumer uptake, as 
this is the main driver for the expected revenues and variable costs. The number 
of customers to serve has a direct impact on the required equipment to install. 
Diffusion models are used to model this uptake. Although such models can 
match the observed uptake of new technologies or services ex-post, the ex-ante 
estimation of the model parameters is harder. Especially since these parameters 
are difficult to interpret for the decision maker. 
As such, market response models have been proposed to offer a more accurate 
estimation of market share evolutions, based on prices, promotion and 
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competition. While such models are accurate for the specific cases they were 
built for, their increased complexity reduces uptake. 
Here, a modular market response model is introduced, able of modelling future 
market shares of competing offers. The main advantage of the modular approach 
is the possibility to use different modules for different cases, while the 
complexity of the calculations within each module is hidden for the user. As 
such, the user only requires simple parameters, such as current market shares, 
price levels and elasticities. Most of these parameters are typically available for 
the user, while econometrics allows quickly finding the missing parameters. 
These parameters are generally accepted economic parameters, and the user can 
easily link them to his specific case, providing him with valuable input for his 
network dimensioning and further techno-economic analysis. 
While the market response model presented here reduces the complexity for the 
user, it is still able to accurately predict market share evolution over time, as has 
been shown by the FTTH case. From the insight gained from the observed and 
modelled FTTH market shares, questions about the necessity of FTTH can be 
raised. With only small market shares, the business case for operators will not 
balance when the large upfront investment costs are taken into account. 
However, customers will require higher access speeds, driven by the uptake of 
bandwidth demanding services. As the willingness to pay for network access 
does not seem to grow with this increased demand, operators will need to look 
into other options to improve the FTTH business case. 
5.2 Cooperation models in telecom 
Cooperation models typically aim at achieving cost reductions. In Chapter 2, we 
already introduced cooperation in standardisation bodies as a possible 
cooperation strategy. Other cooperation possibilities are also present in the 
current environment. For example, public and private players can cooperate by 
forming a new entity, a so-called public private partnership (PPP). Another 
example was already introduced in Chapter 3, where one entity rolls out the 
network, while another operates it. Another cooperation model aims at cost 
sharing between several players through joint operations. This last model will be 
discussed in more detail in Section 5.3. 
5.2.1 Public private partnership models 
For large infrastructure works, a public authority cooperates with private players 
through a PPP, in order to split the investment costs. By cooperating instead of 
competing, several goals can be achieved. If both players have a customer base, 
this can be combined, increasing the possible revenues. Referring back to the 
high initial investment cost of network deployment, this cost can thus be spread 
out over a larger customer base. In addition, both actors can perform different 
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roles, leveraging their own strengths. However, several guidelines must be kept 
in mind when a PPP is formed, especially when the rollout of access networks is 
considered. 
In case of access network rollout, The European Commission has forbidden state 
aid in several regions, depending on the current competitive state. However, as 
was already described in Chapter 3, the competitive environment might not 
reflect the desired state of the public authority. For example, in Belgium, no state 
aid is allowed in broadband access network rollout, as (almost) the entire country 
is covered by two competing infrastructures. However, none of these are FTTH 
networks. When a public authority wants to invest in the latter type of network, it 
must do so under the market investor principle, meaning that they invest under 
the same terms as a private company would do. An example of such a PPP set up 
for the deployment of an FTTH network is the case of Amsterdam, where the 
municipality funded 30% of the initial investment, on the same terms as a private 
player. 
Examples of such PPP models were already introduced in Chapter 3. When the 
value network analysis was conducted for the FTTH access market, it was 
already indicated that the actor taking up the role of fibre infrastructure 
deployment could be a utility or municipality. The daily operation of this 
network could then be outsourced to a tender winner. Instead of outsourcing, a 
PPP could also result from this cooperation model. During this research, the PPP 
model was also applied to the case of a wireless access network rollout in the 
city of Ghent [5.29]. The municipality and a private player form a PPP to deploy 
a municipal WiFi network. Both actors invest on the same terms, with the 
municipality taking a share of 30%. A quantitative analysis of such a PPP can be 
found in the next chapter. 
5.2.2 Split responsibilities 
Up to now, the discussed models considered cooperation up to some level in the 
value network. In joint infrastructure rollout, players cooperated in the 
deployment phase of the access network, more specifically in the trenching part. 
In the PPP model, both players invest on equal terms in the partnership, in order 
to share costs and increase the customer base. Competing would result in a 
fragmented customer base and duplication of infrastructure, decreasing the 
viability of the case for each actor. However, cooperation in access network 
rollout can also be very limited. In the extreme case, one party can independently 
rollout the network, before selling it to another actor. In this case, the 
coordination costs present under a tender case are removed, and only the cost 
linked to the negotiation of the sale remain. 
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5.3 Cooperation in access network deployment 
Competition for end customers was shown above to put pressure on the business 
case viability for operators. A large part of the investment cost is independent of 
the number of customers, as each house must be passed in order to be able to 
offer the service. On the other hand, revenues are driven by the customers 
connecting. As a result, operators need to look for new approaches to increase 
viability. We already indicated that the initial investment for the rollout of 
networks is high, up to €2.000 per home passed in rural areas [5.24], [5.25], 
[5.30]. The majority of this cost can be attributed to the initial outside plant 
deployment, driven by trenching and fibre deployment. Research has indicated 
that the initial installation cost for the outside plant of underground networks 
represent between 55% and 70% of the initial investment [5.31]. This high 
upfront investment is one of the main reasons private players have not started the 
rollout of FTTH networks on a large scale in Europe. The largest share of the 
investment is independent of the customer uptake. As such, low uptake due to 
competitive interaction has a negative impact on the viability. The lag in FTTH 
installation is clearly reflected in the current penetration rates of FTTH in 
Europe. Compared with the penetration rate of fibre to the building/home in 
Korea (72.10%), Japan (49.65%) and the United States of America (12.34%), 
most Western European countries are clearly behind with 4.81%. Only 
Switzerland and the Netherlands have a fibre penetration over 10%. [5.23]. 
Focussing on cost reduction in this initial deployment can thus help to improve 
the business case. 
In recent years, a shift in perception can be noticed towards telecom networks, 
where they are seen as just another utility network, like gas or electricity 
networks. Several similarities can be identified between these infrastructures. 
The passive infrastructure of all these networks typically can be found in the 
same location in the public domain, and the operations in rollout and 
maintenance of this infrastructure show several similarities over all networks. 
The initial rights of way, trenching and rollout of the cable or duct is alike for all 
infrastructures, although differences in the technical limitations exist. Important 
economies of scope can be gained by combining these operations [5.32], [5.33]. 
Regulatory practices of one infrastructure can also set the example for other 
infrastructures. The unbundling of the electricity market, with a structural 
separation between the infrastructure operations and the electricity production 
and supply can be successfully transferred to telecom networks [5.34], [5.35]. In 
the electricity sector, distribution grid operators roll out and maintain the 
network and sell access to this grid to suppliers and producers on equal terms. In 
telecom, Swedish municipalities have rolled out and own the passive fibre 
infrastructure [5.36]. Other telecom operators are given access to this network on 
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fair terms to offer services to end users, which is an open access model for 
telecom [5.37–5.39]. 
These two factors, the similarities in the passive network rollout and operations 
and the comparable regulatory issues, have resulted in recent policy and 
recommendations towards the joint rollout of infrastructures [5.40], [5.41]. By 
stimulating the cooperation between different infrastructure owners, policy 
makers aim at reducing the nuisance for inhabitants and small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) by reducing the total work time. The economic impact of 
road works cannot be neglected. Time losses and extra fuel consumption due to 
congestion is only one aspect. In addition, especially for infrastructure works in 
cities, SMEs can be (partially) cut off and are harder to reach for their suppliers 
and customers, resulting in lost turnover. 
Here, we show how cooperation impacts the technical design of the outside 
infrastructure rollout. We introduce a cost sharing model based on underground 
location of the infrastructure to indicate that a joint rollout of different types of 
infrastructures not only results in reduced nuisance and economic losses for the 
society, but also offers cost saving possibilities for the utility owners compared 
to an independent rollout. With this model, it is shown that joint rollout 
drastically improves the business case for an FTTH infrastructure owner. 
Reducing the initial investment costs can persuade actors to start with the rollout 
of the infrastructure, raising the penetration of FTTH networks in Europe and 
helps at reaching the goals of the Digital Agenda.   
Section 5.3.1 gives an overview of the typical network characteristics, together 
with the (ideal) trench model. Next, the cost and allocation model is discussed in 
sections 5.3.2, 5.3.3 and 5.3.4. We continue with two example case studies, 
highlighting the impact of a joint network infrastructure rollout on the total initial 
rollout cost in different areas. Section 5.3.7 concludes, together with some topics 
for future work. 
5.3.1 Underground network infrastructures model 
To decrease the existing gap between the Digital Agenda goals and the existing 
cost issues for infrastructure providers to rollout the network offering the higher 
access speeds, a joint utility network rollout model has been developed. This 
rollout model starts from the underlying technical requirements of the 
underground infrastructure. In Greenfield situations, the opportunities for 
cooperation during rollout are straightforward. In Brownfield situations, existing 
utility networks typically require regular pre-emptive maintenance, which can be 
an opportunity for telecom operators to deploy a new network. Also, the 
potential large upgrades needed to the electricity networks to move towards 
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smart metering offer opportunities for other actors to coordinate road works
6
. A 
last example where cooperation in Brownfield installations can occur is the 
upgrade of existing sewage systems. While these are currently single pipe 
systems, they need to be upgraded towards split systems for sewage and rain. 
Several advantages can be expected from such a joint rollout. Reducing the 
rollout cost for FTTH networks could improve their respective business cases, 
speeding up the introduction of these high bandwidth networks in Europe. 
Additionally, other utility providers could profit from such cost synergies. An 
important advantage for policy makers could be the reduced nuisance for 
inhabitants and SMEs when all infrastructure works are carried out together, 
thereby reducing the total work time. However, such a joint rollout can also be 
expected to result in extra overhead costs. Deploying the infrastructures together 
will require extra coordination costs. Additionally, existing safety regulation 
concerning underground infrastructures could result in only marginal cost 
savings, making the extra overhead costs outweigh the possible cost gains. It is 
therefore important to identify the level of cooperation between the different 
utility operators. 
 
 
Figure 5-15: Overview of potential utility network synergies 
 
                                                          
6 This opportunity only exists in case PLC is chosen as technology to transfer smart meter 
data. In case of wireless technology, no road works will be required. 
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Figure 5-15 shows an overview of the different network parts (access, in the 
building, within the home or apartment) when considering a utility. In the model 
presented here, an open access network is shown [5.35]. The network is opened 
at different levels to different actors, as was also described in Chapter 3. The 
focus in this model is on the physical infrastructure provider (PIP) who deploys 
and operates the access infrastructure and opens it for all network and service 
providers on top. More in detail, the PIP actor contains the Right of 
Way/trenching and duct/fibre role. Since previous research indicated that 
cooperation offers synergy opportunities in these layers, focus is on the PIP 
[5.32], [5.33].  
In every network part, four network lifecycle phases can be identified on the 
horizontal axis: deployment, initial and later-on connection provisioning to the 
customer and network operations [5.35]. As was already indicated, the largest 
part of the cost of an FTTH network is in the deployment phase [5.31]. For an all 
buried installation, deployment costs typically result in over 55% of the total 
costs. Depending on the chosen technology, this can go up to over 70%. Within 
this deployment cost, 75% can be attributed to the outside plant installation. 
Even small cost savings in this domain will thus already have a considerable 
impact on the total investment cost for an FTTH network. For Belgium, the total 
capital expenditures (CapEx) for a full FTTH rollout have been estimated around 
€4 billion [5.42]. Additionally, in the deployment phase, the operations 
conducted by the different utility providers show resemblances. Apart from the 
technical constraint of the network, e.g. requiring a ring or tree structure, most of 
the work consists of trenching and deployment of cables and ducts. Therefore, 
this model will look at the possible synergies in this deployment phase, which 
includes right of way, trenching, ducts, cables and flexibility points, and indicate 
what the impact of cooperation is on the total cost for each utility operator. 
5.3.1.a Infrastructure characteristics 
To indicate the possible synergies in the infrastructure rollout phase, the typical 
characteristics of each considered network must be taken into account. Typically 
in a fully buried installation, the following networks can be found underground: 
telecom networks (cable, copper and fibre), energy networks (electricity, gas and 
heat), drinking water and the sewage system. An overview of a typical cross-
section of a road can be found in Figure 5-16. 
Since the liberalisation of the energy market through the different energy 
packages, the energy network infrastructure falls under the responsibility of the 
transport and distribution system operators [5.34]. A typical electricity 
distribution network can be found at a minimal depth of 60 cm. Electricity cables 
are quite flexible and not many safety regulations apply. For example, the 
minimal distance between an electricity cable and another network should only 
be 6 cm.  
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Figure 5-16: Cross section of a typical road 
 
Gas networks require a more rigid duct system, mainly for safety reasons. In 
addition, a safety distance needs to be taken into account when installing other 
networks in the proximity of gas pipes. They are typically also installed deeper 
underground than electricity networks and no other infrastructure can be placed 
on top or below this network. 
Telecom networks, typically the hybrid fibre coax (HFC), copper and fibre 
network, in a fully buried network, are laying at a minimal depth of 75 cm. At 
regular distances, flexibility points like manholes and street cabinets are 
installed. Apart from this, only few requirements are in place for these types of 
networks. The safety distance between telecom networks is also considerably 
lower compared with the safety distance for gas networks. 
The last two networks considered are the drinking water and sewage system. 
Like the gas infrastructure, drinking water makes use of a rigid infrastructure and 
has similar safety requirements. Concerning the sewer system, a separate system 
is required for rain and sewers infrastructure for new rollouts. Since these 
systems are typically located in the middle of the road, while all other networks 
are installed on both sides under the footpath, the sewage system is left out in the 
analysis. However, when large road works are carried out or contracted by the 
government, be it federal, regional or local, utility owners could benefit from the 
road works to roll out their infrastructure while the road is open since no or only 
limited additional digging would be required [5.40].  
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5.3.1.b Standard trench 
It was already indicated that most underground infrastructures, apart from the 
sewage system, are located in the same area on both sides of the street. The 
combination of all limitations, namely the existing safety regulations on required 
coverage, distance between infrastructures and minimal distance to the walls of 
the trench (Table 5-6), has resulted in the description of a standard trench (Figure 
5-17) [5.43]. In addition to the requirements inside the trench, extra safety 
requirements are imposed. A minimal distance of 1.10m to buildings should be 
saved for Greenfield situations. For the same reasons, the trench should not 
exceed the dimensions of 1.10m width and 1.20m depth. 
Based on these requirements, a cost model tool was developed to minimise the 
cost of deploying different infrastructures. After optimising the dimensions of 
and locations in the trench, a cost allocation model allows to calculate the impact 
of a joint rollout on the total costs per utility operator. 
Table 5-6: Proposed standard trench parameters [5.43] 
Infrastructure 
type 
Depth (m) 
Distance to trench 
wall (m) 
Distance to other 
cables (m) 
Electricity 0.6 0.05 0.06 
Gas – low 
pressure 
0.8 0.1 0.2 
Gas – medium 
pressure 
1 0.1 0.2 
Telecom 0.75 0.05 0 
Drinking water 1.10 0.1 0.2 
 
 
Figure 5-17: Standard trench description 
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5.3.2 Trench optimisation model 
The standard trench proposed by one of the Belgian distribution grid operators 
Eandis [5.43] offers a first guideline towards a theoretical optimised trench, but 
in practice, rolling out a new network will probably not be executed in a 
Greenfield situation. The location of existing infrastructures and space 
limitations should all be taken into account. Therefore, the spreadsheet model 
developed in [5.44] was extended towards an optimisation model in java code. 
When developing the model, two challenges were encountered. 
The first challenge is identifying the parameter or function to optimise. The 
distribution net operator [5.43] indicated both width and depth of the trench as 
important drivers for the total cost of the infrastructure deployment. This is 
reflected in the cost for opening and repairing the pavement (surface dependent) 
and the cost for digging (depth dependent). In this model, the total volume of the 
trench is optimised to minimise costs. However, the model can easily switch to 
other functions to optimise. The total width of the trench could be a more 
important factor, for example if the repair cost of the surface is very high. 
Optimising width or depth separately has therefore also been implemented in the 
model. Other functions can easily be added to the model. 
A second challenge towards the implementation of an optimisation algorithm is 
the presence of distance constraints between different infrastructures. Simple 
Linear Programming (LP) software and algorithms can therefore not be used 
[5.45]. To counter this issue, we developed a tool analysing all possible 
permutations of infrastructures to solve the optimisation problem. Since in most 
cases, only up to 6 infrastructures are present in one trench, computation time is 
not an issue. For each permutation, the first infrastructure is placed based on its 
constraints in the upper left corner of the available area (Figure 5-18). Each 
additional infrastructure is then placed on the lowest cost location of the 
remaining area. In this model, this is the position where the total volume of the 
resulting trench is minimal. As can be seen in Figure 5-18, electricity is placed in 
the upper left corner of the available area. When a fibre network is added to the 
trench, the constraints for distance between the electricity and fibre 
infrastructure, and the depth constraints for the fibre infrastructure diminishes the 
available installation area (gray area in Figure 5-18). The model returns the 
optimal location of each infrastructure after checking every permutation. After 
identifying the optimal trench, the costs can be divided between the different 
utility owners.  
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Figure 5-18: Identifying the lowest cost location 
5.3.3 Cost allocation model 
Before going into detail on the different cost categories taken into account in the 
cost model, a short introduction on cost allocation theory is given. 
5.3.3.a Cost categories and allocation methods 
Three distinct cost categories can be identified when cost allocation is concerned, 
namely direct costs, shared costs and common costs [5.46]. Direct costs are 
specific for one actor, and are typically borne by one actor and not divided 
between different actors. In infrastructure rollout projects, the cost of ducts, 
cables and flexibility points are typical examples of direct costs. Shared and 
common costs can be divided between the different actors involved, and are thus 
of interest for the cost sharing model. The difference between both cost 
categories is in the cost allocation key applicable. Shared costs can be divided 
based on a cost driver (e.g. time, equipment used, volume, etc.). For 
infrastructure rollout, the digging costs are shared costs, and can be divided 
based on the volume each infrastructure requires. In this model, volume is used 
as cost allocation key for the shared costs, to maintain consistent with the 
objective function of the trench optimisation model. Common costs are 
characterised by the absence of a clear allocation key, for example, overhead 
costs like administration and licensing costs. These costs are divided between all 
players upon agreed rules, mostly just an equal division between all actors. The 
different cost allocation methods are described next. 
E
F
E
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For a fair comparison of an independent rollout and a joint rollout of 
infrastructures, correct cost allocation methods should be used. The stand alone 
cost (SAC) is the cost allocation used for the independent rollout. With the SAC 
method, all direct, shared and common costs are directly allocated to one actor, 
as if there would be no cooperation between the infrastructure owners (Figure 
5-19). 
 
 
Figure 5-19: Stand alone cost principle 
 
For the joint rollout, the fully allocated cost (FAC) method is used to calculate 
the rollout cost for each actor under cooperation. All costs are divided between 
all involved parties based on the allocation schemes selected for each cost 
category. Direct costs are attributed to each actor, while the shared and common 
costs are divided based on cost allocation keys (Figure 5-20). 
 
 
Figure 5-20: Fully allocated cost principle 
 
A third allocation option is the long run incremental cost (LRIC) method (Figure 
5-21). Here, every additional actor only bears the additional total cost when he 
cooperates with the other actors. This might be the case when road works are 
conducted that require opening the complete street. Any utility network provider 
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who wants to install his network at this moment is accounted for his direct costs, 
while the actor who commissioned the road works bears all shared and common 
costs. 
 
Figure 5-21: Long run incremental cost principle 
5.3.4 Cost model – overview of the different impacting factors 
In the cost sharing model, focus is on the cost reductions that can be gained from 
cooperation in the initial deployment phase. Costs linked with the later stages of 
the network operations are thus not taken into account. It can however be 
important to check the impact of joined rollout on the operational processes of 
repair and maintenance in the future, or synergies in the initial household 
connection phase.  
Two important cost categories have been identified within the trenching cost, 
namely digging and initial installation of the cables or ducts. The digging cost is 
again driven by two parameters. First, from the trench optimisation model, the 
total dimensions of the trench can be computed. While a stand-alone rollout 
might result in a smaller volume of the trench compared with a joint rollout, the 
incremental cost of the joint trench is spread out over more actors. Secondly, the 
pavement type also has an influence on the digging costs. A distinction is made 
between three different types: bank, loose pavement and asphalt. When no 
pavement is present, this reduces the total cost substantially, since the contractor 
can immediately start digging and no repair of the pavement after installation is 
necessary. In the two other cases, loose pavement and asphalt, repair is required 
and raises the total cost of the rollout.  
The dimensions and the pavement type are used to calculate the different 
components of the digging costs. The largest part of the digging cost is the 
personnel costs, while material and equipment comprise a smaller portion of the 
total cost. It is clear that in a joint rollout scenario, these costs can easily be 
shared between the different utility providers. 
Next to the digging cost, installation cost is the second important aspect of the 
trenching cost. These costs include again personnel costs, now for the 
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5
LRIC
Variable
Direct 
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deployment of ducts and cables. Additionally, costs for cables, ducts or 
flexibility points are also taken into account. These costs are actor specific, but 
cooperation could influence the total installation time, especially for smaller 
rollouts. Installing several ducts and cables simultaneously in the same trench is 
impossible. However, for larger installations, a sequenced coordination of work 
can undo the time losses. An overview of the different costs can be found in 
Table 5-7. 
Table 5-7: Installation and direct costs for trenching [5.43] 
Cost type Cost (€) Classification 
Personnel cost (€/hour) 36.75 Direct / shared 
Truck (€/hour) 15.75 Direct / shared 
Digging machine (€/hour) 17.85 Shared 
Electricity cable (€/m) 3.22 Direct 
Fibre cable (€/m) 3.00 Direct 
Gas duct (€/m) 3.50 Direct 
 
As introduced in section 5.3.1, this model calculates the possible cost synergies 
in the initial deployment phase. Making the physical connection to the customer 
premises is part of the provisioning stage, and thus not included. In case the 
utility and telecom providers do not cooperate in this stage, this classifies as 
direct costs, making the extension straightforward. However, in the future 
cooperation could also apply here.  
5.3.4.a Cost allocation key 
In the previous paragraphs, it was already indicated that for shared costs, a cost 
allocation key needs to be decided on to come to a fair distribution of the costs to 
each individual actor. Since a joint rollout will impact the total volume of the 
utility trench, and in turn this influences the total digging costs, the cost 
allocation key is based on these costs. Eq. 5.17 is used to define the cost 
allocation key for each actor. For the installation costs, a similar allocation key is 
used.  
 
 
                     
             
              
 
   
 (5.17) 
With Digging cost i as the digging cost when the utility actor rolls out the 
network independently. 
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5.3.5 How cooperation influences the total rollout cost – case 
examples 
The combination of the trench dimensioning optimisation tool and the cost 
allocation model allows calculating the impact of cooperation on the total rollout 
cost for each utility network in a fully buried case. Since the main goal is to 
indicate how cooperation can diminish the costs for fibre networks, thereby 
speeding up the rollout of these networks in Europe, special attention is given to 
the impact on fibre rollout cost. However, the impact on other utility networks is 
also taken into account, as cooperation should obviously benefit all actors 
cooperating. 
Three different scenarios will be described here. First, an independent rollout by 
all actors will be introduced. It will be indicated that the cost results for the initial 
trenching are realistic compared to the results from other studies. This scenario 
will serve as a benchmark for the other scenarios, where a joint rollout with other 
utility providers will be analysed. In order not to overcomplicate the analysis, 
these scenarios will look at the rollout of different infrastructure networks in one 
street, with a trench length of 100 meter. It is assumed that along this road, 20 
premises are present, comparable with a rollout in an urban area. Such a 
geographical model closely resembles a ribbon development case, which is still a 
typical case in e.g. Belgium. Terminating flexibility points have been foreseen in 
all scenarios. Current practice is to catalogue these manholes as direct cost, as 
they are deployed separately by each actor. 
5.3.5.a A stand alone rollout by different operators 
In case each operator rolls out his network independently, the stand-alone cost 
allocation is used. every actor has to bear the costs of opening the pavement, 
digging the trench, installing of the cables or ducts and repairing pavement. Such 
a situation is presented in Figure 5-22 for electricity, fibre, gas and drinking 
water networks. In total, an independent rollout requires in the example case a 
total digging volume of just under 105m
3
. The fibre operator would only need to 
dig 24m
3
. Including the costs for flexibility points, the trenching cost per home 
passed for the fibre network comes down to €470. When comparing this number 
with costs typically found in research on fibre network rollout in urban areas 
(€900 - €1200 per home passed), the results of this cost model are found in this 
region. Indeed, trenching costs consist of around 80% of the deployment costs, 
which are 60% of the total costs for an all buried installation. Table 5-8 
summarises the total costs per home passed (HP) for every utility provider. The 
impact of trench volume is clearly reflected in the digging costs, with the cost for 
drinking water 30% higher than for electricity. The extra cost for equipment only 
has a small impact on the installation cost. This equipment cost also comprises 
the cost for terminating man- or handholes for each utility at every home passed. 
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Figure 5-22: Cross section of a stand alone rollout 
 
Table 5-8: Cost allocation results in the stand alone rollout scenario 
Cost aspect Electricity Fibre Gas Drinking water 
Digging cost €82 €91 €98 €107 
Installation cost €113 €114 €117 €118 
Equipment cost €266 €265 €268 €268 
Total cost €461 €470 €482 €493 
 
5.3.5.b Brownfield scenario: Joint electricity – fibre rollout 
In this first joint rollout scenario, the cooperation between a distribution system 
operator and a fibre network operator is analysed. This scenario comes close to a 
Brownfield scenario, where the fibre network is deployed in places where 
maintenance works are carried out on the electricity network. Since less safety 
regulations apply for these networks, these types of cables offer the most 
opportunities for cost reduction in rollout phase. Regulation even allows placing 
an electricity cable on top of a fibre cable, taking into account a safety distance 
of minimum 6cm. As a result of this regulation, this type of cooperation in the 
rollout phase offers large amounts of cost saving opportunities for both actors. 
Indeed, due to the cooperation in the trenching phase, the shared and common 
costs can be distributed between the different actors. A fully allocated cost 
methodology is applied here. The joint rollout only requires one trench, and thus 
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only one time the opening and repair of the pavement, while a stand-alone rollout 
simply duplicates these operations. Additionally, the total volume of the trench 
under cooperation equals the volume of the fibre trench under stand-alone 
rollout, resulting in a substantial reduction of digging time. The results from the 
trench optimisation model are shown in Figure 5-23. 
 
 
Figure 5-23: Electricity - fibre cooperation cross section 
 
Applying the cost allocation keys derived from eq. 5.17, the following impact on 
the total cost per HP can be observed (Table 5-9). First, there is a major 
reduction in the total digging costs of 50% for the fibre network. This reduction, 
as already indicated, is driven by the large reduction in total digging volume 
compared with the independent rollout. Secondly, there is also a reduction in 
installation cost for every utility provider, caused by the reduction in manpower 
for the opening and repair of the pavement. In total, both infrastructure 
companies can gain significantly from cooperation, with cost reductions in initial 
deployment up to 15%. The relative drop in total costs for each actor is lower 
due to the impact of the direct costs (manholes), where no cost sharing is 
possible. However, when analysing these numbers closer, the cost reduction 
resulting from the cooperation is sufficiently large to benefit the business case 
for each utility provider. Especially for the fibre network operator, a cost 
reduction of 15% on the initial deployment costs represents a decrease of 7% in 
the total cost. For a deployment in an area like the city of Ghent, with 106,000 
households, the absolute decrease in the total cost would rise to €4.3 million, 
taking a cost per HP of €500 into account.   
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Table 5-9: Cost impact of cooperation in electricity and fibre network rollout 
Cost aspect Electricity Fibre Cooperation 
Digging cost €43  €48  €91 
Installation cost €86  €87  €173 
Equipment cost €266 €265 €531 
Total cost €395 (-14%) €400 (-15%) €795 (-15%) 
 
5.3.5.c Greenfield scenario: Joint infrastructure rollout 
While the previous example case introduced a Brownfield scenario where fibre 
cables were deployed together with an electricity cable during maintenance or 
repair of the latter, here the Greenfield scenario is studied (Figure 5-24). In case 
of allotment of new areas, the utility infrastructure needs to be deployed towards 
all lots. In the trench optimisation model, energy (gas and electricity), drinking 
water and fibre networks are included. Compared to the independent rollout, the 
total trench volume is reduced from 105m
3
 to 77.7 m
3
. From the cost model 
results, the same trends as in the Brownfield scenario can be observed (Table 
5-10). However, the total cost savings are lower, due to the safety restrictions on 
drinking water and gas networks. The total impact on pavement to be opened and 
restored is lower since the width of the trench is not impacted as much. However, 
the synergy gains are still considerable for all network operators, even in the 
Greenfield scenario. 
Table 5-10: Cost results for greenfield rollout 
Cost aspect Electricity Fibre Gas 
Drinking 
water 
Cooperation 
Digging cost €38  €42  €45  €49  €173 
Installation 
cost 
€90  €91 €93  €95  
€369 
Equipment 
cost 
€266 €265 €268 €268 €1066 
Total cost 
€393  
(-15%) 
€398  
(-16%) 
€406  
(-15%) 
€411  
(-17%) 
€1608  
(-16%) 
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Figure 5-24: Trench cross-section under greenfield rollout with all 
infrastructures 
 
5.3.5.d Impact of pavement type on the cost gains. 
In the previous two paragraphs, the cost reduction was calculated for a 
deployment under loose pavement. However, while this assumption holds for 
Brownfield situations, in case of a Greenfield rollout, the installation will most 
likely be carried out under the bank, since no pavement will be installed yet in 
the new allotment. In this section, the impact of the pavement type on the cost 
reduction is indicated. The cost for the fibre rollout is presented in Figure 5-25 
under the different pavement types. Since most of the synergy gains come from 
the reduction of the number of times the pavement has to be opened, the cost for 
opening and repairing the pavement has a clear impact on the cost gains. Because 
a deployment under the bank pavement type is the cheapest and easiest, only 
minor gains (5 to 7%) are achieved, but cooperation in a rollout under asphalt 
can result in gains up to 21% (between Brownfield and SAC). While cooperation 
in Greenfield scenarios might be easier to plan and coordinate, this analysis 
shows that the significant higher cost savings in Brownfield cooperation might 
incentivise actors to engage in more rollout cooperation in these cases. 
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Figure 5-25: Impact of pavement type on cost per HP for fibre rollout 
5.3.5.e Impact of manhole deployment on cost gains 
In the previous sections, manhole deployment was assessed as a direct cost, to be 
borne by each actor separately. Two types of man- or handholes exist, 
intermediate and terminating handholes. While an intermediate flexibility point 
typically covers equipment covering a larger area, e.g. passive splitters for a fibre 
network, terminating manholes offer the flexibility point to connect each 
building to the network.  
Current practice is a deployment of manholes in series by the different operators, 
and is also the approach followed here. As such, the manholes are catalogued as 
direct costs. The reason for this practice is that the collocation of manholes is 
expected to result in additional difficulties, and as such an increase in the 
overhead cost of cooperation. First, the span of intermediate manholes differs 
between infrastructures, requiring additional planning and cooperation between 
utility providers to decide on the placement of manholes. For example, passive 
optical fibre networks require a passive splitter per 4 homes. In the case of 
copper or electricity networks, the intermediate flexibility point can typically be 
over 100m away from the house. Secondly, when flexibility points are combined 
in one structured manhole, this means that technicians of any infrastructure have 
access to all other infrastructures. Although the same goes for access to ducts, 
flexibility points are typically more fault sensitive. In such a case, technicians 
would require additional training in order not to evoke faults to the other 
infrastructures present in the manhole while performing operations.  
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However, the algorithm developed in this dissertation can also be applied to 
evaluate the cost savings in deployment of the manholes, if the correct safety 
distances between the infrastructures are introduced in the model. 
5.3.6 Policy and business implications 
The different rollout examples in the previous section have indicated that 
cooperation in the rollout phase of utility network infrastructures can offer 
significant cost savings for the actors involved in the deployment phase. 
However, such a cooperation is not typically observed today, and this raises 
questions on the impact of this cooperation on the coordination and overhead 
costs. Indeed, while the cost savings are expected to occur during the deployment 
phase, the impact of joint infrastructure rollout on the planning phase cannot be 
neglected.  
In fact, a joint infrastructure rollout can be expected to significantly raise the 
transaction costs [5.47] of the deployment. Transaction costs are defined as costs 
that are incurred when an exchange happens. They can be subdivided in three 
categories. The first category, the search and information costs will definitely be 
impacted, as all actors involved need to be aware of the requirements of the other 
networks, available infrastructures (e.g. empty ducts), etc. Additionally, since a 
policy framework for joint rollout is currently missing, the bargaining costs will 
raise as well. Negotiations on the used cost sharing keys are required, but also 
permit granting can be an issue. The last category, the enforcement costs are 
impacted as well by joint deployment. In a standalone rollout, there is only a 
need to monitor the contractor. In joint rollout, the other parties will need to be 
monitored as well, again increasing the transaction costs. While the previous 
examples indicate a raise in the transaction costs of the planning phase, even in 
the deployment phase, cooperation can increase costs. Joint deployment could 
require higher skilled workforce, raising the personnel cost. 
It is clear that these transaction costs reduce the cost reduction gains from joint 
infrastructure rollout, and it is here that policy can have a large impact. Already, 
some countries push towards joint rollout by issuing regulation. Recently, the 
European Commission organised a public consultation on possible measures to 
reduce the cost of high speed communication infrastructure. Three main possible 
policy measures resulted from this consultation [5.41]. Implementing these 
policy recommendations reduce the transaction costs. This way, the cost gains 
from joint deployment can be achieved in reality. First, there should be made a 
better use of existing infrastructure, even across utilities. Here, the search 
transaction costs can be reduced by using integrated Geographic Information 
Systems (GIS). It is immediately clear to an actor wanting to do infrastructure 
works which other infrastructures are present in the area, available infrastructure 
is visible and the system could automatically warn other interested actors. 
Examples in Europe are the KLIP project in Flanders, where a full mapping of 
174  Chapter 5 
 
the infrastructure is being implemented. In Portugal, the CIS portal indicates 
spare capacity in the network when an access seeker inspects the network. 
Secondly, the transparency and coordination of civil engineering works should 
be enhanced. Offering possibilities to lay new ducts or infrastructures during 
public works is recommended. Our model showed that significant cost savings 
can be gained when infrastructures are rolled out together. 
Thirdly, transparent handling of network rollout requests can promote joint 
rollout. By creating a coordinated permit granting procedure through a one-stop-
shop, the transaction costs in the planning phase can be reduced.  
5.3.7 Importance of cost sharing through cooperation 
One of the reasons the rollout of FTTH networks is lagging in Europe, is the 
large initial investment costs due to the fully buried installation requirement. 
However, in order to reach the goals set out in the Digital Agenda for Europe, 
next generation fixed access networks are the most future proof technology. 
Several propositions to stimulate the rollout of these networks have already been 
made. In Sweden, municipal fibre networks have been rolled out by the local 
governments and opened for competition on the service layer. This way, the 
investment cost for service providers is sharply decreased, since the network 
rollout cost is borne by the local government. However, the initial investment 
outlay is replaced by a recurring cost, the wholesale price for the access to the 
infrastructure. Other measures to decrease the initial rollout cost is allowing 
aerial deployment of fibre cables, or promoting cooperation between utility 
networks.  
In this section, we focussed on the latter option, translating the benefits of 
cooperation through a cost sharing model. To research the impact of cooperation 
in the deployment phase on the rollout cost, an integrated model was built based 
on the technical requirements of the underground infrastructure. First, it builds 
an optimal trench based on the required safety distances between infrastructures 
in an automated way. For any location in the network topology, this optimal 
trench is modelled. Secondly, based on this optimal trench, the model allocates 
the different costs. The model has been applied on two cases, where the 
cooperative and independent rollout were compared. In the deployment phase, 
cost savings between 5 and 21% have been found, depending on the pavement 
type and the number of utility infrastructure providers cooperating. 
These results indicate that new policy towards enforcing utility firms to 
cooperate closer during the rollout phase could not only benefit the inhabitants 
through a reduced nuisance, both only has a significant positive impact on the 
rollout cost for the utility firms. Additionally, since a joint rollout between 
operators requires a coordinated approach, extra insight in the operational and 
overhead processes should also be gained. This way, the impact of higher 
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coordination costs of cooperation on the total costs can be integrated with the 
current deployment cost model. 
5.4 Conclusions 
When techno-economic decisions are made, the analysis must always take into 
account the surrounding market environment in which the decision maker is 
active. In concentrated markets, where only a few players are active, the impact 
of competitive or cooperative interaction should not be neglected. This 
interaction impacts the market share of the actor, and directly impacts the costs 
and revenues linked to the technical design of the techno-economic case. 
In case of fibre access network rollout, typical research suggests high take-up 
potentials for these new networks. However, the impact of existing networks, 
like cable or DSL networks should be taken into account. Customers choose 
products based on (perceived) pricing and quality. During our research, we 
developed a market response model able to capture competitive interaction on 
the market share of different products and services. This model has been applied 
throughout various publications, and through the case study presented in this 
chapter, we show how the model adequately captures market share evolution.  
In light of the results from the market model, it is clear that low take-up of FTTH 
networks is expected to reduce the viability of network rollout. Two approaches 
to increase this viability exist, either focus on increasing take-up, or focus on 
cost reduction. Under the first approach, techniques like geomarketing or cherry-
picking apply, which fall outside the scope of this dissertation. The second part 
of this chapter focussed on possible strategies to attain cost reduction through 
optimal network design in the rollout of access networks. 
The most advanced form of cooperation discussed in this chapter is the public 
private partnership. In such a cooperation model, a public and private player 
form one entity to serve the market. Such a model has two advantages. First, by 
cooperating, no duplication of infrastructure is done, so the investment cost of a 
single infrastructure can be shared between the two partners. Secondly, again 
since only one entity is active, the customer base is not split between extra 
operators, thus increasing the customer base of the entity served by the single 
infrastructure. It is clear how market share is directly reflected in the technical 
requirements of the techno-economic case study.  
However, such a high level of cooperation is not always required. Research has 
indicated that the majority of the costs in access network rollout are linked to the 
installation of the outside plant. In case of a buried installation, the costs for 
trenching can make up to over 50% of the total cost. However, this is also where 
most synergies can be found with other players, as the processes to rollout 
physical infrastructure do not differ much between e.g. telecom and electricity 
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operators. We developed a model quantifying these cost savings, and found a 
potential of up to 21% cost reduction in outside plant installation. 
The tools and models described in this chapter form the basis of the competitive 
analysis in the following chapter. The quantitative analysis performed there can 
assess the value of different competitive and cooperative strategies, indicating 
the optimal strategies for all actors.  
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6 
Game Theory Methodology to 
Model Competitive Interaction 
 “You have to learn the rules of the game. And then you have to play 
better than anyone else”, Albert Einstein 
Market interactions play a vital role in the viability of investments in the telecom 
sector, as was indicated in the previous chapter. When a new offer is entered on 
an existing market, it will step in competition with the existing offers. While the 
market model introduced in Chapter 5 allowed predicting the impact of this 
competition on market shares, and cooperation models offer cost sharing 
opportunities, these models do not offer insight in the prevailing competitive 
strategies. When all players have different possible strategies, which one to 
choose that optimises your utility? This is where game theory comes into play. 
From a set of players, each with their own strategy set, it offers a methodology to 
indicate the market equilibrium, taking into account how competitors react on 
different competitive strategies. In this chapter, we will introduce the basics of 
game theory from a mathematical point of view. Game theory has been a 
research topic for over 50 years now, so it offers a broad set of methodologies to 
analyse competitive interaction. However, its application in techno-economic 
analysis is only slowly getting accepted. To increase this uptake, a game theory 
software tool was developed during this research to analyse competition between 
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players with underlying techno-economic models. Again, comparable as in the 
previous chapters, the insights will be applied to the case study. The results from 
this case study were published in [6.1]. 
6.1 An introduction to game theory 
Competition is an important aspect in realistic business modelling. Making 
strategic decisions not only impacts the company itself, but also changes the 
existing equilibrium on the market and thus the other actors. Price wars are an 
example of such competitive interaction. When one player decides to lower his 
price, in order to attract more customers, his competitors can react by lowering 
their prices as well. No actor will gain extra market share in the long run, but the 
prices on the market will drop. When price reductions continue to occur, a price 
war behaviour is observed. As a result, companies start selling at or even below 
production cost price, and non-efficient companies are driven out the market. 
Although price is a straightforward example of competitive interaction, any 
strategic decision taken by a player impacts the competitive equilibrium. 
Entering new geographical markets, offering new services or upgrading 
technology will all have an impact. An example can be found in the fixed 
broadband access market. If one player decides to increase the access speed it 
offers, it can be expected that the other operators will follow. Linking back to the 
real option methodology discussion, any option executed from the 7S framework 
in Chapter 4 will trigger competitive interaction. However, the options from the 
7S framework make abstraction of this competitive interaction. In many cases, 
such interaction is indeed absent, e.g. when acquiring a mobile licence. The 
process of the spectrum auction is a competitive process, but once the licence is 
acquired, the player owning the spectrum licence can operate in absence of 
competitive interactions within its spectrum. 
Therefore, it is important to take competition aspects into account when 
conducting techno-economic analyses, as each strategy is based upon a different 
underlying technology model. Two aspects can be identified in such competition 
modelling.  
First, the impact of competitive interaction on the market share and adoption 
potential needs to be taken into account. Based on price and quality factors, such 
a model allows estimating the market share of different offers, based on price 
and cross elasticity concepts. As such, this model also allows indicating the 
impact of a new entrant in a mature market. The deployment of a fibre network 
in a region where broadband infrastructure is already present is an example of 
such an entry. The market model was introduced in Chapter 5. 
Secondly, the techno-economic decision process also needs to take into account 
the possible counter strategies from the competitors. Game theory is the 
designated tool to model these interactions.  
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6.1.1 Game theory basics 
Game theory is “aimed at modelling situations in which decision makers have to 
make specific actions that have mutual, possibly conflicting, consequences” 
[6.2].  
Game theory can be split further down into cooperative and non-cooperative 
game theory. In the latter, the game is one in which players make decisions 
independently of each other, cooperation can occur here, but this cooperation 
must be self-enforcing. All players within the coalition must benefit from the 
cooperation. The difference with the first is that in cooperative game theory, 
players can form coalitions which have the power to enforce cooperative 
behaviour. Within this work, we have focussed on the non-cooperative game 
theory, as in most techno-economic cases, cooperation will only occur when all 
players benefit from the coalition. This mutual benefit was also the basic idea 
from which the cost sharing model in Chapter 5 stems. 
In game theory, all players have sufficiently good knowledge of each other’s 
possible strategies and payoffs. Payoffs represent the utility function of the 
different actors. These assumptions allow representing the game by means of a 
payoff matrix. This matrix has a payoff (e.g. Net Present Value) for all players 
for each possible combination of strategies. This is called the strategic form of 
the game and allows finding an equilibrium in the game (Figure 6-1). An 
equilibrium is a set of strategies (one for each player) at which players are not 
inclined to change their strategy. Different equilibrium concepts have been 
proposed in the field of game theory. The most commonly known equilibrium is 
the Nash equilibrium (NE), which is defined as a situation in which no player 
can gain by unilaterally changing its strategy. In such a NE, each player will use 
a pure strategy [6.2]. It is often assumed that a game with fully rational players 
(using this equilibrium as criterion) is expected to result in one of the NEs being 
chosen. 
Typically static games (the game has one stage in which the players interact) can 
also be reduced or solved by removing strictly dominated strategies. These 
dominated strategies have a strictly lower payoff than another (dominant) 
strategy for all possible counterstrategies. No fully rational player would play a 
strictly dominated strategy but would instead play the dominant strategy. As such 
this strategy can be removed for the considered player. By iteratively using this 
approach for the different players, the matrix of the game can be simplified and 
can in some cases be solved to a unique strategic choice for each player. In these 
cases, this strictly dominant strategy set is the only NE of the game.  
In Figure 6-1, a strategic form of a toy example is shown, with two players. Each 
cell represents a payoff tuple, where the first number represents the payoff of 
player B, while the second is the payoff of player A. Applied to the example 
strategic form, it is clear that strategy A3 is dominated by A2. With this strategy 
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removed, the strategy B2 is no longer interesting for player B, since he gains a 
larger payoff in all cases for strategy B1. Now only the strategic combinations 
(B1, A1) and (B1, A2) remain, and player A will always choose A2. 
 
 
Figure 6-1: Strategic form of a game and Nash equilibrium (highlighted) 
 
Pareto optimality is a second equilibrium concept. It is based on the Pareto 
improvement concept. Given an initial set of strategies, a change to a different 
allocation making at least one player better off without making another actor 
worse off is called a Pareto improvement. When no Pareto improvements can be 
made from a given strategy set, the set is Pareto optimal or efficient. An 
economic system that is not Pareto efficient implies that changing the strategy set 
would make some players better off without reducing the payoff for the other 
individuals. From an efficiency point of view, it is clear that non-Pareto optimal 
points should be avoided. When looking at the example given in Figure 6-2, 
which plots the matrix from Figure 6-1 on a payoff chart, strategy set (B1, A1) is 
not Pareto optimal, since player A can improve its payoff from 0 to 2 without 
reducing the payoff off Player B if it chooses action A2. Extra analysis shows 
that the Pareto optimal points are in this small example (B2, A1), (B1, A2) and 
(B2, A3). Another way to identify Pareto optimal points is using the Pareto 
frontier concept. The Pareto frontier is the set op Pareto optimal solutions and 
can be graphically presented (Figure 6-2). 
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Figure 6-2: Pareto optimal strategy sets for the example game 
6.1.2 Game theory in telecom 
Game theory has already been widely applied in telecom research. However, the 
main application of this theory is in networking games for flow and congestion 
control, network routing, load balancing and quality of service (QoS) 
provisioning. We refer to [6.3] for a complete literature overview of these 
networking games in wireless networks. 
Nevertheless, techno-economic telecom research can also greatly benefit from 
the concepts of game theory. Investment projects in new fixed and wireless 
networks never occur in a monopolistic environment. Typically, for both the 
fixed and mobile market, customers have the possibility to choose between 
different vendors, operators and service providers. When launching a new 
product, network or service, the actor has to take into account the effect of its 
decision on the competitive equilibrium in the market. Techno-economic 
oriented game theory offers important methods and concepts to assess this 
competitive interplay in the economic assessment. To use the concepts of game 
theory, it is important to model the impact of the competition between all players 
on their respective business cases. Most likely, the chosen strategies will have an 
impact on the division of the market between all players and on the technical 
design.  
Competition modelling by means of game theory between different operators is a 
more recent field in techno-economics. Typically, a mathematical model is built 
to analyse the game and the resulting equilibria. For example, [6.4] studied the 
competition equilibrium in the Chinese triple-play market. Another example is 
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[6.5], where the optimal pricing strategy for new telecom services in developing 
countries is assessed using mathematical game theory models.  
However, while such mathematical models can prove useful for general 
reflections on competitive interplay, they lack the possibility to model 
competition between different players with an underlying numerical techno-
economic model. Such research has already been used in several techno-
economic publications. In [6.6], the viability of a municipal Fibre To The Home 
(FTTH) network rollout was assessed. It introduced a first mover advantage to 
divide the potential market between a cable operator and an FTTH network. 
Being the first to offer services to consumers resulted in a faster adoption and 
larger initial market share. This allows for an analysis of the business case of the 
FTTH deployment under more realistic assumptions, especially since the 
viability of such a deployment largely depends on the take rate and thus the 
competition with other operators. If the FTTH network is rolled out in regions 
where existing communication infrastructures, like copper and/or cable 
broadband access networks, are present, this could drastically impact the 
economic assessment. Applied to the specific case of a municipality rolling out 
an FTTH network where an existing cable operator upgrades its network to 
DOCSIS 3.0, game theory offers insight in the most profitable rollout scenarios 
under competition. Since an FTTH rollout suffers from high upfront installation 
costs, it is advantageous to start with a slower rollout compared to the cable 
operator and focus first on the largest industrial sites. In residential areas, FTTH 
should focus on the densest regions, since this reduces the digging costs per 
connection. On the other hand, the cable operator has less digging constraints 
and focuses on the larger residential areas. 
In another case, using game theory to model the competition between different 
wireless operators, price competition was introduced to divide the market 
between the different operators [6.1]. Based on this market division, the viability 
of different business models offering wireless broadband access was studied. A 
municipal WiFi network was found to be economically interesting, even in 
competition with several mobile operators offering 3G femtocell access. 
However, when other players are interested in rolling out a commercial WiFi 
network, a public-private partnership (PPP) between these players is designated. 
We discuss this case in more detail in Section 6.4.1. 
6.2 Mathematical game theory 
The main approach used to apply game theory in techno-economics is the 
mathematical approach. In this section, we will shortly describe the mathematical 
approach through a simple example, and indicate why techno-economics require 
a more hands-on approach. 
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There exists a broad mathematical foundation of game theory. Names like Nash, 
Cournot, Bertrand and Von Neumann laid these foundations, on which the 
researchers today are still building further.  
Here, the basics of mathematical game theory in duopoly will be introduced. In 
duopoly, competition is characterised by competition between two firms. To 
analyse duopoly, a clear view on the influence of each firm on the other is 
required. Game theory offers the toolkit to analyse this influence. Several models 
exist to study duopoly, of which the Cournot quantity and Bertrand price 
competition model are the most well known. Both models can be used to indicate 
how competitive advantage can result from a better cost position. These models 
were already introduced shortly in the previous chapter. Here, we present a more 
in-depth description of the mathematical background. 
6.2.1 Cournot and Bertrand duopoly – background 
The quantity competition model was introduced by Cournot in 1838 [6.7]. As it 
was developed more than a century before Nash introduced his equilibrium 
concepts, it obviously does not rely on them. However, Cournot roughly 
anticipated these concepts. The basic assumption of the Cournot model is that 
two firms decide on output quantity. From the aggregated output, the market 
decides on the market-clearing price level, as a representative auctioneer. In this 
case, price is exogenously determined. The main criticism, resulting in the 
Bertrand model [6.8], is that in reality, firms do not compete on quantity, but on 
price. Currently, both models are used as cornerstones in industrial organisation. 
Due to their differences in approach, the Bertrand model is viewed as a short-
run, tactical approach, while Cournot quantity competition explains long-term 
capacity commitments. In the next section, we will introduce the Bertrand model 
for heterogeneous goods. 
6.2.1.a Bertrand duopoly – mathematical foundation 
The mathematical derivation of the equilibrium in Bertrand duopoly is based on 
profit maximisation. When competing with another company, both firms will try 
to maximise their profit, given the market price and demand resulting from their 
aggregate outputs. Take an iso-elastic demand curve, depicted in eq. 6.1. An iso-
elastic demand curve has a constant elasticity coefficient. This elasticity is the 
ratio of percentage change in the dependent variable to the percentage change in 
the independent variable. The demand curve reflects the price in function of the 
quantities sold by both companies. Parameter s indicates the substitution degree 
of both products. The higher s, the more both goods are substitutes of each other. 
If s equals zero, player i operates in monopoly. Indeed, in that case, the price of 
product i (pi) is only function of the amount of i produced (qi). 
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(6.1) 
 With: pi  = price of good or service i 
  qi  = amount of good of service i sold. 
  qj  = amount of good or service j sold 
  s  = substitution factor  [0,1] 
 
Both players face the same constant variable cost c, resulting in the following 
profit function. 
 
           
 
 (6.2) 
 
To calculate this profit function, the inverse demand function is required. This 
inverse demand function returns quantity in function of the price of the two 
products. The inverse demand function for player i equals: 
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This results in the following profit function for player i.  
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The functions for player j can be derived symmetrically. As both players strive 
for profit maximisation, the first order profit maximisation condition must be 
met.  
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Or, when applied to the profit function of player i, resulting in the reaction curve 
for player i: 
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Again, the reaction curve for player j is obtained symmetrically. 
 
   
  
   
 
 (6.7) 
 
As both players try to maximise profit, the equilibrium price is obtained where 
these two curves intersect. 
 
       
 
 
 (6.8) 
6.2.1.b Bertrand competition – numerical example 
To indicate the application of the Bertrand duopoly model in practice, a toy 
example is included. Two players are offering mobile and wireless access in a 
city environment. Player i offers this access through its 3G network, while player 
j deploys a WiFi network. Both products offer the same functionality, so they are 
(partial) substitutes. However, as the 3G provider also offers connectivity outside 
the city, the products are not assumed to be full substitutes. Parameter s from the 
demand function (eq. 6.1) is chosen at 0.50. 
The two players are confronted with an iso-elastic demand curve, and have 
symmetrical variable costs of 10. Inserting these parameters in eq. 6.8, results in 
an equilibrium price of 20. A graphical representation of the reaction curves can 
be found in Figure 6-3. 
 
 
Figure 6-3: Reaction curves and equilibrium determination for toy example 
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6.2.1.c Advantages and drawbacks of mathematical game theory 
Applying mathematical game theory to techno-economic investment problems 
has several advantages. First, as it is an established field, it offers a broad toolkit 
to solve such problems. Secondly, as was indicated in the numerical example, it 
can be applied in a straightforward manner. 
However, it also has numerous drawbacks. The Bertrand model, and in extension 
the other models, are based on strict assumptions. The profit function must be 
derivable. While performing this might still be feasible for simple cases, for 
more complex cases, this can no longer be performed ‘on the back of an 
envelope’. Especially when profit functions are based on a detailed techno-
economic model, this increases the difficulty of the exercise. In addition, the 
example above only takes in account variable costs. In realistic cases, fixed costs 
cannot be neglected. For example, when a WiFi network is rolled out, this comes 
with considerable fixed costs, depending on the technical specifications used in 
the techno-economic model. Extensions exists for the basic Cournot and 
Bertrand models incorporating these costs, but this again impacts the 
computability. Finally, mathematical game theory as applied above requires 
knowledge of the demand curve. For emerging markets, this is no 
straightforward exercise. 
While the mathematical approach can be extended to include these additions, it 
decreases the readability of the models used, making it less suited for applied 
techno-economics. Professionals are used of working with more detailed models. 
As a result, a more hands-on game theory approach is required for techno-
economic cases. 
6.3 A hands on Game Theory approach 
Resulting from the drawbacks described for mathematical game theory, techno-
economic telecom investment problems require a more hands-on approach, 
useable by decision makers who typically do not have the background for the 
mathematical modelling. Actors make decisions based on more complex utility 
functions than the profit function used in the Bertrand example above. As was 
introduced in Chapter 3, private players base their decisions on value creation 
metrics, like the NPV. And for public players, the broadband performance index 
can be used as utility function.  
In this research, software was developed to allow for the game theoretic 
modelling of competitive aspects in telecom infrastructure projects. The 
approach is built around the strategic form of the game (Figure 6-4). A game is 
determined by players and their action set. These action sets contain the different 
strategies the players in the game have. In addition to these two aspects, every 
game contains a calculation engine. It is in this engine that the main intelligence 
of the game lies. Based on the different actions, it returns the payoff for each 
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player. As such, the calculation engine allows to calculate every cell in the 
strategic form of the game. If a game is provided, with players, actions and a 
calculation engine, different solution concepts offered by game theory can be 
applied. Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimality are two of these concepts which 
were already introduced above. The implementation of these solution concepts is 
based on the formal definition of these concepts. In the following sections, more 
detail on the different classes is given. 
 
 
Figure 6-4: A hands-on game theoretic approach 
6.3.1 Actions modelling strategies 
In the hands-on game theory approach developed, an action serves as a 
placeholder for a player to react upon and for any calculation engine to trigger 
the right calculations.  
Several of specific action types can be modelled, depending on the specific 
requirements of the techno-economic case. The most basic action contains only a 
name. Based on this name, it is possible to compare two actions. Actions are 
considered equal if they have the same name. Building further on this basic 
action, several other actions are possible, extending the name of the action with a 
strategic variable. This variable can represent an array of values, with each value 
referring to a specific time. As a result, it is possible to model more specific 
actions, based on e.g. price or investment behaviour. Such an action defines the 
price or investment strategy of a player over a certain course of time. 
Considering a price strategy, this can be a constant price over time, but more 
complex cases, like exponentially decreasing prices are also possible. With 
changing actions over time, more disruptive action changes are also possible. 
Combining different actions together is also possible. With this approach, the 
model allows to include actions consisting of combined strategies. Such 
strategies can for example consist of a combination of a price and an investment 
strategy. In the end, it is the calculation engine that will use the input from the 
actions to determine the payoff of a certain strategic combination based on the 
actions defined in the game. 
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6.3.2 Players engaging in the game 
A player represents one of the actors engaging in the competitive game. Players 
are solely defined by their name, if two players have the same name, they are 
considered the same player. Comparable to actions, different sorts of players are 
possible. The most basic player consists only of a name, but more detailed 
players, based on initial market shares are also possible. We have found that a 
combination of a name and an initial market share suffices to tackle all 
competition problems tackled during our research.  
The list of actions contains the strategy set of the player in the game. If two or 
more players have been modelled, the strategic form of the game can be built 
based on these strategy sets. 
6.3.3 The calculation engine as central intelligence in the 
game 
As already indicated above, the calculation engine contains the required 
intelligence to calculate the payoffs of all players under a given strategic 
combination. The calculation engine returns the payoff of all players for one 
combination of actions.  
Every game requires its own calculation engine, as the underlying specifics of 
each game are different. For example, the interaction between different price 
strategies by different players can be included in this engine through the market 
model introduced in Chapter 5. In addition, the calculation engine contains the 
links to the underlying techno-economic models of the different players. In these 
models, the dimensioning of infrastructure, equipment and operational processes 
is performed, based on expected adoption from the market model. Calculation 
engines have been built for different problems, e.g. to study how competition 
between different wireless access providers influences the business case [6.1], 
how open access in an FTTH network impacts the different players, and even on 
mobile base station sharing to reduce energy consumption. 
6.3.4 Game: bringing everything together 
In order for a game to be solved, it requires a list of players and a calculation 
engine. As every player in the list contains the strategy set of the player, and the 
calculation engine the intelligence to calculate the payoff of each player, the 
game has everything required to calculate the strategic form. 
6.3.5 Solution concepts 
With the game modelled, different solution concepts can be applied to solve the 
game. Two main concepts have been included, namely the Nash equilibrium and 
the Pareto optimality concept. The first is typically used to identify the outcome 
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of the game under competition, with players solely acting in their own interest. 
The second concept aims at identifying the so-called social optima, where no 
player can improve its payoff without decreasing the payoff of another player. 
By including these two concepts, extra insight is gained in the dynamics of each 
game. In fact, if both solutions are identified, they either coincide, or they do not. 
In the first case, it can be stated that competition without intervention will result 
in the social optimal situation. In the latter case, the deviation of the two 
solutions offers an indication to which action might be required to reach the 
social optimum. 
6.3.6 Advantages of a hands-on approach 
The software developed during this research to solve strategic games offers 
several advantages compared to the mathematical game theory approach. The 
first main advantage is that it allows to use detailed techno-economic models as 
utility function for different players. As this is more closely linked to the world 
of decision makers, it is more clear how the different strategies interact, 
compared to a mathematical model, especially since visualising the strategic 
form is possible. A second main advantage is that the approach allows to include 
the impact of uncertainty on the analysis. The game can be run repeatedly with a 
changing input parameter. This parameter can be linked to the revenue side of 
the different underlying techno-economic models, e.g. price sensitivity or market 
potential, but also to cost-related aspects like operational costs or mean time 
between failure. By calculating the strategic form for these different cases, 
changes in outcome can be identified. If the outcome of the game remains the 
same, no matter what the uncertain parameter is, competition will result in the 
same solution. However, if the parameter has a large impact on the chosen 
equilibrium, such a sensitivity analysis can indicate to decision makers how they 
can impact the game and steer it into a desired direction. 
It should be noted that in our hands-on approach, only non-cooperative game 
theory is considered. However, the simulation framework developed can be 
extended straightforward to contain cooperative game theory. Indeed, Nash 
himself proposed two different options for cooperative game theory [6.9]. The 
first is based on an axiomatic approach, while the second consists of including 
the cooperative strategy in the non-cooperative game. This second approach can 
be applied in our framework. This will be indicated through two case study 
examples, described in more detail below. 
6.4 Competition in access network rollout 
When making strategic decisions, be it long term investments or regulatory 
decisions, it must be taken into account that these happen in the existing market 
environment. Typically, an actor deploying a new access network in Western 
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Europe, will have to compete with existing operators. A regulator changing the 
local loop unbundling price will notice a shift in take-up of these services, but 
maybe also an impact on the investment behaviour of the incumbent. 
Including this competitive impact on your objectives is key into making a correct 
valuation of the strategic decision. Game theory is the designated approach to 
take this into account. To indicate how game theory and the framework 
developed during this research can be applied to realistic cases, two examples are 
elaborated on in this section. 
The first example applies a game theoretic approach to the rollout of competing 
wireless networks in a municipality [6.1]. However, as cooperation between 
different players through a public private partnership is a possible ‘competitive’ 
strategy, this strategic option is to be included in the model. In the second 
example, the same approach is applied to the rollout of a municipal fibre 
network. In this case, the network is introduced in the existing broadband 
market, and must compete for market share with the existing infrastructures. 
Again, a cooperative strategy is available within the game. Operators can engage 
in a joint rollout (cfr. Chapter 5), or existing operators can migrate to the new 
infrastructure. The choice of strategy thus clearly impacts the network and 
equipment model. 
In both examples, a municipal player is included in the model. This player has, 
next to its financial objective, other social objectives. In the first example, the 
social objectives are monetised through the concept of indirect revenues. For the 
second example, the game is repeated with the broadband performance index 
described in Chapter 3 to indicate how other utility functions can be used in the 
hands-on game theoretic approach. 
6.4.1 Competition or cooperation in wireless network rollout 
In this first case under study, competition between multiple wireless access 
providers will be discussed. Next generation access networks are expected to 
bring ubiquitous broadband access and have attracted the interest of municipal 
governments. Using a game theoretic approach, the different investment options 
of the municipal player are investigated. 
To investigate the different partnership and competition scenarios for the 
introduction of a city-wide wireless access network, a general model was 
developed, focusing on the rollout in the city of Ghent. Ghent is the third largest 
city in Belgium, with over 240.000 inhabitants. The city also houses 65.000 
students and attracts almost 400.000 tourists a year. Based on the work of Van 
Ooteghem [6.10], we focussed on the city centre as most interesting rollout area. 
Previous research has already been conducted in this topic. In Lannoo et al. 
[6.11], a municipal WiFi player and a 3G mobile virtual network operator 
(MVNO) were already brought into competition. However, several questions 
remain to be addressed in this topic. Will the municipality be interested in a PPP 
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with a commercial WiFi provider? Or is it more interesting for both partners to 
deploy their own network and compete instead of cooperate? By choosing for 
competition, problems with state aid rules and hidden subsidisation will be 
avoided. In order to answer these questions, we developed two techno-economic 
models, based on the wireless technology used by the actor. The first model is a 
3G model, while the second models a WiFi network deployment. Building 
further upon the WiFi model, three different players can be modelled, depending 
on the player rolling out the network and the cooperation strategy. As such, a 
public and private operator is possible, together with a public private partnership 
(PPP) model. First, a techno-economic analysis is conducted for the techno-
economic models of the 3G operator and the WiFi operator in absence of 
competition. Next, the competitive interplay will be discussed and how it 
impacts the results from the standard techno-economic analysis. 
6.4.1.a Viability of a WiFi deployment 
Technical info 
WiFi is a certification label for wireless local area network (WLAN) devices that 
comply with the international IEEE 802.11 standards and sub-standards. Those 
labels are distributed by the WiFi Alliance, and interoperability between 
different products is ensured. Different flavours of the IEEE 802.11 standard 
exist, where 802.11a, 802.11b, 802.11g and 802.11n are presently the most wide 
spread variants. WiFi devices were primarily intended to be installed and 
managed by the customer. However, some telecom operators are nowadays 
exploiting WiFi access points (AP) at public places to offer their clients a fast 
wireless Internet connection, as an extension to their main telecom services. 
In this case, the recent 802.11n standard (released in October 2009) is used, 
because of the higher throughput, compared to the older standards. The 802.11n 
standard can be considered as the successor of 802.11g and it is backwards 
compatible with the latter. Two non-licensed radio frequency bands are defined 
for WiFi, i.e. 2.4 and 5 GHz, and there is opted for a 20 MHz channel bandwidth. 
The wireless municipality network is expected to work within the 2.4 GHz 
frequency band, for which three low-interfering 20 MHz channels are available. 
A maximum achievable physical layer data rate of 65 Mbps per 20 MHz-channel 
can be attained. The 802.11n standard also supports multiple antenna techniques 
like Multiple-Input Multiple-Output (MIMO), which can extend either the data 
rate or the range of the WiFi signals. For outdoor APs, MIMO is better used to 
extend the wireless range while keeping a 65 Mbps channel, than to increase the 
data rate. 
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Access point deployment model 
An import aspect of developing a full techno-economic model of a wireless 
access network is the calculation of the number of WiFi APs that need to be 
deployed in order to assure both coverage and sufficient available bandwidth to 
serve all users. Four important input factors to assess the needed number of APs 
can be distilled: covered area, number of users, required bandwidth and physical 
parameters of the technology. As the number of users directly impacts the 
number of APs, it is already clear here how market share impacts technical 
design. The physical parameters define the signal power, gains, losses, receiver 
sensitivity and margins (fade, shadow, interference …) for calculating the 
maximum range of the technology at a given data rate. Together with the three 
other input factors, the amount of needed APs can be defined. 
In [6.10], the best technical scenario from a techno-economic point of view was 
selected for the deployment of a wireless network. It considered two main access 
technologies: WiFi and WiMAX. The backhaul solutions were varied as follows: 
all APs individually connected to a fixed backhaul network (e.g. digital 
subscriber line (DSL) or fibre); meshed networks of a single wireless technology, 
reducing the number of fixed backhaul connections; or a combination between 
WiFi (as access) and WiMAX (as wireless backhaul) technology. The best 
choice was a meshed WiFi network. The main deployment details can be found 
in Table 6-1. 
Table 6-1: WiFi deployment scenario 
Wireless connection Technology Antenna heights (m) 
AP to user 
Backhaul 
WiFi 
WiFi 
1.5 to 6 
6 
Cost model 
The deployment of a wireless access network requires a large upfront 
investment, mainly driven by the need to install both WiFi APs and the wireless 
backhauling. The APs will be subject to failure, caused by external factors like 
weather conditions and vandalism, so a replacement investment is assumed every 
five years. Next to the APs, an investment in central infrastructure is also 
necessary. This can be subdivided in core equipment, such as routers, servers, 
and general Network Operating Centre (NOC) infrastructure like power supply 
and cooling. All costs are based on [6.10]. 
Next to the upfront investment, operational expenditures will also play an 
important role. WiFi APs are deployed on either public or private sites. Site 
rental will thus be a major aspect of the yearly OpEx. Access to public sites is 
typically cheaper than access to private sites. This is modelled by halving the 
cost for site rental when it concerns a public site. To model the difference 
between a public or a private player, differences in the amount of public and 
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private sites were introduced. In absence of a public player in the project, only 
10% of all sites are assumed to be public. When a municipality steps into the 
partnership, this rate shifts completely, with 90% public sites. These numbers are 
based on discussions with operators. The dimensioning provides the number of 
necessary sites.  
The backhauling APs will be connected to a fixed backhaul connection. A 
volume-dependent connection price per connected AP per year is included. 
Operations, administration and maintenance (OA&M) are mainly driven by the 
number of APs and their equipment. Personnel costs for planning and 
maintenance of the APs are included [6.12].  
The cost for Customer Relationship Management (CRM) is fully driven by the 
number of customers. Offering a new service raises for example the need for a 
helpdesk department. In [6.13], a method is proposed to calculate the helpdesk 
cost. Cost of sales, marketing and advertising complete the CRM cost and are 
based on [6.10]. An overview of the different cost aspects can be found in Figure 
6-5. 
 
 
Figure 6-5: Cost and revenue breakdown for WiFi network deployment 
Revenue model 
Revenues fall apart in two categories. There are the direct revenues, driven by 
the number of customers. For indirect revenues, the link between the revenues 
and the main activity, here the sale of wireless access, is indirect. It is however 
the existence of indirect revenues that makes network infrastructure projects so 
important for public players.  
Direct revenues 
Direct revenues can be derived from the forecasted number of customers. A 
distinction between different service offers is made, based on [6.10]. Table 6-2 
WiFi network
CapEx OpEx Revenues
AP Core Direct Indirect
Installation
Equipment
Replacement
Core equipment
NOC infrastructure
Site rental
Backhaul
OA&M
Personnel
Maintenance
CRM Subscription
Vouchers
Fixed
Customer driven
Service driven
Investment driven
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gives an overview of the monthly revenue per user for the different service 
categories for the considered network. The monthly revenues are based on prices 
for similar services offered by two commercial players in Belgium: namely the 
WiFi operator  ZapFi and the WiMAX operator Clearwire. ZapFi will offer a 
WiFi service with prices starting from €10 per month in a nearby city [6.14], 
while Clearwire currently offers WiMAX subscriptions ranging between €30 for 
1Mbps and €45 for 3Mbps per month at the time of the study. The prices used 
are thus a reasonable compromise between these two different offers. To be able 
to offer a free service, other parties can buy advertising space which will be 
displayed to customers using the free subscription possibilities. 
Table 6-2: Monthly revenue per WiFi service 
Service Price 
Data rates 
Downstream Upstream 
Free € 5 (advertising) 512 kbps 128 kbps 
Low-bandwidth € 12 1 Mbps 256 kbps 
High-bandwidth € 20 3 Mbps 512 kbps 
Vouchers (per card) € 9 1 Mbps 256 kbps 
 
To allow for customer segmentation, four different customer classes are taken 
into account. Each class has a different interest in each of the service offerings, 
as shown in Table 6-3. Inhabitants will be interested in using the free service, in 
addition to their existing fixed broadband connection. Students on the other hand 
will use the two monthly subscription possibilities as primary connection. The 
better bandwidth offer of these services will be more in line with their interests 
than the free service that only offers 512 kbps. Tourists and business users will 
mainly buy vouchers. While tourists are only interested in the vouchers and the 
free service, business users can, depending on their usage time, choose for a 
monthly subscription. 
Table 6-3: Customer class and interest in WiFi services 
Service Inhabitants Students Tourists Business 
Free 60% 5% 20% 10% 
Low-bandwidth 25% 60% 0% 10% 
High-bandwidth 15% 35% 0% 20% 
Vouchers 0% 0% 80% 60% 
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Indirect revenues 
While direct revenues are the main focus for private players, indirect revenues 
form a major driver for public authorities to invest in NGANs. Indirect revenues 
are additional advantages caused by the main activity. Efficiency gains in public 
services are one of the drivers for indirect revenues. The wireless network helps 
the municipality in promoting several eServices. Next to these gains, this project 
can attract new businesses, extra employment and tax revenues. Due to the broad 
spectrum of possible indirect advantages, it is hard to estimate the total indirect 
revenues a project generates. A distinction is made between four different drivers 
to evaluate the indirect revenues, namely fixed, customer, service and 
investment. 
Fixed indirect revenues have no specific driver, but setting up a wireless 
platform allows deploying new applications, which can lead to efficiency gains 
and cost reductions. Customers drive the second part of indirect revenues, as the 
impact of for example an eGovernment application or social network is assessed 
by the amount of users. A third part is service based: an increased wireless 
coverage and bandwidth might benefit several new applications like e-health and 
video services. The last component of indirect revenues is investment driven. 
The municipality can expect to attract companies and high educated inhabitants 
due to such an investment. A part of the invested money will flow back in the 
regional economy, and taxation will generate a money flow to the local 
government. The calculation of the indirect revenues is based on [6.10], [6.15]. 
Investment analysis 
From the cost and revenue models discussed above, a detailed investment 
analysis is carried out for the rollout of a municipal WiFi network. All customer 
classes are considered, and they can choose from the different services offered. 
Figure 6-6 shows the evolution of the cumulative NPV over the lifetime of the 
project. The combination of a high initial investment and slow user adoption 
gives a negative NPV in the first years. The payback period is over 6 years. After 
10 years, an NPV of almost €3.2 million is obtained. Based on these numbers, 
this investment is a viable project, when indirect revenues are taken into account. 
However, it should be noted that no competition is taken into account here. A 
symmetrical player entering the same market would half the uptake, and thus 
largely decrease the return on investment. 
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Figure 6-6: NPV evolution of the WiFi network case 
6.4.1.b Viability of a 3G femtocell deployment 
Technical info 
3G coverage can be extended by installing femtocells at the customers’ house. 
The technical aspects of both 3G and femtocells are described in the following 
subsections. 
3G technology 
The third generation of mobile telephony (3G, like UMTS) refers to the 
transformation of the digital mobile telephony technology (2G, like GSM) to a 
full mobile Internet access technology. The third generation partnership project 
(3GPP) tries to provide uniform standardisations for these and other 3G flavours. 
Release 99 was the original UMTS version. A user typically gets up to 384 kbps 
downlink for R99 handsets. Other releases (R4 - originally Release 2000, R5, 
R6, R7, R8 and R9) are already specified to further improve the UMTS 
technology. The UMTS successor is HSDPA, introduced in Release 5. It 
improves the downlink data rate for UMTS by using shared channels for 
different users. As this is an improvement of the 3G UMTS standard technology, 
it is called a 3.5G technology. 3GPP standards beyond Release 5 further improve 
the data rate. Release 6 introduces High Speed Uplink Packet Access (HSUPA), 
new antenna array technologies (beam forming and MIMO) and a new uplink 
transport channel. It targets 28.8 Mbps downlink and 5.8 Mbps uplink. HSUPA 
clearly improves the uplink, and is sometimes referred to as 3.75G technology. 
Release 7 introduces evolved High Speed Packet Access (HSPA) or HSPA+. 
The target is 42 Mbps downlink and 22 Mbps uplink. Release 8 and 9 introduce 
-3.0
-2.0
-1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
N
P
V
 (M
€
)
year
Game Theory Methodology to Model Competitive Interaction 203 
 
Long Term Evolution (LTE) and the Evolved Packet Core (EPC). LTE promises 
peak rates up to 100 Mbps in downlink and 50 Mbps in uplink. 
Femtocells 
A femtocell is a small cellular base station designed for indoor use. It connects to 
the service provider’s network via the customer’s broadband connection instead 
of connecting via the local mast. So no additional costs for site deployment 
occur. A femtocell typically supports two to five mobile devices in a residential 
setting [6.16].  
Femtocells are able to provide exceptional cellular service with a typical 
coverage range of tens of meters. For a mobile network operator (MNO), 
femtocells are attractive, since they can significantly increase the achievable data 
rates on its mobile network at the customer’s property. This is very interesting 
since delivering high-quality mobile services inside buildings is on one hand a 
tough challenge for 3G because it uses higher frequency bands where radio 
signals attenuate more rapidly. On the other hand fast data rates are only possible 
with a strong signal. Individual connections to the femtocell offload traffic from 
the macrocellular network, thereby improving network quality for the remaining 
users [6.17]. 
We consider the extension of  the macrocell 3G (or 3.5G / 3.75G) network of an 
MNO with femtocells installed by a fixed network operator at the customer side. 
The fixed network operator then provides access to its customers through both 
femto- and macrocells (having agreements with the MNO for the latter), and is 
acting as an MVNO. The used release of the 3G technology will depend on the 
network of the MNO. 
Cost model 
For the introduction of 3G femtocells, four scenarios were developed. In each 
scenario, the MVNO chooses a different subsidisation rate of the femtocells. 
Typically, an operator can choose to either charge the customer for the femtocell, 
or it can buy the femtocell itself, and charge the customer an extra subscription 
cost. A summary of the different scenarios can be found in Table 6-4. The 
operator will need to finance all or a percentage of the femtocell costs, depending 
on the chosen scenario. After five years, these femtocells are replaced by new 
ones. 
For the deployment of a 3G femtocell network, there are also important network 
investments required in core equipment. A femtocell gateway needs installation 
and integration with the existing back office systems. An operator will typically 
opt for a nationwide rollout of closed access 3G femtocells. To assure 
comparability with the municipal WiFi rollout, these costs are scaled down to the 
municipal level. All costs are based on [6.11]. A detailed cost revenue 
breakdown can be found in Figure 6-7. 
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Table 6-4: Different 3G subsidisation scenarios 
Service Subsidisation 
Monthly 
subscription fee 
1) Full subsidisation scenario 100% € 20 
2) 50% subsidisation scenario 50% € 18 
3) No subsidisation scenario 0% € 16 
4) Combinatory scenario Combination Weighted average 
 
Again, OpEx needs to be considered too. Next to the recurring maintenance, a 
cost for the additional usage of the fixed line connection of the customer is 
included based on [6.18]. For the maintenance cost of the core equipment, a 
fractional approach of the total CapEx is used, as done by [6.19]. 
Unlike the WiFi network case, a mobile licence is necessary for the 3G network. 
The cost is influenced by the channel bandwidth, population and the number of 
BSs. A fixed annual cost per customer per year is included [6.11]. 
To assure comparability with the WiFi case, the same model for the promotion 
and helpdesk costs is used. The marketing cost is put lower. Since the 3G 
operator deploys a nationwide network, it can benefit from economies of scale. 
Revenues 
As this player is considered to be a private player, only direct revenues are taken 
into account here. The first three subsidisation scenarios are straightforward. 
Scenario 4 offers flexibility to the customer. In the first years, with high prices 
for femtocells, customers will opt for leasing the femtocell. For example, in the 
first year, 80% of customers will choose for a lease agreement. With femtocell 
prices dropping fast, customers will become aware of cost benefits when buying 
their own femtocell. In 2019, it is expected that only 20% of the customers will 
choose for the femtocell leasing model. 
The operator offers closed access femtocells. This opens up possibilities to offer 
enhanced services, like virtual home numbers or SMS alerts. Not all users will 
show the same interest in these services. Mostly families with teenagers will be 
interested in additional services. Therefore, additional revenues for extra services 
of €5.20 are only added for families with three or more members [6.20]. This 
comes down to about 40% of all households in Belgium. 
In contrast with the WiFi case, one femtocell per household is needed. The 
number of adopting inhabitants is divided by the average household size in 
Ghent, being 2,10. For business users, a distinction between small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) and large enterprises is made. For SMEs, which account for 
85% of all businesses, two femtocells per business suffice. Large enterprises, 
with over 100 employees, are covered with 20 3G femtocells. 
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Figure 6-7: Cost and revenue breakdown for 3G femtocell network deployment 
Investment analysis 
The investment analysis is carried out the same way as for the WiFi operator. 
The NPV evolution of all four scenarios can be found in Figure 6-8. All 
scenarios have a positive payoff, with a payback time around two years. This is 
considerably shorter than the payback period for the WiFi network deployment. 
The case where the operator subsidises 100% is clearly the most profitable, with 
an NPV of almost €6 million after 10 years. 
 
 
Figure 6-8: NPV evolution for a 3G femtocell deployment under different 
subsidisation scenarios 
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6.4.1.c Available strategies under competition 
Up to now, the business cases for both actors were considered in the absence of 
competitive interaction between these players. However, when such networks are 
deployed together in the municipal environment, such interaction must be taken 
into account. When players compete, they can consider several competitive 
strategies. In addition, it should be clearly assessed what the objectives of the 
different actors are. This is where the game theoretic analysis proves very useful. 
In the game, we consider three players, a 3G MVNO, a private WiFi network 
operator and a municipal WiFi network operator, each with several possible 
strategies (Table 6-5). 
The main strategy studied here to attract customers is price change. The WiFi 
player has price schemes based on the offered service. Its strategy will therefore 
be changing its premium subscription price, either up or down. The other 
services are also offered, and their price scales up or down based on the change 
of the high bandwidth service price. For the 3G femtocell player, an extra 
strategic option emerges. Next to changing its premium subscription price, this 
player can choose between different subsidisation rates. In [6.11] the price 
setting strategy was chosen. This work is complemented with the subsidisation 
strategic choice.  
Both WiFi players are offered an extra strategic choice, namely cooperation 
through a PPP. Under this strategy, the four WiFi services are offered by a single 
operator, the PPP. Costs and revenues are adequately shared between both 
players. For the municipality, since it does not have profit, but public welfare as 
its main driver, the non-profit behaviour was added to the business case via the 
indirect revenues concept. As such,  as the municipality acts in the best interest 
for its inhabitants, the strategic decision variable for the municipality in this 
game will be the maximisation of the sum of its payoff and the discounted 
indirect revenues. 
Some additional potential problems need to be tackled before modelling this 
game. State aid is not allowed, so the municipality must invest according to the 
market economy investor principle. Similar to the Amsterdam case, the 
municipality in this model invests 30% of the necessary funds, and reaps 30% of 
the benefits, if any. Similarly, the losses are spread between both partners on a 
30 – 70 basis. This way, state aid issues are avoided. 
The municipality can also choose to rollout an independent network. In this 
situation, its strategies concur with the price strategies of the commercial WiFi 
player. Table 6-5 summarises the different strategies for each player. 
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Table 6-5: Strategic choices for each player in the wireless network rollout game 
Player Strategy Strategic choices 
1 Commercial WiFi Price strategy € 18 - € 21 
2 Municipal WiFi 
Partnership & price 
strategy 
Independent vs. PPP 
€ 18 - € 21 
3 3G player Price strategy 
Subsidisation 
percentage 
 
These strategies result in an asymmetric matrix. Player 1 and 3 both have four 
different options, while Player 2 has five. The resulting payoff matrix can be 
found in Table 6-6. It can be concluded that the municipality will choose for a 
PPP with the commercial player. This strategy is strictly dominant for the 
independent strategic choice. Using strict dominance, the Nash equilibrium 
[0.05;1.56;1.10] can be derived. It is indicated in negative in Table 6-6. The 
municipality should always choose to partner with a commercial player. The 
impact of other adoption choices on the NE was also checked. Both a lower and 
a higher adoption resulted in the same equilibrium being chosen, even with 
adoption curves not only differing by a multiplicative factor. Therefore it can be 
concluded that the results are not impacted by the adoption choices made. 
When the NE is analysed for the other players, it is clear that it is also in the best 
interest for the commercial WiFi player to engage in this PPP. Direct 
competition with the municipality would result in a negative business case, while 
the PPP offers a slightly positive payoff for the commercial player. Due to this 
minimal result, the reasons for the commercial player to engage in this PPP could 
be questioned. Non profit related incentives for the commercial player would be 
brand image, customer satisfaction or reduced churn. The municipality could 
also offer extra advantages to the private player, like free site access or backhaul, 
so both players benefit from the partnership. However, it should be checked if 
these advantages offered comply with state aid regulation. 
The 3G player will, in contradiction with the results of the static business case 
analysis, not choose for the full subsidisation scenario. When this player lowers 
its monthly subscription prices, it gains extra market share that compensates the 
lower profit margins.  
From these results, it is clear that a game theoretic analysis offers more detailed 
insight in the price setting game played by all players. A naive player would 
choose to fully subsidise the 3G femtocells, while it is clear that this strategy 
does not result in the highest payoff.  
A price war behaviour was also noticed in the game theoretic analysis. The 
equilibrium consists of the lowest price for the premium service. The WiFi 
players have an intention to keep lowering their prices, to capture extra market 
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share. Continuously lowering prices would result in negative profit margins, 
which is forbidden by national and European legislation. Too low prices 
compared with other, mainly fixed services, offered by the commercial player, 
could result in an increase churn from fixed towards mobile access, shifting part 
of the resources to the mobile market. 
6.4.1.d Case conclusions 
A lot of attention is going to city-wide wireless access networks, since they 
promise to bring ubiquitous broadband access together with a broad range of 
advantages, like a stimulus for economic growth and extra employment. 
However, the rollout of these networks is only taking off slowly. By 
investigating the prevailing cooperation and competition models between WiFi 
and 3G players in a realistic competitive environment, we show how the 
application of game theory on a realistic case fits these observations.  
The strategic behaviour of a public authority and commercial operators when 
they choose to invest in a wireless next generation access network (NGAN) is 
researched. Detailed numerical techno-economic models for the different players 
were developed, which all showed to be profitable when a standard techno-
economic investment analysis was performed. However, this analysis cannot 
capture the impact of competition on the different business cases. Using a game 
theoretic approach to model this competitive environment, the cooperation and 
competition between the different players was studied. The model clearly 
showed that when the WiFi players roll out the network simultaneously and 
independently in this environment, their business cases are not profitable. 
Duplication of infrastructure while only attracting half of the customer base 
impacts the viability. Using the Nash equilibrium concept from game theory, it 
was proven that a public private partnership (PPP) is the only possible 
cooperation model for public and commercial WiFi players to roll out a city-
wide wireless access network. An additional result from this analysis is the 
different strategy chosen by the 3G MVNO. The best scenario found in the static 
analysis proves to be the least interesting choice in the competitive setting. While 
the static analysis suggest to choose for the highest monthly subscription price, 
the game theoretic analysis shows that the higher market share gained by a lower 
subscription price offsets the lower revenues per customer. It is clear that game 
theory offers valuable insight to decision makers for investment analysis 
compared to the static NPV analysis. 
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Table 6-6: Strategic form for partnership scenario, dominant strategies in 
negative (NPV in M€, lifetime of 10 years) 
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In [6.1], the impact on the strategic behaviour of the different players when extra 
competition enters the market was also studied. While a PPP was shown to be 
the only prevailing strategy for the WiFi operators, the market reaction when 
extra 3G players enter the market were investigated. The extra competition poses 
problems for the WiFi partnership, since its market share is reduced further. 
Building further on the game theoretic model, a new strategic game was 
developed with extra 3G players competing for the market share with the PPP. 
Although the payoff in equilibrium state for the entire PPP remained positive, it 
was shown that the return for the commercial player in the PPP becomes 
negative, thereby completely removing its incentive to participate in the 
partnership. No intention to either rollout an independent or a joined WiFi 
network remains. These findings fit the overall observation that the rollout of 
municipal wireless networks remains slow.  
6.4.2 FTTH rollout in a competitive environment 
In the first case, competition between wireless broadband access providers were 
studied. As a public player, a municipality, was included, it was required to 
correctly capture its objectives. Its objective function consisted of the costs 
related to network deployment and operations, and both direct and indirect 
revenues were monetised and included in the NPV analysis. However, in Chapter 
3, we introduced the broadband performance index as a ranking tool for 
comparing different outcomes when measuring social objectives. In the second 
case example, we will show how a game theoretic analysis can also be performed 
for regulatory problems, applied to the rollout of a municipal FTTH access 
network. Due to the presence of state aid rules, a municipality is not allowed to 
invest in fibre infrastructures, unless it can prove to have a viable business case. 
Both objectives should thus be checked in the analysis. 
6.4.2.a The municipal competitive environment 
In an urban environment, fixed broadband infrastructures are already present. In 
typical European cities, there is both a cable and DSL network installed. The 
rollout of fibre networks in existing broadband market is thus expected to have 
an impact on the existing market shares and the competitive equilibrium in this 
market, as was shown in Chapter 5. In case the newly deployed fibre network is 
rolled out by a third party, it will compete for retail customers with the legacy 
copper and cable networks. On the other hand, when an incumbent is rolling out 
the network, it will cannibalise on its existing network. As a result, the fibre 
business case is expected to be put under pressure, since lower uptake (and thus 
lower revenues) due to competition can significantly reduce the economic 
viability. We have indicated the effect of competition on uptake in Chapter 5. 
This is being observed in Europe, where the rollout of FTTH networks is only 
occurring slowly, compared with other regions [6.21]. In addition, the actors 
Game Theory Methodology to Model Competitive Interaction 211 
 
deploying the infrastructure are mostly not private ones. Typically, public actors 
engage in fibre network rollout. In Sweden, most physical fibre infrastructures 
have been deployed by municipalities (e.g. Stockholm), in the Netherlands, the 
city of Amsterdam has a share of 30% in the fibre deployment company, etc 
[6.22], [6.23]. Their main rationale is that a fibre network has a strong public 
policy case, as it is expected to attract companies, to close the digital divide, 
increase tax income, etc [6.24]. These indirect benefits can justify investment of 
public money in the fibre network deployment.  
However, the investment of public money is bound to regulation. White, grey 
and black areas have been indicated by the European Union, and the investment 
of public money is only allowed in the white areas, where no broadband 
infrastructure is currently available, or planned by private players to be deployed 
within the next three years [6.25]. In the other zones, public money can only be 
invested according to the market economy investor principle. The public player 
invests money, but on the same conditions a private player would. As a result, 
municipal infrastructure providers (MIP) that wish to deploy next generation 
access networks should prove that a viable business case can be obtained for the 
deployment in the municipality. But as was already indicated, competition with 
the existing broadband networks can have a large impact on this viability. It 
should thus be checked how competition impacts both the equipment modelling, 
the financial viability and the social objectives. 
In this case study, it is assumed that an MIP rolls out an FTTH infrastructure, 
and has the possibility to make the policy decision to choose between an open or 
closed network. An open access network allows multiple operators to use the 
network to provide connectivity and services, next to the public network operator 
(NP), while a closed network allows no intra-platform competition, meaning that 
only the public NP is allowed on the network. By choosing for an open access 
model, the municipality can attract the existing players as network providers on 
its newly deployed fibre infrastructure. In case of a closed network, the MIP is 
the only network provider on the fibre infrastructure, attracting more customers 
and their associated revenues. Both choices have their advantages and 
disadvantages. As the MIP can determine the playing field, its strategy can steer 
the outcome of the competitive game. We refer to Chapter 3 for a more in-depth 
description of these different FTTH value network configurations. 
6.4.2.b Players and their available strategies 
The presence of a new, future proof FTTH network offers a range of new 
strategic possibilities to the existing operators, which will in turn impact the 
profitability of the MIP (Table 6-7). With such a dynamic interaction between 
the different strategies, a game theoretic analysis is well suited. Next to allowing 
finding the prevailing competitive equilibrium, the game theoretic analysis will 
also allow to assess the profitability of the MIP under competition. Competition 
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with other infrastructures will negatively impact the adoption. However, 
competition on top of the new fibre infrastructure, so-called intra-platform 
competition, could increase total uptake. Typically, this competitive effect on 
adoption is left out. Some studies have indicated that the adoption of fibre can 
reach 50% within the first five years [6.26]. 
If a passive FTTH infrastructure is rolled out in urban environment in Western 
Europe, three different infrastructures (copper, cable and fibre) are typically 
available to offer broadband access to consumers. However, these three 
infrastructures each offer different possibilities concerning access speeds. 
Without going into more detail on the technical aspects, it can be stated that the 
upgrade possibilities of the copper network towards higher speeds are more 
limited compared to the cable network, whereas the fibre network has almost 
unlimited speed upgrade possibilities, together with the option to offer 
symmetrical speeds [6.27]. Current copper networks could upgrade towards 
higher download speeds (up to 100Mbps) using advanced techniques like 
vectoring and shadowing. However, these download speeds are very dependent 
on the quality of the copper cables, and the distances between the street cabinets 
and the households. The deployment of an FTTH network could thus put large 
pressure on the market shares of the operators offering broadband through the 
copper network. 
Table 6-7: Players and their possible strategies in a competitive fixed access 
network environment 
Player Strategic choices 
1 Incumbent 
Stay on copper infrastructure 
Migrate as ANP to fibre infrastructure 
Deploy own fibre network 
2 MIP (PIP + NP) 
Open access network 
Closed access network 
3 Copper ANPs 
Stay on copper infrastructure 
Migrate to fibre infrastructure 
 
Taking this into account, the incumbent has various possible strategies to react to 
the presence of a fibre infrastructure. The first strategy is continuing to use its 
legacy copper network, and compete with the other operators through more 
aggressive pricing. Additionally, as the copper incumbent has a significant 
market share on the retail market, lock-in effects could assure that their market 
share only decreases slowly. However, in case the newly deployed fibre network 
is an open access network, nothing withholds the copper incumbent to formulate 
a fibre broadband offer. In this case, they can buy wholesale access from the 
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MIP, and offer broadband access to customers using these leased fibres as 
alternative network provider (ANP). This way, the operator can even formulate a 
differentiated offer, by continuing to offer broadband access through the copper 
network. As a third strategy, the incumbent operator can also choose to deploy 
its own fibre network. Here, it needs to be taken into account that when 
deploying its own fibre network, the operator can engage in a joint infrastructure 
rollout with the MIP, as was described in Chapter 5 [6.28]. The total cost of the 
deployment will be decreased for both the incumbent and the MIP, thereby 
improving their business case. 
Existing ANPs do not have their own passive network infrastructure and depend 
on leasing offers. For these ANPs, the emergence of an open access fibre 
infrastructure offers them the opportunity to switch to this offer to provide retail 
services to consumers. This gives them the possibility to offer higher speeds to 
their customers. On the other hand, continuing to buy wholesale access from the 
incumbent’s copper network remains a strategic option. This offer will typically 
be cheaper than the fibre offer, and no customer migration and related equipment 
installation would be required. 
Up to now, the municipal fibre network was assumed to be an open access 
network. Although this might be the preferred choice for the municipality, an 
open access network comes with additional cost during the deployment phase. In 
order to increase profitability, the MIP could decide to allow only no additional 
ANPs on its network. In this case, the copper incumbent and ANPs will not be 
able to buy wholesale access on this network. 
Since the cable operator has a strong presence in Belgium, this player was also 
taken into account. In order not to overcomplicate the game theoretic analysis, 
the cable operator was modelled as a passive player in the market model from 
Chapter 5. 
6.4.2.c Business models for competitors 
To conduct the game theoretic analysis, several quantitative models are required 
for each strategy of all players. For the incumbent, a techno-economic model is 
developed for when he stays on the legacy copper network, switches to the MIP 
fibre network as ANP and as infrastructure owner when he rolls out his own fibre 
network. In the last case, he can profit from cost reductions if he engages in a 
joint rollout with the MIP. For the existing ANPs, a model for copper ANP and 
fibre ANP is built. Finally, for the MIP, there is a model for an open and closed 
fibre access infrastructure, covering a PIP and NP player. In the following 
sections, these models will be described in more detail. For the quantitative 
analysis, input information for the city of Ghent was used.  
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Fibre based models 
For a description of the MIP and ANP models, we refer to Van der Wee et al. 
[6.29]. This model consists of an equipment dimensioning for the entire network, 
driven by customer uptake. This model was introduced in Chapter 2, Figure 2-7 
and Figure 2-8. Additionally, the total required trenching, ducts and fibre length 
was calculated using GIS based models. A comparable model was built for the 
synergetic rollout, taking the cost savings in the rollout phase into account. This 
synergetic rollout occurs in case both the incumbent and MIP roll out a fibre 
network. Our research has indicated cost savings up to 15% for the initial 
trenching [6.28]. 
Incumbent models 
The copper incumbent model is based on two different submodels, namely a 
wholesale model and a retail model. In the wholesale model, the costs and 
revenues the incumbent incurs from offering access to ANPs are calculated. 
However, since these regulated wholesale access prices are based on a Long Run 
Incremental Cost calculation, the revenues the incumbent gains from the ANPs 
should cover the costs. 
For the retail model, the cost is based on the bitstream access prices, 
supplemented with a cost for service provisioning. Additionally, an extra cost to 
connect a new customer is included. The revenue model is based on the monthly 
subscription price per customer. 
In case the incumbent decides to roll out its own fibre network, the used model is 
comparable to the MIP model. 
ANP copper access model 
Comparable to the incumbent copper model, the ANP copper access model is 
based on a simplified cost-benefit model, starting from the existing regulated 
access prices. Per customer, the ANP pays a monthly price to the incumbent. 
Again, extra costs were taken into account for service provisioning and customer 
connection. The revenue model simply multiplies the number of customers with 
the yearly income. 
6.4.2.d Game theoretic analysis of inter-platform competition 
The different strategies for all players were introduced above. However, not all 
strategic combinations are possible. For example, in case the municipal operator 
opts for a closed network, neither the ANPs, nor the incumbent can migrate to 
this fibre network. In the analysis, this was modelled by reducing the adoption of 
these offers to zero in these specific cases. As a result, the business case analysis 
of the players resulted in a minus infinity payoff. This ensures the specific 
strategy is not chosen in equilibrium. 
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To model the market shares of the different offers, the market model based on 
general economic parameters like price elasticity of demand and cross-price 
elasticity is used. Feeding the service offer prices into the model results in a 
market share evolution for all offers over time, which in turn drives consumer 
driven equipment installation. The monthly retail prices for the different offers 
can be found in Table 6-8. The prices for the different offers were based on the 
current market prices in Belgium, and the prices for fibre based broadband in 
Europe [6.26]. 
The impact of inter-platform competition on the business cases of the different 
players is checked, if customers are willing to pay a premium for higher speed 
(Table 6-9). 
An example of the market division can be found in Figure 6-9. The strategic 
combination played by the different players in this market model is the 
following. The copper incumbent deployed his own fibre network, and the ANPs 
migrated to the municipal fibre network, which is an open access type network. 
Different conclusions can be drawn from this figure. First, due to the extra 
infrastructure in place, the market share of the existing operators (both cable 
operator and incumbent legacy) decreases significantly. Additionally, due to the 
switch off of the ANPs legacy buying copper wholesale access, this market share 
is decreasing gradually. Finally, three new offers attract broadband services, 
namely the municipal fibre offer (MIP), the ANPs fibre on top of the municipal 
physical infrastructure, and the incumbent offering fibre based access on its own 
network (Incumbent fibre). Due to the small difference in price between these 
last three offers, the impact on their total market share is negligible. Of course, 
this is mainly caused by the low price sensitivity of customers for broadband, 
which was set at -0.05 per euro difference [6.30]. As such, an offer that is priced 
€1 per month more expensive attracts 5% less market. 
Table 6-8: Monthly retail prices for the different broadband offers 
Offer Monthly ARPU (€) 
Incumbent copper 30 
ANP copper 29 
Cable 32 
Incumbent fibre 55 
Municipality fibre 52 
ANP fibre 52 
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Figure 6-9: Market division on the broadband market under competition 
 
Table 6-9: Perceived broadband quality measured in download speed 
Offer Speed (Mbps) 
Incumbent copper 20 
ANP copper 20 
Cable 30 
Incumbent fibre 60 
Municipality fibre 60 
ANP fibre 60 
 
6.4.2.e Impact of competition on the business cases 
The main question that rises from the market division figure is about the 
profitability of an FTTH deployment. The network needs to be deployed towards 
all households and comes with a significant investment cost. With uptake only 
reaching 16% after 20 years (see Figure 6-9), it is to be expected that this will 
not be an economical viable project. It has been shown that for a MIP, an uptake 
of 30% after 5 years was required to result in a close to break-even business case 
after 20 years [6.26]. The same holds for the FTTH roll out by the incumbent 
operator. Two competing fibre infrastructures would each attract about 16% 
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market share, which is insufficient to result in a positive business case, even with 
cost savings in the rollout phase taken into account. 
We performed a techno-economic analysis for the case of Ghent. The graphical 
representation of the game can be found in Figure 6-10. The results show the 
NPV for each player after 25 years in million € in the form [Payoff incumbent, 
Payoff Public MIP, Payoff ANPs]. It is immediately clear that under the given 
circumstances, an FTTH rollout is unprofitable in case the municipality chooses 
for a closed network. Even with an open access network, it is required that all 
operators move towards this network to result in sufficient uptake for the MIP to 
have a positive business case. When looking at the rollout of two fibre 
infrastructures, it is clear that this is uninteresting for both infrastructure owners. 
While the municipality might have a strong public policy case justifying the 
rollout, the incumbent operator will not engage in a rollout. The high payoff for 
the incumbent under the two other strategies that can be observed in Figure 6-10 
is driven by its current high market share on the broadband market through its 
copper network. 
 
 
Figure 6-10: Results from inter-platform competition under different strategies (in 
million €) 
 
When analysing the game in more detail, the following conclusions can be 
drawn. The first Nash equilibrium, where no player can unilaterally change his 
strategy to improve his payoff is [STAY – CLOSED - COPPER] (grey negative 
equilibrium in Figure 6-10). In case the municipality chooses for a closed 
network, the incumbent can only choose between two strategies, namely 
deploying his own network, or compete through the legacy copper network. 
However, the latter strategy clearly dominates the fibre deployment option. Also, 
in this case the ANPs can only choose to continue buying access from the 
incumbent. Although this is clearly negative for the business case of the 
municipal fibre network, it is one of the prevailing competitive equilibria. 
The second Nash equilibrium is [MIGRATE – OPEN - FIBRE] (negative 
equilibrium in Figure 6-10). In case of an open access network, the ANPs will 
definitely migrate to the more profitable municipal fibre network. In order to 
retain his market share in the broadband market, the incumbent will also choose 
to migrate towards this municipal fibre network. While this second competitive 
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equilibrium could also result from the free competition between the different 
players, it is also one of the Pareto optimal strategic combinations. In these 
points, no player can change his strategy to improve his payoff, without hurting 
another player. The second Pareto optimal point is depicted in light gray.  
From the techno-economic analysis based on financial objectives for the MIP, it 
may be clear that the municipality can only present the required positive business 
case when he deploys an open access network infrastructure. Even then, it is still 
necessary that the other players on the broadband market formulate an offer on 
this infrastructure to come to this positive business case. However, as the MIP is 
the actor engaging in the network infrastructure rollout, it has the advantage to be 
able to define the playing field. As the game theoretic analysis indicated, by 
choosing for an open access network, the physical network will attract the ANPs 
as well as the incumbent.  
6.4.2.f Including non-financial objectives 
As a municipality, and in extension any public player, typically does not invest 
in large infrastructure projects from a profit maximisation viewpoint, the analysis 
should not be limited to financial objectives. Their objectives comprise more 
social welfare related aspects, like broadband penetration, acceptable price levels 
or sufficient competition. As was indicate in Section 6.4.1, indirect revenues can 
be applied to measure these social welfare gains. Another approach to model 
these gains was introduced in Chapter 3. By clustering the different objectives in 
a composite broadband performance index, a ranking of several strategic 
situations is possible.  
In order to analyse the impact of competition on these social goals, we repeat the 
game from section 6.4.2.d, but the utility function of the municipality is now 
represented by the composite broadband performance index introduced in 
Chapter 3. The resulting strategic form is presented in  (Figure 6-11). 
 
 
Figure 6-11: Strategic form of broadband market competition including non-
financial objectives 
 
It is clear that using a different utility function impacts the competitive outcome. 
Now, three Nash equilibria prevail. Two remain the same compared to the 
financial goal game, the third is located in the strategic combination [OWN – 
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CLOSED – MIGRATE]. In this case, the NGAN oriented BPI increases due to 
the availability of two fibre infrastructures. However, it should be noted that the 
Pareto optimal points are again located under the open access strategy by the 
municipality, with [MIGRATE – OPEN – FIBRE] again being both a Nash 
equilibrium and a Pareto optimal solution. As a result, the MIP can decide from 
the beginning to open its network, steering the competitive outcome in its 
socially desired solution. 
6.4.2.g FTTH case conclusions 
Rolling out a fibre infrastructure as municipality will happen in the existing 
competitive broadband market. As a result, the new fibre based offers will have 
to compete for market share with existing legacy copper networks and cable 
networks. Additionally, when multiple ANPs are allowed on top of the physical 
infrastructure, intra-platform competition will most likely also impact the 
business case of the fibre infrastructure. 
By modelling a realistic market environment, the previous section indicated how 
market shares of different offers change under the influence of price and quality 
preferences by end consumers. In addition, the strategies from existing and new 
actors on the market will also influence the market division, which in turn 
influence the equipment dimensioning step in the techno-economic analysis. 
Using a game theoretic analysis, this section modelled the dynamic interaction 
between different operators and indicated the prevailing competitive equilibrium.  
In the case study, two equilibria existed in this competitive environment. Either 
the fibre infrastructure was a closed infrastructure, forcing the existing operators 
to stay on the legacy networks. Additionally, in this case the business case for the 
fibre network (MIP+ANP) was unviable. However, the second equilibrium, 
where the MIP opted for an open access infrastructure, resulted in existing 
players migrating to this infrastructure. Now, the total fibre adoption rose from 
20% to 36%, spread out over three ANPs (MIP, ANP fibre and Incumbent fibre). 
As a result, the business case for the infrastructure provider improved 
significantly. This equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium, and could be reached under 
competitive interaction. However, since the municipality not only focuses on 
profitability of the fibre network, but also on social welfare, it should be checked 
if the equilibrium reached using a financial utility function coincides with the 
equilibrium reached using a utility function capturing its social objectives.  
In fact, the equilibrium where all players migrate towards the fibre network is 
reached with both utility function, and is also Pareto optimal, and should thus be 
preferred.  
The municipality can define the playing field when deploying its infrastructure. 
By opening up the physical infrastructure, the municipality can push the other 
actors towards the social optimal situation. In this situation, the payoff for the 
newly deployed fibre infrastructure is positive, while the other operators also 
220 Chapter 6 
 
have a positive business case. No player is inclined to move from this situation, 
as he cannot improve his own result. 
This analysis indicates the importance of conducting a game theoretic analysis 
when investment decisions and policy decisions are considered. Here, the 
analysis was particularly helpful in identifying different problems in the fibre 
business case. First, it showed which strategic combinations resulted in a positive 
payoff for the MIP. This is of high importance, as regulation forbids state aid and 
intervening in areas where broadband infrastructures are already present. 
Secondly, by indicating the different Nash equilibria, one can estimate which 
states could be reached under competition, while Pareto optimality indicates the 
optimal solutions. Thirdly, it offers guidelines for the different players in how to 
optimise their result. Two equilibria could be reached, but only one resulted in a 
positive payoff for the MIP. As this decision maker will typically move first in a 
sequential game, controlling the playing field, the MIP can steer the equilibrium 
in the desired direction. 
6.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter, the importance of including competitive interactions in the 
techno-economic evaluation is described. Game theory analysis in telecom 
typically uses a mathematical approach. However, once realistic techno-
economic problems are considered, the increasing complexity of this 
mathematical approach decreases the applicability for these problems. Therefore, 
we developed a hands-on game theoretic approach, suited for the analysis of 
realistic telecom investment problems. Once more detailed numerical techno-
economic models are used, the hands-on approach is more suited, especially 
since it allows to visualise the game in the strategic form. 
Applying the existing solution concepts, like the Nash equilibrium and Pareto 
optimality to this strategic form allows to identify the impact of competitive 
interaction on the decision making process. This was shown through two case 
studies. The first case researches the deployment of wireless broadband access 
networks in a municipal environment. First, a standard analysis is conducted, 
without taking competition into account. The conclusions derived from this 
standard analysis were proven wrong when competition was added to the 
analysis. Other strategies are followed, and cooperation through a partnership 
with a private player was the most designated strategy. In addition, social 
objectives were monetised with the indirect revenues concept. 
In the second case, social objectives play a major role. The deployment of a fibre 
access infrastructure in the existing fixed broadband market is studied. When a 
municipality rolls out the network, both financial and social objectives are 
measured. Financial objectives are important since regulation prohibits state aid. 
The public investor must present a viable business case. However, social 
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objectives are the main reason for investing in such broadband infrastructures, 
and were measured with the broadband performance index developed in Chapter 
3. When the equilibria are identified with both objectives taken into account, the 
municipality identifies the open network as the most designated, as this 
optimises both financial viability and the social goals. 
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7 
Flexibility and Competition in 
Access Network Rollout 
 “Risk comes from not knowing what you’re doing”, Warren Buffett 
In this dissertation, both flexibility and competitive interactions and their impact 
on the techno-economic decision process were assessed. Flexibility in the 
upgrade path towards higher speeds in the fixed access network or the impact of 
market share on the equipment dimensioning are just two examples. However, 
up to now, these aspects were investigated separately. The final question 
remaining is: How do these concepts interact and influence the techno-economic 
decision making process? How is the access network flexibly upgraded towards 
higher bandwidth, taking into account competitive interaction with other 
infrastructures. 
This is a very important issue, especially since the concepts handed throughout 
this book have sometimes conflicting outcomes. For example, under uncertainty 
and flexibility, the real option theory discussed in Chapter 4 will always push 
towards waiting as long as possible. Waiting decreases the uncertainty, reflecting 
in a better assessment and payoff. On the other hand, one of the concepts of 
game theory is the first mover advantage. Under competition, it is interesting to 
move first to gain a competitive advantage, resulting in a higher utility. Waiting 
with upgrading the access network towards higher speeds will prove valuable 
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under option theory, but when competitors make this upgrade before you, you 
might lose market share. Here, using a different theory will clearly result in a 
diverging decision. The main reason for this diverging result is that both 
frameworks model a different aspect of the techno-economic decision. Real 
options focus on modelling the impact of stochastic uncertainty on the own 
business case, while game theory aims at incorporating strategic interactions on 
the case. 
In this chapter, we will introduce the foundations of an integrated flexibility-
competition framework. By indicating the limitations of this existing framework, 
we will be uncovering future work opportunities in the field of extended techno-
economic evaluation. 
7.1 Is it a strategy or an option? 
One of the questions arising when looking for an integrated options and games 
framework is what the difference between both approaches is. So far, standard 
game theory has not dealt with stochastic dynamics. By their very nature, static 
games do not involve such a problem, while dynamic games are defined in a 
deterministic environment. On the other hand, real option analysis makes 
abstraction of the effect of strategic interaction while taking stochastic 
uncertainty into account. As both approaches tackle a different problem, decision 
makers can benefit from explicitly incorporating flexibility and commitment 
together. Real options identify flexibility options in the future course of the 
project, while game theory is built around the different strategies. However, the 
difference between an option and a strategy is not that clear. When is an action 
classified as an option, when as a strategy? Is the migration towards a Fibre to 
the Home (FTTH) network lifting an option, or a strategy to attract more 
customers? The answer to this question can offer an indication to which 
framework should be used to analyse the case. However, the answer is not 
straightforward and very case dependent. Some guidelines can be handed to 
identify the designated approach, as both approaches model different aspects. 
When the decision is likely to impact the competitive interaction, it is a strategy, 
and game theory should be used. On the other hand, if there is no such or only 
limited interaction and the decision does not need to be taken today, it should be 
handled as an option. 
For example, the rollout of a new access network infrastructure as described in 
the previous chapter has a clear impact on the market. The new infrastructure 
installed will churn on the market share of the existing operators, and the 
competitive impact is the major aspect in the case. On the other hand, when the 
operator already has an infrastructure, and if a gradual upgrade of the network is 
not expected to influence the market that much, the possible different follow-up 
investments are worth investigating through a real option analysis. This 
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especially holds when the decision can be postponed into the future, linking it 
back to the timing condition for a real option analysis. 
However, the difference is not always that clear, and dependent on the gut 
feeling of the decision maker. Or the problem is a combination of two aspects. In 
case a mobile network operator acquires a licence, he has to take into account 
both aspects when making the techno-economic analysis. There exists 
uncertainty surrounding customer uptake and technological performance, in 
combination with strategic interaction with other operators. An integrated 
framework can offer more insight in the interaction between options and games. 
In the following sections, we will indicate two approaches combining options 
and games. 
7.2 Option games – integrating option and game 
theory 
Option games have been introduced a few years ago as a framework for an 
integrated real option-game theory approach [7.1], [7.2], [7.3], [7.4]. This 
framework can provide valuable insight in problems like optimal investment 
timing and the trade-off between flexibility and commitment. In practice, these 
problems are analogue, as investment timing is closely linked with commitment. 
7.2.1 Option games background 
As the name states, option games combine the concepts of real options, based on 
uncertain future evolutions, and game theory, which relies on strategic 
interaction. As such, it is a hybrid model, overlaying the traditional payoff matrix 
with real option binomial trees. The binomial tree is used to represent the 
uncertain evolution of the project value, while two-by-two matrices are modelled 
at the end nodes of this tree to capture the competitive interactions between the 
two players. As the option games concept is more difficult to grasp from a 
theoretical description, we indicate how they work through an illustrative 
example case. 
Consider a duopoly with two firms, each having an option to invest. Linking 
back to the case studies described in the previous chapters, these two firms can 
be the DSL incumbent and the cable operator, each having the option to invest in 
an FTTH network. Both firms share the option to invest, and for simplicity, it is 
considered that the option expires within two years. This expiration can for 
example be linked with the expiration of the right of way of the operator. 
However, while such a precondition might not typically exist and is artificially 
introduced in this case on the fixed broadband access market, the expiration of 
the option is more frequent in the mobile market. The example case study in 
Chapter 6 introduced competition between wireless operators. Here, we consider 
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two operators operating their network in the licensed spectrum. Operators can 
obtain a wireless licence, under the precondition that they start with the rollout of 
a network operating this licence within the next two years. However, the 
evolution of the monthly retail prices is uncertain. It may be clear that examples 
of investment decisions where option games can prove valuable do exist on the 
telecom market. We will name the two firms in our case Champion and 
Challenger. 
On the mobile broadband market, the uncertainty identified by both firms is the 
future price evolution, or thus the average revenue per user (ARPU) the company 
can gain. The binomial tree in Figure 7-1 depicts this expected price evolution. 
The price is expected to go up or down with a multiple of 10%. However, the 
probability of an up or down move is not equal. The probability of the price 
going up is 40%, and there is a 60% chance of prices going down. After two 
years, we expect the price level to stabilise (Figure 7-2). The investment project 
considered has an expected lifetime of 10 years. Again, this can be closely linked 
to the lifetime of the wireless licence. Both firms thus face the same question: To 
Invest or Not to Invest in the deployment of a wireless network? 
 
 
Figure 7-1: Expected price evolution 
 
 
Figure 7-2: Probability of price evolution 
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invest in a new nationwide mobile network, and thus faces two main 
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will enter the market with a similar network. We assume that in the region 
considered, the mobile market is saturated, with one million subscribers. To 
install its new network, Champion requires an initial investment outlay of €500 
million in the year it decides to invest. Additionally, a variable cost of €480 per 
customer is expected. The project of Challenger is quite similar. For this project, 
the initial investment outlay is only €350 million, but it faces higher variable 
costs of €520. These differences can be driven by different factors. The initial 
investment can be lower due to government stimulus to increase competition on 
the mobile market. Easy site access for new entrants, or regulated access to the 
sites of Champion or just two possibilities. The higher variable cost can be 
driven by the need for higher customer acquisition costs, or the absence of 
synergies with other products on the market. 
When the investment decision is considered, different scenarios exist (Figure 
7-3). Indeed, both firms have different possibilities as they can invest now, wait 
and invest within two years, or even completely abandon the project and let the 
option expire. In case a player decided to wait, they can still decide to invest at 
maturity, after two years. However, this results in a cost of waiting, namely lost 
revenues for the first two time periods. As such, four distinct scenarios can be 
distinguished at start date. In the first scenario, both firms invest today. In 
scenario two and three, only one firm invests now, while the other waits and can 
still decide to invest at maturity. In scenario four, both actors wait and postpone 
the decision to invest for two years. We will go into detail on all scenarios. 
 
 
Figure 7-3: Investment scenarios in mobile network rollout 
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no player will serve the entire market. For simplicity reasons, we assume that 
each player captures 50% of the market if both are present. In reality, a more 
advanced market modelling should be used, e.g. the market response model from 
Chapter 5. Per customer, the company gains the ARPU at the specific node, 
minus the variable costs. In case of a mobile network, this can be energy 
consumption to serve connections, operational processes like billing, etc. For 
example, in the upper node at Y3 in Figure 7-1, Champion will gain €246, while 
Challenger only gets €206 per customer. The same rationale can be followed for 
each node. As a result, Champion gains €123 million in Y3 if this node is 
reached. However, remember that the project had a lifetime of 10 years. In Y4 to 
Y10, the same payoff will be gained. As such, these payoffs should be added to 
the calculation. This is performed through the terminal value (TV) concept. The 
payoffs are discounted with the risk-free interest rate of 5% and summed up. The 
resulting payoff tree for Champion and Challenger can be found in Figure 7-4 
and Figure 7-5, with the TV included in the payoff of the nodes of Y3. 
To calculate the final payoff for both firms, the annual cash flows must be 
weighted with the probabilities from Figure 7-2 and discounted with the discount 
rate. When adding up all numbers, we get the final expected payoff in Y0 for 
both firms when they invest today. 
 
 
Figure 7-4: Cash flow evolution prediction for Champion if both invest 
 
 
Figure 7-5: Cash flow evolution prediction for Challenger if both invest 
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When this analysis is conducted, a final payoff of €-99.5 million for Champion 
and €-104 million for Challenger is obtained. In case both firms invest today, 
both end up losing money. 
7.2.1.b Scenario 2: Champion invest and Challenger waits 
In the second scenario, the case when only Champion invests is analysed. As 
Champion is the only investor in Y0, it is the sole player active on the market 
during the first two years. In the second year, Challenger decides if he invests, 
based on the node reached at this year. As such, it can be expected that 
Challenger will only invest if the price evolved favourably.  
In the first step, we start by calculating the expected payoff for Challenger in the 
end nodes. In Y2, Challenger makes the initial investment outlay of €350 
million. From Y3 on, the company claims 50% of the market, with an ARPU 
depending on the price evolution from Figure 7-1. The resulting cash flows are 
depicted in Figure 7-6. Only in case the upper price node is reached will 
Challenger gain a positive payoff for its project (€286 million). In the two other 
nodes, the project is not economically interesting for Challenger, and it will not 
invest. As such, it’s payoff in those nodes is €0. Combining these payoffs with 
the probabilities from Figure 7-2 results in an expected payoff for Challenger of 
€46 million.  
 
 
Figure 7-6: Expected cash flows of Challenger when investing in Y2 
 
Having in mind that Challenger will only invest in Y2 if the upper price node is 
reached, Champion can make its investment analysis for its investment today. As 
it is the sole player in Y1 and Y2, and from Y3 to Y10 in the two lower price 
nodes, it attains 100% market share in these scenarios. Only in the upper node, it 
has 50% market share, as Challenger decides to invest if that node is reached. 
The market shares of Champion can be found in Figure 7-7. 
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Figure 7-7: Market share evolution of Champion in scenario 2 
 
Obviously, the decision of Challenger not to invest has a large impact on the 
investment viability of Champion. This is clearly reflected in the cash flows 
estimates (Figure 7-8). Weighing these cash flows with the price evolution 
probabilities results in an expected payoff for Champion of €186 million. In this 
scenario, Champion is thus better off to invest today, in contrast with the 
previous scenario. 
 
Figure 7-8: Expected cash flows for Champion in scenario 2 
7.2.1.c Scenario 3: Challenger invests, Champion waits. 
The analysis of this scenario is comparable to the description in the previous 
paragraph. Now, it is first assessed in which price nodes Champion will decide to 
invest in Y2. Like Challenger in the previous scenario, Champion only reaches a 
positive payoff under high price, resulting in an expected payoff of €42.8 
million. 
Next, the impact of Champion’s decision on the case for Challenger is assessed. 
The market share evolution for Challenger is equal to the one of Champion in the 
previous section (Figure 7-7). The expected payoff for Challenger is €46 million. 
7.2.1.d Scenario 4: Both firms wait 
This fourth scenario, where both firms postpone their investment decision, is the 
most interesting one from an analysis point of view. For each price node, it needs 
to be assessed what decision the firms will make: investing or abandoning the 
project. Four subscenarios exist in the price nodes. Either both companies invest,  
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Figure 7-9: Expected payoffs for all nodes in scenario 4 
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no-one invests or only one company invests, while the other abandons the 
project. We will elaborate the upper price node for these four subscenarios.  
In the first subscenario, both firms invest in Y2. The investment analysis can be 
conducted in a similar way as in section 7.2.1.a. This results in an expected 
payoff of €281 million for Champion and €301 million for Challenger. In the 
three other subscenarios, when a player abandons, its payoff is €0. If the other 
firm does invest, its payoff is calculated as above. As a result, for the upper price 
node, a strategic form is obtained (Figure 7-9). Using the Nash equilibrium 
concept, the equilibrium is reached when both firms invest. In the upper node, 
the expected payoff for the firms is thus €281 million for Champion and €301 
million for Challenger. For the two other price nodes, a comparable analysis is 
made. Again, a strategic form is obtained at these nodes, where the Nash 
equilibria obtained represent the expected payoff for each player. A special case 
occurs in the middle price node. Here, two equilibria are obtained. There exist 
theories on how to determine the favoured equilibrium, but for the purpose of 
simplicity, we assume two roughly symmetrical firms, resulting in an equal 
chance that either equilibrium will prevail. This results in a payoff of €125 
million for Champion (= 50% * 250 + 50% * 0). 
To obtain the expected payoff for each player in the fourth scenario, where both 
players wait to decide until Y2, the outcomes from Figure 7-9 are weighed with 
the probabilities, resulting in a result of €105 million for Champion and €84 
million for Challenger. 
7.2.1.e Bringing the results together 
Recall that four scenarios were identified in the investment case. Both players 
had two strategies, investing or waiting. As such, the results for the four 
scenarios can again be combined in a strategic form (Figure 7-10). When solving 
this game for the Nash equilibrium, we obtain the strategies each player will play 
at Y0. The equilibrium is highlighted. According to the solution, the Champion 
should move now and pre-empt the Challenger, while the Challenger is better off 
postponing its investment. By waiting, Challenger can gain extra insight in the 
price evolution and only enter when this evolution is favourable. 
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Figure 7-10: Time-zero strategic form for the investment decision 
7.2.2 Advantages and drawbacks of option games  
The application of option games provides very valuable insight, as it manages to 
combine real option insight with the tools from game theory. When a traditional 
NPV analysis would have been conducted in the example above, assuming that 
the company invests and the other company never enters the market, the 
calculation results a positive payoff for both players (if both made the analysis 
independently). Performing this analysis would suggest that both players invest 
now. As is clear from the option games analysis, this strategic combination 
would lead to high losses for both players in reality. When comparing option 
games to the traditional real options, as real option analysis typically attributes 
value to waiting, performing this analysis would push both players towards 
postponing their investment, which again is contradicted by the option games 
analysis performed above. As the option games framework takes the impact of 
competition into account, and the probabilistic evolution of an uncertain 
parameter, it manages to make the trade-off between commitment and flexibility 
for both players. 
The example above is based on option games in discrete time. Extensions have 
been proposed to allow for an application of option games in continuous time, 
but these result in an increase of complexity of the analysis [7.4]. In addition, as 
these continuous time models have a broad mathematical basis, the readability of 
the models decreases significantly. 
In addition, as a binomial tree is used to model the uncertainty aspect of the 
option game, similar drawbacks as those introduced in Chapter 4 for traditional 
real options emerge. In reality, actors are confronted with continuous uncertainty 
of multiple parameters. The combination of these drawbacks, high complexity  
for realistic cases and the limitations of the binomial tree method make option 
games in our opinion less suited for everyday application in techno-economic 
problems. As such, we propose another extension to options and game theory, 
which we believe can offer new insights and increase the application of a 
combined option-game thinking in techno-economics.  
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7.3 Bringing uncertainty into game theory through 
sensitivity games 
The approach we propose to combine options and game theory thinking builds 
further on the hands-on approach introduced in Chapter 6. By extending the 
game theory framework with an integration of the three conditions for a real 
option analysis (see Chapter 4), an integrated framework can be built.  
This extension has already been developed for the uncertainty condition, and will 
be discussed in the next section. The two other conditions, flexibility and timing, 
will be discussed qualitatively and form the basis of future work. 
7.3.1 Incorporating uncertainty 
In Chapter 4, uncertainty was identified as the first condition to allow for a real 
option analysis. Thus, incorporating uncertainty in the underlying techno-
economic models of the players in the game theoretic analysis is the first step 
towards an integrated flexibility-competition framework. 
Capturing uncertainty is a straightforward exercise using the hands-on approach 
described in the previous chapter. As the model is built around the strategic form 
of the game, with the underlying techno-economic models integrated in the 
calculation engine, adding uncertainty within these models allows for an 
assessment of the impact of this uncertainty on the analysis. In a sensitivity 
games approach, by repeatedly calculating the game with the changed underlying 
techno-economic models and solving for the Nash equilibrium and Pareto 
optimal points offers an indication of the impact of uncertainty on the game. 
Sensitivity games have already been applied previously to an FTTH access 
network rollout case [7.5]. 
7.3.2 Uncertainty and flexibility in fibre access rollout 
In the previous chapter, we discussed the viability of a fibre access network 
rollout. The rollout of a such a network in an urban environment was assessed to 
be economically viable, even under competitive interaction. More specifically, 
competition even steered the outcome towards the social optimal solution. The 
game theoretic analysis indicated that this is only the case under the assumption 
that the physical infrastructure provider opens the infrastructure for other 
operators. In this case, the existing operators, the DSL incumbent and the 
alternative network providers (ANP) on this DSL network will migrate to this 
fibre infrastructure. 
However, opening the infrastructure for ANPs is not a zero-cost operation. We 
already indicated that providing an open access network requires additional 
equipment. While the decision to open the network may be partially driven by 
regulatory and policy decisions, the impact of this choice on the business case 
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cannot be neglected. Indeed, offering an open access network comes with an 
upfront cost and an additional provisioning cost when a customer connects to the 
fibre network. Linking this back to the real option concepts, the infrastructure 
provider buys the option to offer open access to the end users during the 
deployment phase. Later on, he can offer open access to other players and lift 
this option. 
The effect of this option can already be observed in the game theoretic analysis 
in Chapter 6. We repeat the strategic form here (Figure 7-11). The strategic 
combination [STAY – CLOSED – COPPER] indicates a situation where the 
public MIP did not buy the option for an open access network. Comparing this 
situation with [STAY – OPEN – COPPER], all underlying assumptions are the 
same, apart from the public MIP buying the option to offer open access. As a 
result, its business case payoff decreases significantly, since the MIP bought the 
option, but no other player migrates to its fibre network. Since the option is not 
lifted, due to strategic choices by the other market players, no extra revenues are 
gained. The same result can be seen between the combinations [OWN – 
CLOSED – COPPER] and [OWN – OPEN – COPPER]. Again, the option is not 
exercised, resulting in a significant deterioration of the payoff for the public 
MIP. 
 
 
Figure 7-11: Strategic form of broadband market competition 
 
However, in cases when the option is lifted, a significant improvement of the 
public MIP business case can be observed. In the base scenario, shown in Figure 
7-11, exercising the option, by offering the open access network, clearly pushed 
the other players towards a migration to the fibre network. A twofold reason for 
this behaviour can be given. First, when the option is not exercised, the public 
MIP reduces the possible strategies for the other players. Neither the Telco’s nor 
the ANPs can migrate to a closed network. Secondly, if the option is exercised, 
the uptake of the fibre network is increased, thereby increasing the viability of 
the MIP business case. This can be seen by comparing the COPPER and FIBRE 
strategies in case of an open network.  
It can thus be concluded that in this case, the public MIP profits from buying the 
open access option in the planning phase. By effectively opening its network and 
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exercising the option, the existing players migrate to its network and improve the 
viability of the public MIP’s business case. 
7.3.2.a Cost implications of providing open access 
However, an important remark must be made. Up to now, the impact of 
transaction costs for the public MIP was not taken into account. Transaction 
costs were already introduced in Section 5.2. These have been estimated between 
10 and 20% of the yearly revenue for the MIP, and can thus significantly impact 
the viability of the business case. These transaction costs represent the exercise 
price of the option. 
In case no transaction costs are present, the results from Chapter 6 hold. In order 
to check for the impact of transaction cost, an extreme case was modelled, with a 
transaction cost of 30% for the public MIP. For every customer connecting to the 
physical infrastructure via the Telco fibre or ANP fibre, the monthly revenue of 
the public MIP is reduced with 30%. The results of this analysis are shown in 
Figure 7-12. First, it is important that the transaction costs only have an impact 
on the public MIP. The payoff for the other players remains the same. Indeed, 
since these costs are limited to the public MIP, and are not reflected in the retail 
prices, the market division does not change.  
Secondly, the prevailing equilibriums do not change under transaction cost 
uncertainty. In this sequential game, where the public MIP can make the first 
choice (open or closed network), it remains in its best interest to exercise the 
option of the open access network. Although his viability decreases significantly 
in [MIGRATE – OPEN – FIBRE] due to the transaction costs, it remains the 
most profitable strategic combination from its point of view. 
 
 
Figure 7-12: Impact of transaction costs on infrastructure competition in the 
broadband market 
 
In Figure 7-11 and Figure 7-12, the two extreme cases for the game theoretic 
analysis are shown, but there is a large degree of uncertainty on the height of 
transaction costs for the public MIP.  
This is where the sensitivity game analysis can offer important insights. A 
scanning was performed between the two transaction cost extremes for the 
payoff of the public MIP in the strategic combination [MIGRATE – OPEN – 
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FIBRE] (Figure 7-13). It is clear that the transaction costs have a significant 
impact on the viability of the public MIP business case. Once these costs rise to 
about 13.5% of the monthly revenue per customer, the public MIP business case 
turns negative (Figure 7-14). Again, the transaction costs have no impact on the 
prevailing Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimum. Due to the modelling of the 
transaction costs, the relation between the public MIP payoff and the transaction 
costs is linear.   
 
 
Figure 7-13: Impact of transaction costs on the public MIP business case 
 
 
Figure 7-14: Infrastructure competition with 13.5% transaction cost 
7.3.3 Impact of uncertainty on competition 
Uncertainty about future evolutions of different parameters has a major impact 
on the techno-economic analysis. When this uncertainty is present in a 
competitive environment, sensitivity games offer an easy-to-use approach to 
incorporate the impact of both factors on the analysis. Sensitivity games consist 
of a repeatedly calculation of the strategic form and equilibrium selection with 
different parameters. For each calculation, the underlying techno-economic 
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model, together with the required equipment dimensioning is performed. 
Through this approach, two important aspects of uncertainty impact can be 
identified. The first aspect covers the impact of uncertainty on equilibrium 
selection. In the case presented above, the preferred equilibrium was robust for 
uncertainty on transaction cost. However, this will not always be the case. 
Uncertainty on e.g. customer take-up can push the equilibrium towards a wait-
and-see strategy. This behaviour was observed in [7.5], where uncertainty 
impacted the equilibrium. 
The case study in [7.5] focused on the rollout of an FTTH network in a 
municipal environment. As take rate, and thus competition between operators 
impacts the viability of the business case, the strategic interactions between an 
FTTH network operator and a cable operator was investigated. The rollout of the 
new FTTH network pushes the existing operator towards a more aggressive 
strategy concerning network upgrades. The FTTH operator initially focuses on 
smaller areas and industrial areas. Applying a sensitivity games approach, it was 
indicated that there exists a variation in the prevailing equilibrium under 
uncertainty, although the variation is low. 
The second important insight sensitivity games offer is the impact of uncertainty 
on the individual payoffs of the different competitors. The infrastructure 
competition case in a municipal environment offers a clear indication of this 
impact. Due to uncertainty on certain cost aspects, the payoff in the different 
strategic combinations is impacted differently. This allows for a risk analysis of 
the techno-economic case under uncertainty. 
7.4 Incorporating timing and flexibility in game 
theory 
Flexibility and timing are the two other conditions in order to be able to conduct 
a real option analysis. The hands-on game theory approach from Chapter 6 
analyses the competitive interaction at a given point in time. In order to 
incorporate timing and flexibility, the approach should be extended towards a 
time-dependent game theory approach. We describe this extension here. 
7.4.1 Continuous time games 
Continuous time games describe a game theory analysis of a certain techno-
economic problem over a certain time period. Up to now, the strategic form of 
the game only represents the utility reached at a predefined point in time. For 
example, in the option games section above, the analysis was performed based 
on the payoff gained after ten years. In the sensitivity games example, the result 
at year 25 was used as basis for equilibrium selection. 
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However, in techno-economic problems, these payoffs represent an evolving 
utility over time. At each point in time after choosing a certain strategy, a certain 
payoff will be gained. At the start of the project, this payoff is typically negative, 
but it increases continuously as more customers start buying the product or 
service. Each payoff in fact represents a time function of the utility function 
used.  
When determining the equilibrium in traditional game theory, the selected 
equilibrium is thus dependent on the time horizon selected. In continuous time 
games, an equilibrium should be selected independently of the chosen time 
horizon. A first extension to traditional game theory towards continuous time 
games should thus focus on the evaluation of the competitive interaction on 
different points in time, and how the prevailing equilibrium changes over time. 
We will indicate this with a simple example. Imagine two operators willing to 
invest in a new broadband access network. Basically, both operators have two 
strategies, namely investing or not investing. The payoff function of each player 
when investing is time-dependent and shown in eq. 7.1 and 7.2. 
 
Player 1: 31  tU  (7.1) 
Player 2: 532  tU  (7.2) 
 
At t = 0, the resulting strategic form is the following (Figure 7-15). As only the 
initial investment outlay has been paid and no incoming cash flows are gained. 
The abandon strategy is dominant for both players, resulting in an NE at 
[ABANDON , ABANDON]. In the hypothetical case the game theoretic analysis 
would be performed with a very short time horizon, both players would refrain 
from investing. 
 
 
Figure 7-15: Strategic form of toy example at t = 0 
 
However, with an increasing time horizon, the prevailing equilibrium shifts. At t 
= 2, the resulting strategic form looks like Figure 7-16. Apparently, for a 
somewhat longer time horizon, player 2 is better off investing in the project, 
while player 1 still decides that the project is not economically viable. 
 
INVEST -3 -5 -3 0
ABANDON 0 -5 0 0
Player 1
Player 2
INVEST ABANDON
242 Chapter 7 
 
 
Figure 7-16: Strategic form of toy example at t = 2 
 
If t increases even more, the equilibrium will shift towards [INVEST , INVEST], 
as depicted in Figure 7-17 for t = 4. This simple toy example already indicates 
the time dependency of game theory, and why a continuous time game approach 
would offer valuable insight in the dynamics of the decision making process. 
However, the analysis becomes even more interesting when flexibility is added 
to the process.  
 
 
Figure 7-17: Strategic form of toy example at t = 4 
7.4.2 Options in sensitivity games 
With timing and uncertainty incorporated, players still choose a strategy at t = 0 
and stick with it. Incorporating the impact of the third condition for a real option 
analysis, flexibility, is thus required to come to a hands-on option-games 
approach. At each point in time, the game theoretic analysis should thus allow to 
shift strategy towards the one with the highest additional utility over the 
following time period, taking into account the switching costs. Extending the 
existing game theory toolset with this approach is certainly an interesting topic 
for future work. 
7.5 Conclusions 
The concepts for extended techno-economic analysis introduced in this 
dissertation, real options and game theory, can sometimes have a conflicting 
impact on the outcome, as they model different aspects. Real options model 
stochastic uncertainty and its impact on the techno-economic decision, while 
game theory incorporates strategic interaction with other players. An integrated 
approach combining option and games thinking can resolve this conflict. 
Two approaches were identified to combine flexibility and competition in the 
techno-economic analysis. While option games have been around longer and 
INVEST -1 1 -1 0
ABANDON 0 1 0 0
Player 2
Player 1
INVEST ABANDON
INVEST 1 7 1 0
ABANDON 0 7 0 0
Player 1
Player 2
INVEST ABANDON
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have a broader theoretical background, this approach seems less fit to analyse 
more advanced numerical techno-economic cases. However, they can offer a first 
indication of the impact of both aspects. 
To assess such detailed numerical techno-economic cases, the sensitivity games 
approach is more suited, especially since the hands-on approach can simply 
integrate uncertainty. Extending the sensitivity games approach towards a 
complete option integration, by incorporating both the timing and flexibility 
condition, is an important topic of future work, to build a hands-on approach for 
extended techno-economic analysis under uncertainty and competition. 
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Conclusions and Recommendations 
 “A conclusion is the place where you got tired thinking”, Martin Henry 
Fischer 
Today telecommunication companies act in an increasingly uncertain and 
competitive environment. The introduction of new services, the shortening life 
cycle of telecom solutions, advances in access network technology, changing 
customer taste, increasing bandwidth demand and concentrated markets are all 
aspects of this environment. Within this environment, decision makers constantly 
need to adapt in order to stay in the game.  
Extended techno-economic analysis aims at supporting the decision making 
process for these companies. As a result, flexibility to handle uncertain future 
evolutions and competitive or cooperative interaction have a major impact on 
this analysis. 
The very basis of techno-economic analysis is a clear view on the underlying 
technological requirements of the case under study. The deployment of a fixed 
access network requires a detailed model of the required equipment, fibre, duct 
and trench length. Introducing a mobile network requires insight in base station 
equipment, impact of cell load and line of sight on the cell coverage. Uncertainty 
on user uptake, influenced by competitive interaction or other factors and 
uncertainty on the performance of the new equipment already have their impact 
here.  
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Next, the assessment of the viability of the new service or product needs to be 
made. However, before the viability can be assessed, it should be made clear 
what the objectives of the project are. Not all actors have financial motives, and  
non-financial goals should be taken into account if these are the main objective 
of the actor. For example, the impact of new regulation does not aim at monetary 
value creation, but rather at increasing social welfare. With the objectives clearly 
delineated, the quantitative techno-economic analysis can be conducted. Here 
again, the impact of uncertainty and competition cannot be neglected. User 
uptake drives both revenues and variable costs, and this uptake is uncertain by 
nature. Competitors try to optimally behave in light of your strategy.  
This dissertation explores the additions to the standard techno-economic analysis 
to capture flexibility and competitive interaction, taking into account both 
financial and non-financial objectives. First, the standard approach to techno-
economic analysis is introduced, together with a clear indication of the 
limitations of this approach. In the subsequent chapters, more detail on these 
limitations was provided, together with an approach to overcome the drawbacks. 
We introduced value network analysis as methodology to identify the required 
components for the value proposition, which offers at the same time a clear view 
on the possible competition and cooperation strategies. In addition, we discussed 
a composite indicator to capture policy goals related to the broadband market. 
Next, the impact of uncertainty and flexibility on the techno-economic analysis 
was tackled. We introduced real options as an approach capable of quantifying 
managerial flexibility. To incorporate interactions between different actors, we 
developed a market response model based on elasticity parameters, churn and 
price, together with an overview of possible cooperation strategies and their 
possible synergies. Making the best decision under competition was performed 
using a hands-on game theoretic approach. In the final chapter, we propose an 
integrated framework for capturing both competition and flexibility. Throughout 
the entire dissertation, the different frameworks introduced are applied to a case 
study, the rollout of a broadband access network in a city environment. We 
looked at both Greenfield and Brownfield rollout of a fixed fibre access network, 
thereby referring to the underlying technical models. 
In the remainder of this chapter, we summarise the most important work and the 
main results obtained during our research. We also give a general conclusion and 
offer some directions for future work. 
Measuring non-financial objectives 
The telecom market has been liberalised two decades ago. The main objective 
was to increase competition on the market. On the broadband access market, 
regulation aimed at offering a connection to everyone. Today, focus has shifted 
from having broadband to what is broadband? The European Commission, 
through its Digital Agenda, hopes to achieve by 2020 that everyone has access to 
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a 30Mbps connection, with 50% of customers having a connection of minimum 
100Mbps. When policy makers or regulators make decisions, they clearly not 
aim at maximising their own monetary payoff, but at achieving non-financial 
goals. The Digital Agenda aims at high speeds, large coverage, high uptake of 
services, etc. 
In order to capture these policy goals and assess different regulatory strategies on 
their impact on these objectives, we developed a composite next generation 
access network oriented broadband performance index. We applied this index in 
a variety of cases, to rank different countries on broadband performance, but also 
to assess different policy strategies on their performance. 
Keeping the different factors of such an index up to date is very important. What 
is defined as broadband in the current edition of the index may no longer 
catalogue as broadband within a few years, so the definitions should be 
constantly adapted to reflect the current state of technology and of the market. 
Applying real options in practice 
Real options have been developed almost half a decade ago to capture the value 
of flexibility in economic analysis. But up to now, they are only slowly getting 
accepted within the telecom world. However, real options offer valuable insight, 
not only to the financial department, but also to network planners. The 7S 
framework offers insight in possible flexibilities, and different calculation 
methods can quantify the value of these flexibilities. During our research, we 
have classified techno-economic problems and the flexibility technology offers 
into the real option framework. We have applied real options to different techno-
economic cases, showing their applicability to realistic problems. We applied 
them to sensor network rollout, core network migration and fibre access network 
installation. Resulting from these different case studies, we developed a tutorial 
on how to apply real options to telecom investment problems. 
Modelling customer uptake under competition 
The impact of competitive interaction on techno-economic cases cannot be 
overestimated. Each new network, product or service is introduced in an existing 
market, and will thus notice competition from the existing market players. As 
uptake is an important driver for the viability of techno-economic cases, we 
developed a market response model to estimate market share evolution under 
competition. With this model, based on general accepted parameters like 
elasticity and churn, we were able to adequately model the observed uptake of 
fibre access in the Netherlands. We also applied this model in other cases. In the 
case of a fibre access network rollout, we showed how competition clearly 
reduces expected uptake.  
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 A hands-on game theory framework 
A second aspect of competitive impact is answering the following question: 
What is my best strategy in light of possible competitive strategies? Game theory 
can be used to model this question. Much like real options, game theory has been 
around for a long time, but it has not found its way into mainstream techno-
economic modelling. To increase the uptake of game theory in techno-economic 
decision making, we developed a hands-on game theoretic approach which can 
be applied on detailed techno-economic models. This framework offers the 
possibility to evaluate techno-economic models of different players with 
different strategies and select the prevailing equilibrium. This equilibrium is 
either socially optimal (Pareto) or optimal under competition (Nash). 
This hands-on approach was applied to both wireless and fixed broadband access 
rollout in a city environment. In case of the wireless network, we incorporated 
the cooperative strategy through a public private partnership into the strategy set, 
which is a straightforward exercise using the developed framework. The selected 
equilibrium returned the partnership strategy as being designated, explained by 
the reduction of infrastructure duplication. When a fixed fibre access network 
rollout in a competitive environment was considered, the impact of choosing 
between a closed and open access network was analysed. Here, results showed 
that an open access network is the most interesting strategy, both from financial 
and non-financial perspective.  
Overall conclusion 
Before the introduction of technology breakthroughs, new applications, products 
or services is performed, the viability of this introduction needs to be assessed. 
Typically, a techno-economic analysis is conducted for this assessment. 
However, two impacting factors are to be taken into account in this analysis. 
Increasing uncertainty and competitive interaction in the environment makes 
decision making more difficult. It is therefore important that decision makers 
have the appropriate evaluation tools at their disposal to perform a correct 
techno-economic analysis.  
In this work, we have described and developed different tools to be used in an 
extended techno-economic analysis. We developed a composite indicator to 
measure social objectives of broadband policy makers and regulators, indicated 
how real options can capture managerial flexibility, developed cost sharing 
models for synergetic infrastructure rollout, a market response model to estimate 
uptake under competition and a hands-on game theory framework to evaluate 
detailed numerical techno-economic models. Finally, we described two 
approaches to integrate options and games thinking. 
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Future work 
This work has offered tools to improve the techno-economic analysis on various 
aspects. Within the scope of this research, it is impossible to cover all aspects of 
extended techno-economics. In this section, we will broaden the scope of our 
research towards possible extensions. Some of these extensions were already 
introduced in this dissertation, and form the logical next step.  
A practical integrated options and games framework 
Throughout this dissertation, we introduced real options and game theory to 
incorporate flexibility and competitive and cooperative interaction. However, as 
both frameworks model a different aspect of the techno-economic problem, 
techno-economics can greatly benefit from an integrated framework.  
We described two recent approaches towards an integrated framework. Option 
games overlay the game theory approach with a binomial tree, but it has only 
been applied to toy examples up to now. As a binomial tree overlay is used, we 
believe that research towards incorporating continuous uncertainty into more 
detailed techno-economic models should be performed in the field of option 
games. 
The second approach consists of sensitivity games. These consists of a repeated 
sampling of the same game with different input factors for the underlying 
techno-economic models. The game theory framework we developed during this 
research can offer the basis for the application of sensitivity games, but also for 
an extension towards “sensitive continuous flexible” games. In these type of 
games, each player can at each point in time flexibly change strategies to 
optimise his payoff. Moving towards these games can offer interesting results, 
both from a theoretical and practical point of view. 
Quantifying public policy goals 
To quantify public policy goals, two distinct approaches exist. In this 
dissertation, we applied composite indices to measure and rank the outcome of 
different strategies on these policy goals. However, we already indicated that 
using such indices will always be limited by the definitions used in the index, 
and that an evolving definition of the underlying parameters is required. In 
addition, indices like the broadband performance index developed here are 
bound to subjectivity. The weight factor of the different dimensions need to be 
decided upon, and these weights are very dependent on the actor using the index. 
The second approach consists of monetising the indirect revenues of the project. 
Indirect revenues following an investment can be reduced nuisance, an increase 
in inhabitants, improved quality of life, etc. We touched upon this subject in the 
analysis of the wireless access network rollout by a municipality. There, a 
fractional approach to indirect revenues was used. However, research into a more 
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realistic modelling of these indirect revenues can offer increased detail of the 
analysis. 
Multi-objective analysis 
Multi-objective analysis is the final aspect we would like to introduce as possible 
future work of this dissertation. In this dissertation, two approaches were used to 
analyse multi-objective in the different analyses. The first is a straightforward 
approach, repeating the analysis multiple times, thereby evaluating another 
objective. But which decision needs to be taken when the indicators used have 
conflicting results? For example, fixing copper local loop unbundling prices to a 
lower level will increase the uptake of these services, but might reduce the 
willingness to invest in fibre access networks, as more uptake on copper results 
in lower uptake on fibre. When an actor aims for both objectives, the decision is 
no longer straightforward. 
In a second approach, we integrated the different objectives into a composite 
index. This removes the problem with conflicting outcomes, but as already 
indicated, subjectivity of such indices can pose a problem. 
In a third approach, we could move towards a real multi-objective analysis, in 
which objectives are combined into tuples. Different strategies will form 
different tuples of outcome, and can thus be analysed using the Pareto front 
concept. 
   
 
